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ABSTRACT
The Essays on Election Fraud in Authoritarian Regimes
by
Kirill O. Kalinin
Chair: Walter R. Mebane, Jr.
My dissertation is focused on the exploration of methodological and theoretical aspects
of the statistical detection of election fraud, as well as the development and testing of
theories designed to facilitate our understanding of election fraud and its origin in an
authoritarian regimes. It revolves around three major research questions: “Can the finite
mixture model’s estimates be validated against alternative data sources used to identify
electoral anomalies and determine the magnitude of election frauds?”, “How do specific
patterns in electoral data related to election fraud enable autocrats to identify and re-
ward their most loyal subnational agents?”, and “What is the general mechanism behind
a close match between polls and rigged election results in autocracies?” It fills this ana-
lytic gap by offering two formal models to explain the mechanisms by which autocrats,
local agents, and survey organizations act in the context of the informational uncertain-
ties generated by authoritarian regimes. The formal models help to clarify my core as-
sumptions, build internally consistent theories, and derive valid hypotheses.
My first chapter explores whether election fraud precinct-level estimates obtained
from a finite mixture likelihood model, recently developed by Mebane (2016), can be
validated against alternative, more intuitive measures of election fraud. In this chapter
x
the estimated precinct-level probabilities from the parametric model of election fraud are
compared against measures based on election observation, different voting modes as well
as several forensics indicators. This study also tests how well the new measure matches
our theoretical expectations regarding geographic distribution of election fraud. Here
I utilize propensity score matching, correlation analysis, and election forensics cluster
detection methods. My entire analysis is built on the data from the 2011-2012 Russian
federal elections.
My second chapter focuses on the exploration of how political loyalty of subnational
agents can be associated with election fraud. It introduces a novel theoretical approach
towards understanding election fraud under autocracies by suggesting a signaling model
of election fraud and testing its basic implications on unique datasets from Russian and
cross-national settings. According to the theory, the heads of subnational units can send
their signals about loyalty to the leader by means of fraudulently augmented turnout or
incumbent’s vote percentages. In return, the local agents are rewarded by the leader with
the larger amounts of postelectoral fiscal transfers. Basic implications from the formal
model are supported by empirical data analysis of the Russian and cross-national data.
My third chapter explores whether election fraud can be conducive to the enhance-
ment of electoral credibility in electoral autocracies. It provides an innovative perspective
on the mechanism by which the autocrats in electoral autocracies strategically benefit
from preference falsification, which boosts their own electoral ratings and encourages
perpetration of election fraud. This chapter extends Kuran (1991)’s model by adding to
the model the concept of election fraud. Theoretical implications of the model are tested
on the original survey data collected by the author in Spring 2012 during the Russian
presidential campaign, as well as original cross-national data including 59 countries. My
theory is supported by empirical findings.
A practical consequence that follows from this dissertation is that the theories and
methods presented here can enhance our understanding of election fraud in autocracies
xi





On 18 May, 2012, after walking in the tangled labyrinth of unostentatious state buildings
of Lubyanka district in Moscow, I found myself in front of the green façade of the Central Elec-
tion Commission, with its vigilant federal security officers guarding the entrance. The atmo-
sphere in the country was rather gloomy: a few months earlier, Russia hosted its parliamentary
and presidential elections, which marked the return of Putin to power and spawned massive
protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg amidst numerous allegations of fraud. That year, the
Central Election Commission had been the subject of public criticism regarding its involvement
in electoral malfeasance. In a few moments a friend whom I had known for many years stepped
outside of the building and cheerfully greeted me.“Welcome to the residence of evil,” he grimly
joked, and added “Perhaps, you should be very excited about what you are about to see, since
you studied all this for years”. I agreed. The building’s interior clearly received a very expensive
renovation, with many translucent materials used ostensibly to create an impression of trans-
parency and wealth. After taking a glass elevator to one of the upper floors, we entered a small
room where four of us engage in several hours of conversation over tea, touching on a wide
range of topics from opposition rallies and leaders to elections and election forensics methodol-
ogy. My interlocutors, who occupied top positions within the Commission’s system, appeared
dreary and unemotional. However, they all were genuinely interested in meeting someone who
does election forensics analysis and sought to learn more about the tools used to detect electoral
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anomalies. In fact, one of the papers which we published with Walter Mebane in Russian a few
years ago provided them with some helpful guidance (Mebane & Kalinin 2009b). That paper
specifically focused on the application of Benford’s Law–which uses theoretical mean of the sec-
ond digit 4.187 as an expectation for clean elections, within certain bounds of uncertainty–in
detecting election anomalies in Russia’s 2003-2004 and 2007-2008 elections.
The meeting soon ended and could’ve easily been forgotten by all parties. But five years
later it turned out that the results of the 2016 parliamentary elections computed for 96,869
precincts matched the theoretical mean of the second digit by precisely four significant digits,
4.187, which is an extremely rare event even in a democratic setting. This story appeared in the
Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog (Kalinin & Mebane 2017a), suggesting that the Russian
government might have pretty good skills at faking vote data, and then made waves in the Rus-
sian media. Perhaps this observation could’ve occurred by chance alone; perhaps the Russian
elections are so well-managed by the Center that such close matches are possible – we simply
do not know. The Russian government denies any allegations of electoral violations. However,
if the latter is correct, then that meeting could’ve been regarded as a unique scientific experi-
ment proving that modern autocrats take election forensics seriously and can use technology to
out-trick modern methods.
This introductory episode shows the importance of electoral manipulation in authori-
tarian regimes and election forensics methodology to uncover it. In fact, the durability of
authoritarian regimes to a large extent originates from their capacity to effectively under-
mine electoral challenges from the opposition via media, state institutions or elections.
In this sense, the quality of elections has been the subject of concern for a long time with
autocrats very often resorting to electoral manipulations aimed to minimize uncertainty
over favorable electoral outcomes and discourage political opposition by signaling their
electoral or “manipulative” strength (Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013). Moreover, elections
solidify the legitimacy of the autocrat among the general public (Geddes 2006; Magaloni
2006). Elections can provide lots of information that allows assessment of the strength of
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the potential opposition in society, even if the signal is somewhat noisy due to attempts
at manipulation and fraud (Gandhi 2008, 167).
Election fraud is an inherently opaque phenomenon. Its definition therefore helps to
provide conceptual clarity and set necessary methodological benchmarks. Despite the
variation across its competing definitions, election fraud can be defined from both pro-
cedural and coercive perspectives. The first approach views election fraud as “a conduct
intended to corrupt the process by which ballots are obtained, marked, or tabulated; the
process by which election results are canvassed and certified” (Donsanto 2008). Here
election fraud implies clandestine efforts on the part of the perpetrators to shape election
results in a desirable direction (Lehoucq 2003). This definition makes sense in well-
established democracies, but is not applicable to autocracies which lack solid democratic
institutions and are prone to violence exerted upon political opposition (Cavdar 2008).
In my dissertation, I will resort to the second approach using Walter Mebane’s definition
of election fraud, which defines election fraud as a “consequence of a situation in which
all votes are cast in a way that reflects some single person’s intention,” in this sense, “vot-
ers who act in line with threats or bribes are being coerced, and simple ballot box stuffing
also counts as coercion.” (Mebane 2012)
While its hidden origin complicates exploration of election fraud, fraud can leave spe-
cific footprints in the electoral data, which election forensics researchers intend to expose.
From a practical standpoint, this daunting task is challenging due to the data availability
issues related to the lack of fine-grained data and suitable covariates for building complex
explanatory models of election fraud. Unfortunately, the variability of political systems,
electoral systems, cultural and social norms have complicated this problem even further,
making any election forensics research quite a daunting task to implement.
Election forensics adds distinctive value to current efforts to promote the integrity of
elections around the world by developing forensic tools and techniques designed to de-
tect the presence of election fraud and to estimate its magnitude based on the reported
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results of elections. By utilizing electoral data, election forensics seeks to provide sta-
tistical evidence, which could refute or support various sorts of accusations related to
the presence of election fraud. Over the years the availability of election forensics tools
has significantly expanded starting from various digit-based tests, such as the first digits
of aggregate vote totals (Cantu & Saiegh 2011), second significant digits (Mebane 2011;
Pericchi & Torres 2011), the last digits in vote counts (Beber & Scacco 2008) or last dig-
its in percentages (Kalinin & Mebane 2013), to various distribution-based methods pro-
posed by Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shaikin (2009); Shpilkin (2011) and regression anal-
ysis (Sobyanin & Sukhovolsky 1995). Most recently, however, Klimek, Yegorov, Hanel,
and Thurner (2012) proposed the positive empirical model of election frauds, suggest-
ing that there is a winning party or candidate, i.e. with most votes, benefiting from the
votes transferred from other parties/candidates and nonvoters. Mebane (2016), based
on Klimek et al. (2012), further develops the model by utilizing a finite mixture likeli-
hood model which estimates three distinct components measured at the precinct level:
probabilities of incremental fraud, extreme fraud and no fraud. The new approach to
election forensics enables scholars to parametrically estimate the precinct-level frauds
probabilities obtained for an entire election by using sophisticated statistical algorithms,
and provides a promising alternative to descriptive and oftentimes debatable assump-
tions (Deckert, Myagkov, & Ordeshook 2011; Mebane 2014). Based on Klimek’s model,
it’s possible to derive two fraud parameters: incremental fraud, measuring the transfer of
moderate votes proportions and extreme fraud, showing the extreme cases of votes transfer
of votes inside the precinct. The development of election forensics methodology has led
to creation of the “Election Forensics Toolkit” website sponsored by the USAID and de-
veloped by Walter Mebane and Kirill Kalinin. The project has been specifically designed
to make election forensics accessible for the use of policymakers, practitioners, and schol-
ars. Most of the empirical analysis presented in this research has been conducted through
the Toolkit.
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My dissertation is focused on the exploration of methodological and theoretical as-
pects of the statistical detection of election fraud, as well as the development and testing
of theories designed to facilitate our understanding of election fraud and its origin in
authoritarian regimes. My work revolves around three major research questions: “Can
the finite mixture model’s estimates be validated against alternative data sources used to
identify electoral anomalies and determine the magnitude of election frauds?”, “How do
specific patterns in electoral data related to election fraud enable autocrats to identify
and reward their most loyal subnational agents?”, and “What is the general mechanism
behind a close match between polls and rigged election results in autocracies?” My work
fills this analytic gap by offering two formal models to explain the mechanisms by which
autocrats, local agents and survey organizations act in the context of the informational
uncertainties generated by authoritarian regimes. I also provide empirical tests of these
theories, derive the measures of electoral anomalies using the Election Forensics Toolkit,
and discuss the best election forensics techniques.
My first chapter focuses on validation of the finite mixture model – the most advanced
up-to-date method of election forensics analysis, which is currently under development
and therefore requires a series of validity checks. Based on the Russian electoral data,
this chapter attempts to find answers to the set of the following questions: Does the new
finite mixture estimator more or less correctly predict the results from the available field
experiments? How well the new measure matches our theoretical expectations regarding
geographic distribution of election fraud? How well does the distribution of geograph-
ical clusters of the finite mixture estimates correlate with the geographical clusters of
different election forensics estimates? To answer these questions I utilize a broad range of
available techniques: propensity score matching, correlation analysis, and election foren-
sics cluster detection methods. My entire analysis is built on the data from the Russian
elections of 2000s. In fact, as abundance of evidence illustrate, in the 2000s the grow-
ing authoritarian tendencies in Russian political system has exacerbated the problem of
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blatant election fraud and various electoral manipulations even further, making it an in-
teresting subject of research by many scholars. Availability of precinct-level electoral data
and alternative data sources, such as the data on election observation and installation of
electronic voting machines, makes the Russian case valuable for the methodological val-
idation of a new measure. In this chapter I specifically focus of 2011 parliamentary and
2012 presidential elections.
In my second chapter I focus on the exploration of how the political loyalty of sub-
national agents can be associated with election fraud. Elections can elicit information
about election fraud itself: specific patterns in electoral data can persist conditional on
the strategies of officials and their success in signaling the loyalty to the leader. This
information is especially valuable to the autocrat, who can use the electoral data to get
a snapshot of the loyalty status of the local agents, and decide on each agent’s success
in mobilizing his regional “political machine” to provide necessary electoral support to
the leader (Gel’man 2009). While the previous research has shown that, in Russia and
elsewhere, fraud can often be readily detected (Mebane & Kalinin 2009b; Myagkov & Or-
deshook 2008; Myagkov, Ordeshook, & Shaikin 2008; Myagkov et al. 2009), it has rarely
focused on the mechanisms by which election fraud can be conducted nationally. My
theory describes whether local agents engage in a signaling strategy, wherein election
fraud signals loyalty to the leader, who distributes post-election rewards and punish-
ments based on electoral results and turnout. This approach allows us to explain the
prevalence of anomalous data patterns in turnout and voting percentage data, specifically
the frequency with which a 0 or 5 appears as the last digit in a percentage. The Russian
case exemplifies this phenomenon quite well: while in the mid-1990s Russian governors
used strategies of bargaining, in which powerful regions provided the leader with fa-
vorable electoral outcomes in exchange for political, institutional and financial resources
(Treisman 1997a, 1997b), political recentralization in the 2000s has led to revision of bar-
gaining agreements and the imposition of electoral signaling. In the Russian case this
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strategy is employed by regional governors to signal their loyalty to the leader by means
of fraudulently augmented electoral results and to get certain rewards in exchange, such
as political survival or postelectoral transfers. The expansion of the “signaling game” to
the cross-national realm is possible through the classification of different emergent equi-
libria. Specifically, the presence of rigged elections and associated numerical anomalies
either in democracies or autocracies can be explained by a combination of various insti-
tutional factors such as regime type (authoritarian or democratic), system of government
(federal or unitary), and form of government (presidential vs. parliamentary). In sum, all
these factors preset a specific level of loyalty of local agents via-a-vis the leader, leading
to the described strategic behavior expressed in signaling strategies.
In my third chapter I explore if election fraud can be conducive to the enhancement
of electoral credibility in electoral autocracies. It provides an innovative perspective on
the mechanism by which the autocrats in electoral autocracies strategically benefit from
preference falsification, which boosts their own electoral ratings and encourages perpe-
tration of election fraud. My theory suggests that election fraud serves as a by-product
of pre-election forecasts that are contaminated with the preference falsification, creating
leeway for numerous electoral violations, including election fraud. Within this frame-
work, election fraud is designed to mask the discrepancy between incumbent’s inflated
electoral support and genuine electoral preferences. Ideally, the presence of the observed
close match between polling forecasts and election results enables the autocrat not only
to claim his electoral legitimacy validated by pre-election polling, but also to reveal the
weaknesses of political opposition unable to enjoy such extensive public support. If,
however, any of such mismatches occur these goals are severely undermined and elec-
toral credibility is jeopardized. Theoretically, this chapter builds on Timur Kuran’s work
on preference falsification, by adjusting his basic model to the topic of election fraud (Ku-
ran 1987, 1991). Within this framework, election fraud is designed to mask the discrep-
ancy between endogenously determined public and private pre-electoral preferences, and
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guarantee the autocrat a stable equilibrium. The contribution of this chapter to the ex-
isting literature is threefold. First, this chapter extends Kuran’s model by adding to the
model the concept of election fraud, and thus offers a mechanism by which an incumbent
insures his most desirable electoral outcome. Second, this chapter tests the theoretical
implications of the model by utilizing original survey data collected by the author in
Spring 2012 during the Russian presidential campaign. In contrast to conventional elec-
tion forensics research, which does not consider the dimension of public opinion surveys,
this research demonstrates strong empirical findings with respect to the effect of prefer-
ence falsification on the level of election fraud in electoral autocracy. Third, I compare the
reliability of two types of election fraud indicators: two digit-based tests and the model-
based measure of election fraud. In order to extend my findings beyond the Russian
case, I also apply a statistical analysis of 59 countries with the inclusion of both electoral
autocracies and democracies.
The conclusion summarizes some of the main points and discusses the prospects of
future research in election forensics methodology.
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CHAPTER II
Validation of the Finite Mixture Model Using
Quasi-Experimental Data and Geography
2.1 Introduction
Election forensics adds distinctive value to current efforts to promote the integrity of
elections around the world by developing forensic tools and techniques designed to de-
tect the presence of election fraud and to estimate its magnitude based on the reported
results of elections. By utilizing electoral data, election forensics seeks to provide statis-
tical evidence, which could refute or support various sorts of accusations related to the
presence of election fraud. Since election fraud is increasingly difficult to measure, vali-
dation studies aimed to test whether the conceptual ideas of election fraud are plausibly
measured by election forensics methods, become the integral part of election forensics
research. In this sense, any auxiliary data containing information on electoral anomalies
and violations, collected through some objective process can serve as a validation check
against election forensics measures.
A new breakthrough in election forensics due to the emergence of the positive empiri-
cal model of election frauds (Mebane 2016) opens new valuable opportunities for scholars
and practitioners interested in exploring election frauds in multiple electoral settings. It
also raises the issue of validity of a new estimator. The Russian case clearly raises sev-
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eral valuable opportunities for validation of this new methodology. By employing the
electoral data from the Russian 2011 and 2012 presidential elections both of which are
notoriously fraudulent (Enikolopov, Korovkin, Petrova, Sonin, & Zakharov 2013; Kalinin
& Shpilkin 2012; Klimek et al. 2012; Kobak, Shpilkin, & Pshenichnikov 2012) and the
auxiliary data from field experiments and alternative data sources, it becomes feasible to
assess the validity of a new forensics measure.
The newly developed election forensics estimator belongs to a variety of election
forensics methods. Over the years the availability of such methods has significantly ex-
panded starting from various digit-based tests, such as the first digits of aggregate vote
totals (Cantu & Saiegh 2011), second significant digits (Mebane 2011; Pericchi & Torres
2011), the last digits in vote counts (Beber & Scacco 2008) or last digits in percentages
(Kalinin & Mebane 2013), to various distribution-based methods proposed by Myagkov
et al. (2009); Shpilkin (2011), regression analysis (Sobyanin & Sukhovolsky 1995) and
parametric models of election fraud (Klimek et al. 2012; Mebane 2016). Each of the elec-
tion forensics measures makes different implicit or explicit assumptions regarding the
data generating mechanism of the “clean data” with some methods being more suitable
than others depending on the electoral context and the research question.
The development of election forensics methodology has led to creation of an “Election
Forensics Toolkit” website sponsored by the USAID and developed by Walter Mebane and
Kirill Kalinin. The project has been specifically designed to make election forensics ac-
cessible for the use of policymakers, practitioners, and scholars.1 Most of the empirical
analysis presented here utilized the code from the Toolkit. Besides using election foren-
sics methods with electoral data, this chapter also engages experimental data: two field
experiments based on the data from election observers and the data on voting equipment
1Major election forensics methods, such as the derivation of the finite mixture estimates and building
maps containing the results of clustering analysis, have used the Election Forensics Toolkit. The Election
Forensics Toolkit is a web application, which has been technically implemented by Walter Mebane and
Kirill Kalinin. The Toolkit is designed to conduct election forensics analysis using the publicly accessible
website. The link to the website: http://electionforensics.ddns.net:3838/EFT_USAID/
10
in the precincts.
This research will focus on validation of the finite mixture model estimates for a num-
ber of reasons. First, this is the most advanced method of election forensics analysis to
date, but it is currently under development and therefore requires a series of validation
checks. Second, conditional on the assumption that the finite mixture model is correct,
unlike all other approaches, the model provides the quantities of greatest substantive
interest for researchers and practitioners, i.e. fraud probabilities of two distinctive mech-
anisms – incremental and extreme fraud. Third, the finite mixture estimates for the
precinct-level data are provided at the lowest level of aggregation, making validation
study more nuanced and precise, especially when auxiliary data at this level is available.
This set of properties of the finite mixture model makes its validation study particularly
appealing and promising for election forensics research.
Here I attempt to find answers to the set of the following questions: Does the new
finite mixture estimator more or less correctly predict the results from the available field
experiments? How well the new measure matches our theoretical expectations regarding
geographic distribution of election fraud? How well does the distribution of geograph-
ical clusters of the finite mixture estimates correlate with the geographical clusters of
different election forensics estimates for which the mechanism of election fraud is al-
ready known? To answer these questions I utilize a broad range of available techniques:
propensity score matching, correlation analysis, and election forensics cluster detection
methods.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 describe the literature on
election forensics methodology. Section 2.4 lays out the context of the Russian elections
and discusses availability of the relevant Russian data. Section 2.5 describes methodolog-
ical tools and formulates a set of hypotheses. Section 2.6 presents my general findings
from empirical analysis based on experimental evidence, correlation analysis and clus-
tering analysis using both precinct-level and territory-level data. In the final part, I draw
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conclusions on the basis of my findings and discuss the prospects of future research.
2.2 Measuring Election Fraud
The durability of authoritarian regimes to a large extent originates in their capacity
to effectively undermine electoral challenges from the opposition via media, state insti-
tutions or elections. In this sense, the quality of elections has been the subject of con-
cern for a long time, with autocrats very often resorting to electoral manipulations aimed
to minimize uncertainty over favorable electoral outcomes and discourage political op-
position by signaling their electoral or “manipulative” strength (Greene 2007; Magaloni
2006; Simpser 2013). Since election fraud is an inherently opaque phenomenon, its initial
definition will provide conceptual clarity and set necessary methodological benchmarks
for my forthcoming empirical analysis. Despite variation in its competing definitions,
election fraud can be defined from two major perspectives – procedural and coercive.
The first approach views election fraud as “a conduct intended to corrupt the process by
which ballots are obtained, marked, or tabulated; the process by which election results
are canvassed and certified” (Donsanto 2008). Here election fraud implies clandestine
efforts on the part of the perpetrators to shape election results in a desired direction
(Lehoucq 2003). This “procedural” definition, however, makes sense in well-established
democracies with developed electoral institutions and clear organization procedures, but
is hardly applicable to autocracies which lack solid democratic institutions and are prone
to political violence exerted upon the opposition (Cavdar 2008). Therefore in my disser-
tation I will resort to the second approach using Mebane (2012)’s definition of election
fraud based on Arrow (1950)’s impossibility theorem, defining it as a “consequence of a
situation in which all votes are cast in a way that reflects some single person’s intention,”
in this sense, “voters acting in line with threats or bribes are being coerced, and simple
ballot box stuffing also counts as coercion.”
While its hidden origin complicates exploration of election fraud, it can leave specific
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footprints in the electoral data, which election forensics researchers intend to expose.
From a practical standpoint, the difficulty of this task is exacerbated by data availability
issues related to the lack of fine-grained data and suitable covariates for building complex
explanatory models of election fraud. Unfortunately, the variability of political systems,
electoral systems, cultural and social norms have complicated this problem even further,
making comparative election forensics research quite a daunting task to implement.
One of the most popular methodological approaches are digit tests built on compar-
ison of empirical distributions with pre-specified theoretical distributions. Among the
most popular methods are the first digits of aggregate vote totals (Cantu & Saiegh 2011),
second significant digits (Mebane 2011; Pericchi & Torres 2011), the last digits in vote
counts (Beber & Scacco 2008) or last digits in percentages (Kalinin & Mebane 2013). For
example, while the first and second digits are expected to follow the Benford’s Law (2BL)
if elections are clean, last digits in vote counts or percentages are expected to follow a uni-
form distribution. The second digit test has been criticized as a viable election forensics
method. For instance, Deckert et al. (2011) find that 2BL test is susceptible to false posi-
tives. Due to the lack of solid theory, it remains unclear how its performance is affected
by election law, strategic voting patterns, the number of competing parties or candidates,
and a variety of other factors. Mebane (2012); Mebane and Klaver (2015) also disavow
the 2BL test and find that the second digits are sensitive to strategic, gerrymandered, and
coerced votes, making it hard to disentangle strategic behavior from the effects of election
fraud. Since 2BL test turned out to be invalid as a detection tool, it is no longer used in
election forensics methodology.
Following Mebane (2006)’s approach, Beber and Scacco (2012) propose the last-digit
test based on the idea that clean vote counts have uniformly distributed 0-9 last dig-
its. The authors also list several conditions which need to be met for the test: a) vote
counts do not cluster within a narrow range of numbers, and there is minor variation in
election unit sizes, electoral support, or turnout; b) vote returns must not contain many
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single- and double-digit counts, i.e. the method should not be applied to the minor can-
didates with small vote counts or small polling stations. Once these conditions are met,
any statistically significant divergence from the uniform distribution can be attributed to
fraudulent electoral outcome. The last-digit approach can be extended to any electoral
variables meeting the aforementioned condition. The last digit approach has been fur-
ther developed by a new test of last digit of percentages, supported by the concept of
signaling games. The presence of election fraud becomes a basic signaling mechanism
of regional bosses’ loyalty and of their ability to control their administrative resources to
the Kremlin’s benefit (Kalinin & Mebane 2013). If electoral signaling occurs, data manip-
ulation is most likely to manifest with rounded percentages of electoral support, which
is the easiest and most readily detected way to report basic information to superiors. An
extensive analysis of the signaling concept will be provided in the next Chapter of my
dissertation.
The non-digit approach utilizes different techniques. Based on normality assump-
tion for the distribution of vote shares or turnout, certain departures from normality can
be seen as electoral anomalies. Analysis of vote flows between the elections in multi-
ple heterogeneous settings is another viable method of election forensics (Myagkov et al.
2009). Relationship between turnout and vote shares measured by correlation or regres-
sion analysis (Buzin & Lubarev 2008; Sobyanin & Sukhovolsky 1995) is proposed in a
number of works. The nonparametric approach developed by Sergey Shpilkin is another
viable method based on the histogram built for turnout and electoral support (Shpilkin
2011). The detailed review of election forensics methodology can be found in Hicken and
Mebane (2015).
Since election fraud is increasingly difficult to measure, validation studies, testing
whether the conceptual ideas of election fraud are plausibly measured, become crucial for
election forensics research. Unfortunately, each of the election forensics measures makes
different implicit or explicit assumptions regarding the data generating mechanism of
14
the “clean data” with some methods being to be more suitable than others depending on
the electoral context and the research question. There can’t be apparent consensus re-
garding the validity of alternative methods being compared with one another, since, so
far, no study has been conducted yet to assess which method exercises higher “election
forensics” validity compared to the other methods. Such comparison of different meth-
ods is further complicated by various scales (digits, probabilities or magnitudes), levels
(precinct-level or higher levels of aggregation) captured by the estimates and, presum-
ably, different underlying vote-rigging mechanisms exposed by each of those methods.
This research will focus on the validation of the finite mixture model estimates for a
number of reasons. First, this is the most advanced up-to-date method of election foren-
sics analysis. Second, conditional on the assumption that the finite mixture model is
correct, unlike all other approaches the model provides the quantities of greatest of sub-
stantive interest, i.e. fraud probabilities of two distinctive mechanisms – incremental and
extreme fraud. Third, the finite mixture estimates for the precinct-level data are provided
at the lowest level of aggregation making validation study more nuanced and precise.
This set of features makes the validation study of the finite mixture model particularly
appealing for election forensics research.
Most recently, Kalinin and Mebane (2017b) attempted to conduct a validation study
based on Alexander Kireev’s approach by comparing the estimates derived from the fi-
nite mixture estimator against the measures obtained with Sergey Shpilkin’s approach.
While Alexander Kireev’s subjective evaluation of the fraud’s magnitude for 2016 Duma
elections is backed by his assessment of turnout’s geographic anomalies, voting patterns,
and invalid votes, Shpilkin’s approach is based on nonparametric analysis. It uses the
histogram with turnout broken into a series of intervals or bins (x-axis), within which the
level of electoral support falling into each interval is calculated (y-axis) and a set of steps
used to identify election anomalies. Kalinin and Mebane (2017b)’s findings indicate that
the finite mixture method and Shpilkin’s approach roughly agree about the ordering of
15
which regions have many fraudulent votes and which have few, although the methods do
not agree regarding the absolute magnitudes. If Kireev (2016)’s subjective assessments
are viewed as appropriate for validation test, it turns out that while the finite mixture
model estimates are not as good as Shpilkin (2016)’s estimates in distinguishing “average
fraud” from “no fraud,” they match Kireev’s categories better than Shpilkin’s estimates
when it comes to distinguishing “strong fraud” from “average fraud.” (Kalinin & Mebane
2017b).
The new validation approach put forward by my present analyses is that the validation
can be reached by the use of quasi-experimental techniques well-grounded in the theory
as well as previous studies exploring geographic distribution of election fraud. This paper
will be specifically focused on quasi-experimental validation of the finite mixture model
estimates and geographic dispersion of election forensics measures, including the final
mixture estimates, both of which can turn out to be very useful in election forensics
research.
Until very recently, quasi-experimental designs mostly dealing with election monitor-
ing were utilized to tackle the set of limitations and assumptions associated with election
forensics methodology. Election monitoring, by increasing emphasis on democratic rights
and creation of a market of outside validation, has become an integral part of the effort to
promote clean and fair elections worldwide (Bjornlund 2004). It also enables an autocrat
to credibly signal his adherence to both domestic and international audiences, as well as
discourages opposition from participation by exposing corrupt activities (Simpser 2006).
A quasi-experimental setting using observers as the treatment enables scholars to obtain
rough estimates of election fraud nationwide. For instance, research on election observa-
tion studies estimating the effects of observers on electoral outcomes in selected precincts
demonstrates that the mere presence of election observers can significantly reduce elec-
tion fraud (Hyde 2007, 2011; Kelley 2012; Sjoberg 2012). This, however, can also induce
the monitored party to strategically adapt its behavior, by resorting to less detectable
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methods of vote falsification (Sjoberg 2014) or simply displacing election fraud to neigh-
boring areas (Ichino & Schundeln 2012). For instance, Sjoberg (2014), using data from
2008 elections in Azerbaijan, argues that the increase the integrity of the electoral process
is tolerated by an autocrat as long as the negative effects can be offset by other forms of
manipulation.
Likewise, adoption of new voting or observation technologies at the election tend to
impact the behavioral strategies of election administrators. The effects of technology on
electoral behavior has been studied by Herron (2010), Sjoberg (2014), Bader (2013). Her-
ron (2010) argues that increase of passive monitoring through installation of webcams
results in lower support for pro-regime forces in Azerbaijan’s electoral-type events. An-
other interesting avenue of research relates to installation of different voting machines.
Installation of optical scan voting machine or a type of the direct-recording electronic
(DRE) voting machines in the precincts, which will be discussed later, can potentially re-
duce traditional election fraud, such as ballot stuffing and ballot switching (Bader 2013).
Also it is quite likely that the installation of new voting technologies in a limited number
of precincts could have prevented the adoption of new fraudulent strategies and discour-
aged election perpetrators from artificial inflation of election outcomes in “conventional”
ways. An active engagement of election observers in post-election audits based on a ran-
dom sampling of polling stations can insure cleaner elections, deter fraud against the
voting system, and enhance general public confidence in the results of elections (Estok,
Nevitte, & Cowan 2002; Norden, Burstein, Hall, & Chen 2007).
Unfortunately, both observer-based and technology-based quasi-experiments often-
times rely on poor data quality related to the failures of random treatment assignments
in the majority of cases, eventually, leading to rather biased conclusions, whereas much
more efficient survey designs, for instance stratified multistage sampling, are rarely uti-
lized because of the high associated costs (Hyde 2008).
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2.3 Positive Models of Election Fraud
The breakthrough in election forensics methodology happened with the development
of the positive empirical model of election fraud proposed by Klimek et al. (2012). The
Klimek model suggests that there is a winning party or candidate, i.e. with most votes,
benefiting from the votes transferred from other parties/candidates and nonvoters. Their
original model consists of two components. The first component includes turnout and
vote counts under condition of fair elections. Vote counts are simulated from a normal
distribution with the mean and standard deviation obtained from the area on the left-
hand side of the mean. The second component accounts for intensity of anomalies al-
legedly linked to electoral frauds, and is obtained from the right-hand side of the sample
mean. The model is used to obtain two fraud parameters: incremental fraud, measuring
the transfer of moderate votes proportions, and extreme fraud, showing the extreme cases
of votes transfer of votes inside the precinct. Each of the parameters are tied to different
mechanisms. Ballot switching is reflected in incremental fraud, and and ballot stuffing is
indicated by extreme fraud.
Specifically, Klimek’s approach, according to Mebane (2016), suggests that both sam-
ple turnout and the winner’s vote proportion are drawn from two normal distributions:
τi ∼ N (τ,στ ) and νi ∼ N (ν,σν). The occurrence of fraud corresponds to two conditions:
(a) xα the proportion of opposition votes going to the winner, and (b) (1 − y)α the pro-
portion of genuine opposition votes going to the winner. Here α indicates whether more
vote stealing or more vote manufacturing takes place. If α = 1 both types of election
fraud equally affect votes; if α < 1 the vote stealing is important, whereas α > 1 then vote
manufacturing votes from nonvoters is prevalent.
Incremental fraud is presented by the proportion of nonvotes turned into votes for
the winner fi . The number of of votes going to the winning party through incremental
fraud is Wi = Ni(τiνi + xi(1 − τi) + xαi (1 − νi)τi , the number of votes for the opposition is
Oi = Ni(1 − xαi )(1 − νi)τi , and the number of nonvoters is Ai = Ni(1 − xi)(1 − τi). Here is
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xi ∼ |N (0,θ)|.
Extreme fraud, fe, implies the probability proportion of nonvotes that are not turned
into votes: yi ∼ |N (0,σv)|, σx = 0.075, 0 < yi < 1. Consequently, Wi = Ni(τiνi + (1− yi)(1−
τi)+(1−yi)α(1−νi)τi , the number of votes for the opposition isOi =Ni(1−(1−τi)α)(1−νi)τi ,
and the number of nonvoters is Ai =Niyi(1− τi).
Finally, if fraud never occurs f0 = 1− fi − fe, then the number of votes for the winner is
Wi = Niτiνi , the number of votes for the opposition is Oi = Niτi(1 − νi), and the number
of nonvoters Ai =Ni(1− τi)
The proposed model enables the authors to estimate the large presence of frauds in
non-democracies, such as Uganda and Russia, vis-a-vis democracies, where no anomalies
attributed to frauds are detected. The basic assumption of the model is partly supported
by the data: the log transformed distributions of vote counts and turnout must look ap-
proximately Gaussian for the countries with fair elections. In contrast, for the countries
with rigged elections, these distributions are characterized by right-tailed skewness and
larger kurtosis. Even though the model is flexible across different levels of data aggrega-
tion, the measures of anomalies can be affected by the data heterogeneity. For instance,
the authors’ claim that extreme fraud with substantial fraction of districts reporting a
100% turnout with almost all votes going to a single party can be explained by specifics
of precincts located in small rural communities, military units or prisons.
Overall, the frauds measurement model proposed in the paper of Klimek et al. (2012)
is both innovative and contributing to the field of election forensics. Even though basic
assumptions of the model are too strong, these are justified by the benefits of the model
in estimation of anomalies and new opportunities of practical application of the model
on a larger set of countries.
Mebane (2016), based on Klimek et al. (2012), further develops the model by utilizing
a finite mixture likelihood model with three distinct components: probabilities of incre-
mental fraud, extreme fraud and no fraud for each precinct. The model fitting is based on
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the likelihood function with variables treated from Klimek et al. (2012) as unobserved.
The model assumes that τi , νi , xi and yi are generated from the normal distributions:






gjW (Wi | Ni ;Ψ )gjA(Ai | Ni ;Ψ ) (2.1)
In the model f0, fi and fe are probabilities of no fraud, incremental fraud and ex-
treme fraud, where f0 + fi + fe = 1. The model describes the joint density of the ob-
served vote counts for the winning party Wi , the observed sum of votes cast for all
other parties Oi and the number of observed nonvotes Ai , i.e. (Wi ;Oi ;Ai) as being con-
ditioned on the number of eligible voters in each precinct Ni and estimated parameters
Ψ = (α,ν,τ,σν ,στ ,φ)′ defined by Klimek’s model. The estimated precinct-level param-
eters are α – intensity of incremental fraud, ν – the winner’s vote proportion and its
standard deviation σν , τ – the turnout and its standard deviation, and θ – incremental
fraud garnering a higher number of votes for the leading party. The analytic integration
of the finite mixture estimates with the estimates computed from alternative data sources,
such as election monitoring reports or postelection complaints, provide the most fruitful
strategy of election forensics research (Mebane 2016).
The model’s parameters are estimated using an EM algorithm. In addition to it, sev-
eral quantities of interest are computed: a) the magnitude of the frauds as the number
of fraudulent votes; b) the precinct-level probability that election fraud occurs; c) the
precinct-level magnitude of the frauds as the number of fraudulent votes (Mebane 2016).
While the EM algorithm allows to obtain estimates of the conditional probability that
each observation belongs to different fraud mechanisms, it doesn’t provide the uncer-
tainty of precinct-level probabilities. Moreover, similar to the Klimek’s model, the finite
mixture model also relies on multimodality in the distributions of turnout and vote pro-
portions as the feature of election fraud, whereas multimodality can be also generated by
the normal features of politics, for instance, strategic voting. Since reliance on the mul-
20
timodality assumption can potentially lead to false positives, the use of contextual and
auxiliary information can be crucial in determining the origin of electoral anomalies in
specific context.
2.4 Context and Data
Russia has a long history of fraudulent elections in which artificial electoral support
is provided by Kremlin-backed presidential candidates or parties, and viable political
competition is rigidly suppressed. In the 2000s the growing authoritarian tendencies in
Russian political system has exacerbated the problem of blatant election fraud and vari-
ous electoral manipulations even further, making it an interesting subject of research by
many scholars. The detrimental quality of Russian elections is analyzed in a large body of
literature (Buzin & Lubarev 2008; Mebane 2010; Mebane & Kalinin 2009a; Myagkov et al.
2009; Shpilkin 2011), exposing numerous statistical anomalies across different electoral
cycles and across different election administration levels.
The 2011-2012 electoral cycle was marked by the transition of presidential power
from Dmitry Medvedev back to Vladimir Putin. In the fall 2011 then-President Medvedev
proposed then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to run for a third term. This pre-arranged
move of two politicians ignited a widespread public discontent and has set the tone for
both upcoming Russian parliamentary and presidential elections. The parliamentary
elections led to a crushing defeat of the party of power United Russia, which lost its two-
thirds constitutional majority it had held prior to the election in spite of the manipulated
character of elections and numerous fraud allegations. Consequently, obvious unfairness
and uncleanness of election results provoked the rise of massive protests in Moscow and
St. Petersburg, which forced the Kremlin to urgently launch a series of reforms aimed
to provide electoral transparency of the forthcoming March presidential elections, such
as installation of transparent ballot boxes(one-third of polling stations used transparent
ballot boxes) and web cameras in every polling station across the country. Noteworthy,
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that alongside to the protests, both elections, especially presidential ones were marked
by a significant increase in civic engagement, including an increased focus on election ob-
servation to enhance the integrity of the process: “Golos”, “Citizen-Observer”, “League
of Voters”. The preventive actions of Russian electoral authorities to equip the precincts
with the web cameras and transparent ballot boxes, along with the civic engagement in
election observation helped to obtain auxiliary data on web-cameras and observers for
our scholarly research.
Based on multiple sources, such as electoral, survey data and observer reports both
Russian elections are seen as marked by widespread fraud significantly affecting the elec-
toral outcomes (Enikolopov et al. 2013; Kalinin & Shpilkin 2012; Kobak et al. 2012).
According to the findings, in 2012 the estimated election fraud in Russia amounts to
5% and 10% for Putin’s electoral support and turnout, respectively (Kalinin & Shpilkin
2012); other studies provide the estimated proportion of precincts with the election fraud,
reaching about 40% in 2012 and 60% in 2011 (Klimek et al. 2012). It’s pretty difficult to
argue about trustworthiness of Shpilkin’s or Klimek’s methods, since both rely on a cer-
tain set of assumptions. Specifically, these two approaches have two weaknesses: first,
they are both highly sensitive to the algorithm by which the highest mode is identified;
second, observed multimodality can be attributed to the electorate’s heterogeneity and
differences in electoral behavior of the voters across the parties. However, by all accounts
2011 elections compared to 2012 elections are characterized by greater amounts of elec-
tion fraud.
Luckily, availability of alternative data sources, such as the data on election observa-
tion and installation of electronic voting machines, makes the Russian case valuable for
the methodological validation of a new measure. First, it’s assumed that the mere physi-
cal presence of observers putting election administrators under scrutiny will most likely
change their behavioral strategies and prevent them from committing election fraud.
Second, the installation of electronic voting machines in selected precincts makes tra-
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ditional manipulation, such as ballot stuffing or ballot switching, immensely costly for
election administrators, subsequently resulting in a reduction electoral malfeasance. The
installation of web cameras can also impact the behavioral strategies of administrators by
constraining their traditional vote manipulation strategies. Both approaches work well
under the assumption that we randomly assign precincts to receive treatment or not, i.e.
allowing randomization to balance out possible confounders across treatment and con-
trol groups. Thereby, this is a convenient way to assess the magnitude of electoral frauds
free from distribution assumptions and receive a useful instrument for validation of the
finite mixture estimator.
Since we deal with the observational data rather than experimental data here we need
to account for the differences in observed covariate distributions between our treatment
and control groups. Moreover, it is also assumed that observers or installation of voting
machines wouldn’t be altering the voter’s behavior. It can be the case, that the voters
will be viewing their voting choice as being monitored, especially, knowing that certain
features of KOIBs/KEGs imply creation of a file with a picture of the bulletin with the
time stamp (Herron 2009). Even though the placement of web cameras is expected to
yield more information about the cleanness of election results, due to their installation
in almost all polling stations in 2012 and the lack of control group, it is impossible to
derive any estimate of election frauds. Therefore, the use of another treatment based on
variability of utilized voting machines across the precincts sounds more promising.
In my analysis of 2011 elections I’ll be using the dataset on election observation in
Moscow previously analyzed in Enikolopov et al. (2013), available through Vasily Ko-
rovkin. The data originally comes from the independent nongovernmental organization
Citizen Observer (Grazhdanin-nablyudatel’), that trained more than 500 volunteer ob-
servers in the city of Moscow. The observers were sent to 156 randomly selected polling
stations using a systematic sampling technique (Levada Center). Enikolopov et al. (2013)
conclude that the mere presence of observers reduced the share for United Russia by 9.3-
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10.8 percentage points and increased it for other parties. In my 2012 analysis I’m using
the data from the website of SMS-CIK project, which allowed the observers to promptly
report their information from the precinct-level protocols. The procedure is rather sim-
ple: the phone messages containing the figures from precinct-level protocols are texted
by observers to a specific phone number, then they are processed by the servers and in-
stantly become publicly available through the website www.sms-cik.org. Unfortunately,
this procedure implies that election observers are self-selected into the database rather
than randomly assigned to precincts by design. These data have been downloaded from
the website, parsed and merged with the official electoral precinct-level 2012 data set.
The geographical data and voting equipment data on both elections has been kindly
provided by Sergey Shpilkin. In both the 2011 and 2012 elections two types of new voting
machines were used. The first, KOIB (Kompleks Obrabotki Izbiratel’nykh Byulleteney),
is an optical scan voting machine with a ballot box made of translucent materials. As
one of its features, it creates a time-stamped file of the scanned ballot, and transmits
election results over telecommunications network to a higher level of election commis-
sion (it’s an integral part of the GAS Vybory automated tabulation system). The second,
the KEG (Kompleks Elektronnogo Golosovaniya) is a direct-recording electronic (DRE)
voting machine with a touch-screen with lists of candidates and parties for the voter to
choose from. Its results are stored in the memory of KEG, as well as printed on a special
paper tape unavailable to the voter. Both devices can induce election administrators to
abstain from traditional election fraud, such as ballot stuffing and ballot switching (See
Figure A.1(a),(b) in Appendix A).
Bader (2013), by applying difference-in-difference design based on the Myagkov et al.
(2009)’s idea of “flow of votes” between the elections, finds that for precincts equipped
with KOIBs in 2011 but not in 2012 are characterized by decreased turnout (-3.8% ) and
incumbent’s vote share (-4.8%). For the precincts equipped with KOIBs in 2012 but not
in 2011, the effects of KOIBs are small and insignificant amounting to only 0.4% for
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turnout, and 0.6% for the incumbent’s support. Since the selection criteria for placing
KOIBs/KEGs are vaguely known (for instance, KEGs are predominantly used in ethnic
regions as a bilingual device), it is hard to draw stronger statistical inferences using
Bader (2013)’s findings. As a part of solution to this problem in this paper the polling
stations will be matched to approximate random assignment of the treatment (Herron
2010; Sjoberg 2014). Unfortunately, proposed matching procedure does not necessarily
solve many of the problems associated with non-random assignment and the absence of
pre-treatment data.
Hence, my validation study will be build on the analysis of the following datasets:
• Precinct-level electoral data used for estimation of election forensics measures of
fraud, including the finite mixture model;
• Data on election observation in Moscow (parliamentary elections 2011) and nation-
wide (presidential elections, 2012);
• Data on the allocation of KOIBs/KEGs/observers in 2011 and 2012 elections.
2.5 Analytic Strategy
My analysis is built on the quasi-experimental data using propensity score matching
technique, correlation analysis and a geographic cluster analysis of election forensics esti-
mates. My analytic strategy implies: (1) validation of the finite mixture model’s estimates
using the quasi-experimental data on election observation and allocation of KOIBs/KEGs;
(2) validation of the finite mixture model’s estimates using geographic distribution of
election fraud described in theoretical literature.
2.5.1 Validation Using Quasi-Experimental Data
Since no data are available to solve the problems associated with non-random assign-
ment of the treatment, here I apply to propensity score matching. The result of the match-
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ing procedure, which was carried out with Matching() package (Sekhon 2012) in R, is
a dataset balanced in key variables: type of the region (Republic/Oblast), urban/rural,
precinct size. Originally, my top priority was given to matching between the pairs of
precincts with observers/voting machines and precincts without observers/paper ballots
boxes based on the k-nearest neighbors algorithm, however, large standard errors pre-
vented me from pursuing this approach any further. The choice of variables included
in propensity score model are related to the outcome. Republics usually tend to exhibit
more electoral support for authorities compared to oblast’s. Moreover, the empirical ev-
idence suggests that Republics compared Russian oblast’s, by having better established
“machine politics” in place, are able to achieve unprecedented levels of electoral mobi-
lization (Kalinin & Mebane 2013; Mebane & Kalinin 2009a). Here “machine politics”
implies the creation of organizations, i.e. “political machines” providing electoral sup-
port by trading material benefits to citizens in exchange for their votes (Golosov 2013).
As a rule, these organizations are located in ethnic republics and autonomous districts
with dense ethnicity-based social networks and rural areas with the rural population de-
pendent on local bosses (Golosov 2013; Hale 2003; Matsuzato 2000).
Arbatskaya (2004) by analyzing Russian elections 1996-2000 argues that there is sub-
stantial variation in political participation across the regions, which is partly determined
by administrative interference in the electoral process by officials as well as other factors,
which include the type of the region, urban/rural settlement, type of industrial struc-
ture, seasonal effects contributing to the changes in turnout rates during the day. As a
result of her analysis, Arbatskaya groups regions into two broad categories of turnout ac-
tivity: passive, predominantly, Russian regions and urban territories; and active regions,
Republics and rural territories.
Hence, by including three precinct-specific variables (type of the region, urban/rural,
precinct size) into my propensity score model I hope to account for heterogeneity of elec-
toral practices across various levels of aggregation.
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2.5.2 Validation Using Geographic Distribution of Election Fraud
For Russia, expected geographic distribution of election fraud is closely connected to
the strength of political machines in the regions. Hale (2003) argues that the ability of re-
gional governors to convert patronage networks into political machines aimed to provide
necessary level of incumbent’s electoral support has been the case in the 2000s. The use
of “administrative resource” implies that “different kinds of pressures are exerted upon
voters by the regional authorities in order to provide desired electoral returns” (Golosov
2006). In the post-Soviet years the Republics enjoyed more bargaining power with the
Center (See next Chapter) and used to be more capable to manipulate voting in the re-
gions (Reisinger & Moraski 2017; Solnick 1995). The governors in the Republics were
more effectively monitoring voting than their counterparts from the Russian regions, and
thus were able to punish or reward voters more effectively (Hale 2007, 231). Hence, here
we would expect that locations associated with Republics and regions with strong politi-
cal machines will most likely exhibit largest clusters of election fraud.
Which regions will most likely exhibit the fraudulent clusters? The list of such re-
gions can be derived using the expert ratings of regional democracy constructed by Niko-
lay Petrov and Alexey Titkov (Petrov & Titkov 2013). These regions in descending order
of democracy are Dagestan Republic , Omskaya oblast’, Orlovskaya oblast’, Tambovskaya
oblast’, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya Republic, Yamalo-Nenetskiy autonomous okrug, Kostrom-
skaya oblast’, Penzenskaya oblast’, Tatarstan Republic, Yakutiya Republic, Bryanskaya
oblast’, Rostovskaya oblast’, Smolenskaya oblast’, Khakassiya Republic, Adygeya Repub-
lic, Belgordskaya oblast’, Mariy El Republic, Bashkortostan Republic, Kemerovskaya ol-
bast’, Kurganskaya oblast’, Tyva Republic, Kalmykiya Republic, Severnaya Osetiya Re-
public, Kurskaya oblast’, Kabardino-Balkariya Republic, Ingushetiya Republic, Mordoviya
Republic, Chukotka autonomous okrug and Chechnya Republic. Hence, if our finite
mixture estimates account for the poor democratic environment and the presence of the
strong regional machines, we would expect to find the majority of clusters are located in
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these listed regions.
It is also expected that the clusters of election fraud will be associated with the rural
areas where higher levels of social connectivity and lower levels of anonymity compared
to urban area predispose the use of local political machines. Reisinger and Moraski (2017)
argue that local politicians who play prominent role in the provision of goods and services
will be the most successful in mobilizing voter support in their respected localities. The
literature suggests that rural social networks are effective in mobilization of voter support
in Kyrgyzstan (Darr & Hesli 2010) and rural Africa (Kuenzi & Lambright 2011). Hence,
we would expect that rural localities will be most likely to exhibit clusters of election
fraud.
This part of my analysis adopts geographic clustering tests, indicating geographical
clustering patterns across different election forensics measures at the level of precincts
and territories. Geographic clustering indicates whether any clusters or localities share
similar strategies of election administrators. While the precinct-level analysis provides
us with the most detailed overview of fraud’s allocation in specific localities, the territory-
level analysis helps to derive aggregated measures of election fraud at the level of Russian
territories.
The presence of clustering doesn’t necessarily imply the possibility of fraud but can be
attributed to a large range of causes. However, we may have reason to believe that there
is some heterogeneity among certain precincts or territories related to variation in fraud.
I use two estimation procedures available in the Election Forensics Toolkit: (a) Getis-
Ord Gi analysis of hotspots (Ord & Getis 1995) to measure whether the mean of values
geographically close to observation i differs from the global mean and (b) local Moran’s
Ii , which measures whether the value at observation i differs from the mean of values
geographically close to the observation i (Anselin 1995). Both statistics are estimated for
each election forensics indicator: precinct-level data in 2012 (Getis-Ord Gi) and territory-
level data for 2011 and 2012 (local Moran’s Ii). By doing so I am able to identify the levels
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at which the coordination of vote manufacturing and vote stealing is taking place and as
a result better understand specifics of its organization. Moreover, at each selected level of
analysis I employ correlation analysis between the hot spot types and test levels assigned
to each polling station or territory.
If the finite mixture estimates reflect the same signaling mechanism as other election
forensics measures, we would expect that our finite mixture estimates will be also associ-
ated with alternative measures of election fraud. Using these measures in the model we
will be able to examine the finite mixture’s construct validity by tracking its relationship
with other election forensics measures.
Hence, the proposed research hypotheses to be tested here:
Hypothesis 1. The finite mixture indicator is expected to be affected by the presence of
KOIBs/KEGs and well-trained observers, since more vote rigging is taking place in the polling
stations equipped with the ballot boxes rather than KOIBs/KEGs and without well-trained ob-
servers vs. with them.
Hypothesis 2. The geographic clustering tests will expose the presence of election fraud
clusters mainly located in the areas exhibiting poor democratic environment and the presence
of the strong regional machines, these are mainly the Republics and the rural territories.
Hypothesis 3. The strong correlations between the geographic clusters of the final mixture
estimates and the geographic clusters of alternative election forensics measures associated with
signaling patterns ([P05] test for turnout and incumbent), and anomalous last digits in vote
counts[CL] found at the levels of both precincts and territories, are expected to be found in our
study.
To test my proposed hypotheses, I turn to my empirical data analysis.
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2.6 Findings
According to my findings at the Russian presidential elections about 8% of precincts
host incremental fraud and about 0.2% – extreme fraud; at the Russian parliamentary
election these figures are 11% and 0.2%, respectively. These findings match our initial
expectations based on multiple accounts of extensive fraud in the parliamentary elec-
tions and reduced use of fraud in the presidential election. Thus, the finite mixture
estimates demonstrate that 2011 Russian parliamentary elections are, indeed, far more
fraudulent compared to presidential election. In terms of fraud probabilities, the finite
mixture model provides us with more conservative estimates compared to Klimek’s es-
timates yielding 64% of fraudulent precincts back in 2011 Duma elections, and 39% in
2012 presidential elections.
Furthermore, Mebane (2016, Table 4)’s estimates illustrate much smaller magnitudes
of election fraud, amounting to 1.5% in the parliamentary elections and 0.68% in the
presidential elections. Specifically, the estimates of the number of votes produced by in-
cremental and extreme frauds (Mebane 2016, 13) show 680,082 (Mi) and 260,254 (Me)
fraudulent votes in 2011 Duma elections and 292,339 (Mi) and 189,912 (Me) fraudulent
votes in 2012 presidential elections (Mi andMe are estimated numbers of votes produced
by incremental and extreme frauds). These findings of fraud magnitudes are inconsistent
with the previous studies yielding the magnitude of election fraud in the range between
5% and 10% (Kalinin & Shpilkin 2012). Similarly to the finite mixture probabilities,
(Mebane 2016)’s estimates of the fraud’s magnitude provide us with the most conserva-
tive estimates of election fraud.
Turning to a more detailed data analysis, Table 2.1 illustrates the effects of voting
machines and observers on turnout and candidates’ vote shares in 2012. In the context
of this research the observed effects of technology on turnout and incumbent’s support
can be regarded as proxies for election fraud, since the installation of electronic voting
machines in precincts makes traditional manipulation, such as ballot stuffing or ballot
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Table 2.1: Effects of KOIBs/KEGs and Observers on Turnout and
Vote Share, 2012
KOIBs KEGs Observers Violations
Putin -0.036??? 0.035?? -0.087??? 0.011
(0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.014)
Zhirinovsky -0.001 -0.007? -0.005??? -0.006
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Zuganov 0.008??? -0.027??? 0.004? -0.011
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008)
Prohorov 0.02??? 0.009? 0.074??? -0.003
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.014)
Turnout -0.003 0.054??? -0.019??? -0.012
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.014)
fi -0.006? -0.053? -0.007x -0.024
(0.003) (0.022) (0.004) (0.025)
fe -0.002? 0.042??? -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 5241 311 1819 54
Notes: Matching is based on a set of observables: number of registered vot-
ers, residence (urban/rural), region (republic/oblast’).
Data: Precinct-level electoral data merged with the data on KOIBs/KEGs
and election observation (number of matched units is provided in Obser-
vations).
Variables: Listed variables show the difference in vote shares for each can-
didate, turnout and the finite mixture model’s estimates between KOIB-
equipped precincts vs. precincts with ballot boxes (“KOIBs”), KEG-
equipped precincts vs. precincts with ballot boxes (“KEGs”), precincts
with observers vs. precincts without observers (“Observers”), precincts
with violations vs. precincts without detected violations (“Violations”).
“Putin”, “Zhirinovsky”, “Zuganov” and “Prohorov” variables stand for
the differences in vote shares for Vladimir Putin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky,
Gennadiy Zuganov and Mikhail Prokhorov, respectively.
Significance levels: xp ≤ 0.1, ?p ≤ 0.05, ??p ≤ 0.01, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.001.
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switching, immensely costly for election administrators.
As mentioned earlier, in order to reduce potential biases due to nonrandom assign-
ment, propensity score model was utilized based on a number of covariates, such as the
number of registered voters, residence (urban/rural) and region (republic/oblast’). Un-
surprisingly, the effect of optical scan voting machines (KOIBs) on turnout and Putin’s
vote count is negative, reducing incumbent’s support by 3.6 percentage points, while for
other candidates it remains positive or statistically insignificant. In other words, com-
pared to KOIBs, ballots boxes seem to provide Putin with statistically significant inflated
support allegedly linked to election fraud. Both our finite mixture measures fi and fe
are consistent with our expectations, indicating statistically significant negative effects of
KOIBs: −0.6 and −0.02 percentage points, respectively. KEGs demonstrate more mixed
findings: this technology results in inflation of 3.5 percentage points in Putin’s vote share,
which is visibly connected to the similar magnitude of extreme fraud fi , i.e. stealing votes
(+4 percentage points). It also seems that the presence of observers decreases Putin’s sup-
port by 9 percentage points and turnout, i.e. ballot stuffing, by about 2 percentage points
with marginally significant fi . Finally, detection of violations by observers seems to exer-
cise no effects on turnout or vote shares of interest. One of the explanations behind KEGs
exhibiting higher levels of election fraud compared to the ballot boxes is their small size
and mobility making it possible to use it in small localities or the rural areas with higher
levels of social connectivity and lower levels of anonymity. Moreover, the use of KEGs
in remote areas is correlated with the lack of proper election observation and elevated
likelihood of electoral malfeasance.
Similar findings are derived from Table 2.2: the presence of KOIBs yields a positive
effect on vote shares for almost all the parties, but negative effect on United Russia’s
vote share as well as turnout reducing each of these estimates by 6.7 and 2 percentage
points, respectively. The statistics of incremental fraud fi demonstrates a reduction in
the estimate by 4 percentage points. In contrast, again, KEGs positively affect United
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Table 2.2: Effects of KOIBs/KEGs on
Turnout and Vote Share, 2011
KOIBs KEGs










Pravoe delo 0.001??? 0.001???
(0.000) (0.000)









Notes: Matching is based on a set of
observables: number of registered vot-
ers, residence (urban/rural), region (repub-
lic/oblast’).
Data: Precinct-level electoral data merged
with the data on KOIBs/KEGs and election
observation (number of matched units is
provided in Observations).
Variables: Listed variables show the differ-
ence in vote shares received by each party,
turnout and the finite mixture model’s es-
timates between KOIB-equipped precincts
vs. precincts with ballot boxes (“KOIBs”),
KEG-equipped precincts vs. precincts
with ballot boxes (“KEGs”). “United Rus-
sia”, “Just Russia”, “LDPR”, “Patriots”,
“KPRF”, “Yabloko” and “Pravoe delo” vari-
ables stand for the differences in vote shares
received by different parties.
Significance levels: xp ≤ 0.1, ?p ≤ 0.05, ??p
≤ 0.01, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.001.
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Russia’s vote share and turnout, inflating them by 6 and 7.4 percentage points each with
the magnitude of incremental fraud fi reaching 5.5 percentage points. This observation
supports our claim that a different mechanism of election fraud tends to be associated
with KEGs rather than KOIBs, and it holds across the elections.
My analysis of 2012 presidential elections on the Moscow level demonstrates that
while KOIBs seem to exercise no effect on Putin’s support, they do seem to reduce turnout
by 6 percentage points and incremental fraud by 12 percentage points. While the pres-
ence of observers seems to contribute to a drop in Putin’s support by 2 percentage points
and Prokhorov’s support by 2 percentage points, none of the forensics measures demon-
strates statistical significance. Finally, detection of violations does not seem to have any
statistically significant impact.
Turning to analysis of parliamentary elections in Moscow, we find more evidence of
blatant fraud (See Table 2.4). KOIBs seem to have reduced United Russia’s support by as
much as 19 percentage points and turnout by almost 12 percentage points, whereas the
electoral support for other participating parties has clearly increased. The measure of in-
cremental fraud has been also reduced by 11 percentage points. The presence of observers
demonstrates a similar pattern of effects, resulting in a drop in support for United Russia
by almost 11 percentage points and turnout by 6.4 percentage points. More importantly,
however, the presence of observers has a negative effect on incremental fraud, reducing it
by almost 5 percentage points. Finally, the detection of violations impacted the measure
of turnout and incremental fraud, reducing both measures by almost 3 percentage points.
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is partly supported by my analysis: in Russia, more vote rigging
is taking place in the polling stations equipped with ballot boxes rather than KOIBs, and
without well-trained observers rather than with them. The measure of incremental fraud
seem to almost always agree with this observation, showing statistical significance with
expected signs and magnitude for effects. Another distinctive finding of my analysis
is that a different underlying mechanism of election fraud related to KEGs seems to be
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Table 2.3: Effects of KOIBs and Observers on Turnout
and Vote Share, Moscow 2012
KOIBs Observers Violations
Putin -0.008 -0.021??? -0.028
(0.007) (0.002) (0.02)
Zhirinovsky 0.003 -0.003??? 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Zuganov 0.005x 0.003??? -0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.007)
Mironov -0.001 0.002??? 0.005x
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Prohorov 0.013?? 0.02??? 0.02
(0.005) (0.002) (0.017)
Turnout -0.055??? 0.004 -0.022
(0.01) (0.003) (0.023)
fi -0.12??? -0.003 -0.053
(0.018) (0.004) (0.051)
fe -0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 253 942 17
Notes: KOIBs(matched), Observers (matched), Violations
(matched). Matching is based on a set of observables: num-
ber of registered voters, votes reported at different times
during the day.
Data: Precinct-level electoral data merged with the data on
KOIBs/KEGs and election observation (number of matched
units is provided in Observations).
Variables: Listed variables show the difference in vote shares
for each candidate, turnout and the finite mixture model’s
estimates between KOIB-equipped precincts vs. precincts
with ballot boxes (“KOIBs”), KEG-equipped precincts vs.
precincts with ballot boxes (“KEGs”), precincts with ob-
servers vs. precincts without observers (“Observers”),
precincts with violations vs. precincts without detected vi-
olations (“Violations”). “Putin”, “Zhirinovsky”, “Zuganov”
and “Prohorov” variables stand for the differences in vote
shares for Vladimir Putin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Gennadiy
Zuganov and Mikhail Prokhorov, respectively.
Significance levels: xp ≤ 0.1, ?p ≤ 0.05, ??p ≤ 0.01, ? ? ?p
≤ 0.001.
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Table 2.4: Effects of KOIBs and Observers on Turnout
and Vote Share, Moscow 2011
KOIBs Observers Violations
Just Russia 0.047??? 0.022??? 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
LDPR 0.051??? 0.017??? 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Patriots 0.005??? 0.002??? -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
KPRF 0.061??? 0.028??? -0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Yabloko 0.035??? 0.035??? 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Pravoe delo 0.003??? 0.001??? 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
United Russia -0.193??? -0.108??? -0.019
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
Turnout -0.118??? -0.064??? -0.027x
(0.01) (0.008) (0.016)
fi -0.111??? -0.045??? -0.034??
(0.015) (0.008) (0.012)
fe 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 250 3163 3163
Notes: KOIBs(matched), Observers (not matched), Violations
(not matched). Matching is based on a set of observables:
number of registered voters, votes reported at different times
during the day.
Data: Precinct-level electoral data merged with the data on
KOIBs/KEGs and election observation (number of matched
units is provided in Observations).
Variables: Listed variables show the difference in vote
shares received by each party, turnout and the finite mix-
ture model’s estimates between KOIB-equipped precincts
vs. precincts with ballot boxes (“KOIBs”), KEG-equipped
precincts vs. precincts with ballot boxes (“KEGs”).
“United Russia”, “Just Russia”, “LDPR”, “Patriots”, “KPRF”,
“Yabloko” and “Pravoe delo” variables stand for the differ-
ences in vote shares received by different parties.
Significance levels: xp ≤ 0.1, ?p ≤ 0.05, ??p ≤ 0.01, ? ? ?p
≤ 0.001.
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occurring: most likely the use of this device in remote areas makes it more susceptible to
election fraud compared to KOIBs.
Next, I present the results from hot spot analysis of Russian 2012 elections based on
the Gi statistic computed using multiple election forensics indicators. The maps display
the “hotspots” of anomalies, indicating whether the mean of values geographically close
to a particular observation differs from the overall mean. The red spots in Figure 2.1(a)
indicate whether there are clusters of atypically high values, i.e. locations where the
local mean of the variable of interest is significantly greater than the overall mean value
f̄i = 0.08. Many red spots are clumped together geographically in predominantly ethnic
regions, such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Mordoviya, Chuvashiya, Dagestan, Chechnya,
as well as some Russian oblast’s: Belgorodskaya and Voronezhskaya oblast’s and several
others, indicating high levels of incremental fraud probabilities. Detailed information
on the number of territories and precincts belonging to anomalous clusters is provided
in Table A.1 of Appendix A. The predominance of blue colored spots, indicating local
average scores being significantly below the overall average, are noticeably concentrated
in the Moscow region and the capital.
Separately built cluster maps for Moscow’s voting in 2011 and 2012 elections do not
seem to reveal any interesting patterns related to anomalies in respective elections (See
Figure A.2). The hotspots for Moscow 2012 elections demonstrate the lack of hetero-
geneity in the values of clusters. Most precincts are blue colored, thus indicating that
compared to Russia’s global mean of 0.08, the majority of Moscow’s precincts exhibit low
values of fraud. Hence, in accordance with our expectations even though 2011 and 2012
elections in Moscow seem to be affected by election anomalies, the Moscow’s case seems
to be not too far away from the fraud’s national average.
Figure 2.1(b) illustrates that the clusters of extreme fraud significantly higher than the
global mean are mostly located in Chechnya and in the northern part of Dagestan, with
smaller clusters located in Tatarstan. While Figure 2.1(c) does not show much evidence
37
of localized anomalies in Putin’s vote counts [CL] against the global mean CL = 4.48, as
it is in close proximity to theoretical expectation, Figure 2.1(d) demonstrates tiny clus-
ters scattered around the blue background with the clumps of red points located in the
northern part of Dagestan (all compared to the global mean of P 05 = 0.21). Anomalies in
turnout display similar findings. In Figure 2.1(e), a small blue cluster is noticeable in the
Tatarstan region. However, in Figure 2.1, the global mean is elevated, informing us that
anomalies of turnout are widespread in Russia. In this sense, Tatarstan looks uniquely
“deflated”. Finally, Figure(f) shows that red-colored signaling patterns occur in mostly
Tatarstan and in the southern Dagestan exceed the global mean of P 05 = 0.22.
The results for Russian parliamentary elections are demonstrated in Figure 2.2. Since
some of the regions changed enumeration of their precincts between the elections in 2012
for which the geodata is available) compared to 2011 (for which there is insufficient geo
data), I removed those regions from my 2011 clustering analysis. As a result, omitted
regions are visible as blank spots on 2011 maps. Nevertheless, my findings still demon-
strate that the geographical patterns of election forensics yield surprising consistency
across both studied elections, even against somewhat elevated global means for 2011 due
to higher levels of electoral anomalies in that year.
As we earlier hypothesized, across different years the clustering patterns are located
in a subset of listed regions, such as Dagestan Republic, Tatarstan Republic, Belgorod-
skaya oblast’, Bashkortostan Republic, Severnaya Osetiya Republic, Kabardino-Balkariya
Republic, Mordoviya Republic, and, finally, Chechnya Republic. For several regions the
finite mixture estimator in some disagreement with the democracy scores, these regions
are Chuvashskaya Republic and Voronezhskaya oblast’.
The finite mixture figures also demonstrate tiny dispersed clusters, which can be at-
tributed to local political machines producing rigged election outcomes.
The next question addressed here relates to the check in geographical consistency be-
tween explored geovalues: if empirical association between these values exists than a sig-
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Figure 2.1: Hotspot and Cluster Outlier Analysis of Forensics Indicators, Russia 2012,




Notes: Overall fraud probability averages are in parentheses. (a) – fi(0.08) ; (b) – fe (0.002); (c) –
Putin[CL](4.48); (d) – Putin[P05] (0.21); (e) – Turnout[CL] (4.939); (f) –Turnout[P05] (0.22).
Measures of anomalies: [P05] – 0s and 5s in the last digit of the turnout percentage and incumbent’s vote
percentage; [CL] – last digits in vote counts and turnout.
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Figure 2.2: Hotspot and Cluster Outlier Analysis of Forensics Indicators, Russia 2011,




Notes: Overall fraud probability averages are in parentheses. (a) – fi (0.11); (b) – fe (0.002); (c) – UR[CL]
(4.47); (d) –UR[P05] (0.21); (e) – Turnout[CL] (4.92); (f) –Turnout[P05] (0.22).
Measures of anomalies: [P05] – 0s and 5s in the last digit of the turnout percentage and incumbent’s vote
percentage; [CL] – last digits in vote counts and turnout.
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Notes: (a) – 2012 presidential elections; (b) – 2011 parliamentary elections.
naling mechanism of election fraud behind the finite mixture estimates can be uncovered
(Kalinin & Mebane 2013). Figures 2.3 (a), (b) contain geographic correlation matrices
between respective geovalues. The categorical variable was coded by assigning to each
of the precinct categories different numeric code. In the cluster analysis we deal with
four basic categories of precincts: “HH” – high value among high values of anomalies;
“LL” – low value among low values of anomalies; “LH” – low value among high values
anomalies; “HL” – high value among low values of anomalies) measured at α = 0.01 or
α = 0.05 significance levels. The obtained categorical variable, which will be utilized in
my correlation analysis, was coded as “-2” – LL,“-1” – HL, “0” – not significant, “1” – LH
and “2” – HH. The rationale for building the variable’s scale starting with cluster’s low
value among low values and ending with high value among high values is to express the
relative strength of clustered election fraud across the precincts.
Our findings demonstrate that for both elections the correlations between the clusters
associated with signaling patterns [P05] in Putin’s/United Russia’s vote shares and signal-
ing patterns in Turnout [P05], on the one hand, as well as between estimated incremental
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fi and extreme frauds fe, on the other hand, are specifically strong (ρ = 0.86 for 2011
elections; ρ = 0.91 for 2012 elections). While moderate correlation is observed between
the clusters indicating extreme fraud and P05 in turnout (ρ = 0.41 for 2011 elections;
ρ = 0.45 for 2012 elections) and UR’s/Putin’s electoral support (ρ = 0.42 for 2011 elec-
tions; ρ = 0.46 for 2012 elections), quite weak correlation persists between incremental
fraud and our P05 indicator for UR’s/Putin’s electoral support(ρ = 0.28 for 2011 elec-
tions; ρ = 0.29 for 2012 elections) and turnout(ρ = 0.27 for 2011 elections; ρ = 0.25 for
2012 elections). This finding demonstrates that the geographic distribution of the finite
mixture fraud probabilities can be also connected to the strength of political machines in
the regions. Moreover, this finding is also backed by our expert evidence, showing that
the list of the regions with the least democracy scores and strongest political machines
matches partially matches the clusters of the finite mixture fraud probabilities.
On the next stage I employ hot spot analysis of Russian elections, by calculating the
mean of precinct-level election forensics indicators for each territory, i.e. subregional
administrative unit. This approach enables us to test if territory-level clusters in any par-
ticular way correlate with the findings based on the precinct-level data analysis. It also
helps to test the hypothesis if the likelihood of election fraud can be attributed to the
territorial level. Moreover, to dismiss the areas with low population density, here I inten-
tionally resort to comparison of precinct-level clusters with the territory-level clusters, by
presenting the map of western part of Russia for both estimated finite mixture measures.
The patterns associated with the territory-level analysis are similar to the patterns
from the precinct-level analysis. In 2012 clusters of incremental frauds fi are persistent
predominantly in ethnic territories of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Mordoviya, Chuvashiya,
Dagestan, Chechnya, Severnaya Osetiya, and of extreme fraud fe, in Chechnya and Dages-
tan. In 2011 clusters of incremental fraud fi are more dispersed involving, in addition to
the previously mentioned regions, Amurskaya, Belgorodskaya, Voronezhskaya oblast’s,
Krasnodarskiy kray, and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya Republic and several others. Extreme
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Notes: Overall fraud probability averages are in parentheses. (a) – fi 2012 (0.09); (b) – fi 2011(0.13); (c) –fe
2012 (0.002); (d) – fe 2011 (0.003).
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fraud fe was still prevalent in the north of Chechnya and Dagestan Republics. Moreover,
since the global mean for 2011 election is elevated compared to 2012, these results indi-
cate the presence of less heterogeneity at higher levels of electoral anomalies. For more
information on the number of territories and precincts belonging to anomalous clusters
check Table A.1 in Appendix A.
Thus, taking into the account the totality of evidence, our Hypothesis 2 is partly con-
firmed by our empirical findings: the geographic clustering tests, indeed, expose the
presence of election fraud clusters mainly located in the areas exhibiting poor demo-
cratic environment and the presence of the strong political machines, these are mainly
the Republics and the rural territories.
Unsurprisingly, the correlation matrix built using territory-level data demonstrates
somewhat weaker findings compared to the point-data correlation matrix. Notably, the
correlations between the estimates of interest for the presidential elections are stronger
compared to the parliamentary elections. Both finite mixture estimates weakly or mod-
erately correlate between each other (ρ = 0.25 for 2011 elections; ρ = 0.45 for 2012 elec-
tions) and the signaling estimate [P05] (ρ = 0.24 for 2011 elections; ρ = 0.39 for 2012 elec-
tions). A moderate correlation seems to occur in 2012 between the estimates measuring
signaling patterns[P05] for turnout and Putin’s support (ρ = 0.33 ). I’ve also implemented
a separate correlation analysis across the elections: its findings illustrate that the finite
mixture estimates and signaling estimates, are closely correlated across both elections as
well, thus, numerically indicating the consistency of election fraud quite noticeable in
the maps.
Hence, the cluster analysis enables us to conclude certain data patterns are well-
captured by the last-digit election forensics measures. The observed correlation between
both finite mixture estimates and signaling indicators[P05] depending on the aggregation
level is moderately strong. Moreover, the territory-level anomalies seem to replicate the
anomalies from the precinct level quite well. This peculiar finding yields two important
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Notes: (a) – 2012 presidential elections; (b) – 2011 parliamentary elections.
derivations. First, with regard to the mechanism we can conclude that in selected terri-
tories election fraud definitely has been organized and coordinated not so much at the
precinct-level, but rather at the higher levels of election commissions. Second, the lack
of precise geographic information about polling stations, namely the absence of precincts
coordinates, does not necessarily preclude us from performing cluster analysis at the ter-
ritory level; the severity of election fraud at the level of polling stations is evident at the
territory level as well.
Thus, empirical analysis is supportive of Hypothesis 3 as well: depending on the elec-
toral context, we observe moderate or strong correlations between the geographic clusters
of the final mixture estimates and the geographic clusters of forensics measures associ-
ated with signaling patterns ([P05] test for turnout and incumbent), as well as anomalous
last digits in vote counts[CL] found at the levels of both precincts and territories. Hence
here we can conclude, that the estimates derived from the finite mixture estimator can
be associated with the subnational agent’s success in mobilizing his regional “political
machine” to provide necessary electoral support for the Kremlin’s candidate or a party.
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This finding has been additionally validated by our Hypothesis 2.
2.7 Conclusion
Even though none of the election forensics statistics provide definitive proof of fraud,
the combination of the data from observers and consideration of technological factors,
along with the various election forensics measures enables us to strengthen our con-
jectures. This research has been specifically aimed at validating an innovative election
forensics tool, i.e. the finite mixture estimator, by engaging alternative data from election
observation, different voting modes and several election forensics measures sensitive to
machine politics in the regions and local areas. All three hypotheses have been confirmed
by my data analysis. New measures of election fraud confirm our expectations about vote
rigging taking place in the polling stations with ballot boxes rather than KOIBs, and with-
out well-trained observers rather than with them. The use of KEGs in remote areas is as-
sociated with the lack of proper election observation and elevated likelihood of electoral
malfeasance – the finite mixture estimator catches this device’s feature really well.
Moreover, our geographic clustering analysis exposes the presence of clusters mainly
located in the areas exhibiting poor democratic climate with strong political machines –
these are mainly the Republics and the rural territories.
In addition to this, based on the presented evidence, it can be also concluded that our
last-digit election forensics indicators can serve as relatively good geo-predictors of the
clusters of these new measures. In other words, there is a relatively strong correlation
between various clusters measured with the help of different forensics indicators, which
is indicative of geographic consistency between various measures of election fraud and
across the Russian elections. Hence, as of now the development of a new election foren-
sics estimator as a part of the Election Forensics Toolkit seems to be very promising, but
surely, this new estimator has to be further validated across multiple electoral, political
and cultural contexts. In my future research I intend to bring in more electoral data and
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implement validation study using several other election forensics methods. This will al-
low systematic comparison of election forensics methods, elucidating possible problems
of validity, and thereby strengthening the election forensics research, in general.
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CHAPTER III
Theory of Loyalty: Signaling Games of Election Frauds
3.1 Introduction
In recent decades authoritarian and formerly authoritarian regimes held many elec-
tions, some truly competitive and some not (Bunce & Wolchik 2011; Hyde 2011; Hyde &
Marinov 2012; Levitsky & Way 2010; Wolchik & Bunce 2010). Election fraud and its de-
tection in those states have been a concern in a large body of literature (Alvarez, Hall, &
Hyde 2008; Bjornlund 2004; Cantu & Saiegh 2011; Fukumoto & Horiuchi 2011; Kalinin &
Mebane 2013; Lehoucq 2003; Myagkov et al. 2009; Schedler 2006; Simpser 2013; Svolik
2012; Wintrobe 1998).
Elections are important for autocrats, because, if rightly controlled by them, elections
periodically demonstrate the regime’s popular support, thus reducing the likelihood of a
coup by disappointed regime notables. Elections solidify the legitimacy of the autocrat
among the general public (Geddes 2006; Magaloni 2006). Elections can provide lots of
information that allows assessment of the strength of the potential opposition in society,
even if the signal is somewhat noisy due to attempts at manipulation and fraud (Gandhi
2008, 167). Moreover, elections can also elicit information about election fraud itself:
specific patterns in electoral data can persist conditional on the strategies of officials and
their success in signaling the loyalty to the leader. This information is especially valuable
to the autocrat, who can use the electoral data to get a snapshot of the loyalty status of
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the local agents, and decide on each agent’s success in mobilizing his regional “political
machine” to provide necessary electoral support to the leader (Gel’man 2009).
While the previous research has shown that, in Russia and elsewhere, fraud can often
be readily detected (Mebane & Kalinin 2009b; Myagkov & Ordeshook 2008; Myagkov et
al. 2008, 2009), it has rarely focused on the mechanisms by which election fraud can be
conducted nationally. In this chapter, I argue that local agents engage in a signaling strat-
egy, wherein election fraud signals loyalty to the leader, who distributes post-election
rewards and punishments based on electoral results and turnout. This approach allows
us to explain the prevalence of anomalous data patterns in turnout and voting percentage
data, specifically the frequency with which a 0 or 5 appears as the last digit in a percent-
age. The Russian case exemplifies this phenomenon quite well: while in the mid-1990s
Russian governors used strategies of bargaining, in which powerful regions provided the
leader with favorable electoral outcomes in exchange for political, institutional and fi-
nancial resources (Treisman 1997a, 1997b), political recentralization in the 2000s has led
to revision of bargaining agreements and the imposition of electoral signaling. In the
Russian case this strategy is employed by regional governors to signal their loyalty to the
leader by means of fraudulently augmented electoral results and to get certain rewards
in exchange, such as political survival or postelectoral transfers.
Signaling strategies and signaling games in the authoritarian setting have been the
subject of previous research. For instance, Simpser (2013) focuses on a ruling party sig-
naling its “strength” by means of increasing the winner’s election margin. By creating a
public impression of his own political dominance, the autocrat is able to discourage the
political opposition from its quest for power (Lohmann 1994; Simpser 2013). Rundlett
and Svolik (2014) claim that to overcome the limited information problem, agents start
relying on the autocrat’s genuine nationwide popularity as a coordination mechanism.
This, however, still leads to Pareto-inferior outcome expressed in an oversupply or un-
dersupply of fraud, resulting from a herd dynamic among agents. Kalinin (2014b) argues
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that the autocrat’s genuine nationwide popularity can be polluted by preference falsifi-
cation, which induces the agents to commit election fraud to cover up any discrepancies
between polling estimates and election results. In other words, election fraud can be seen
as a function of the preference falsification in the pre-electoral surveys, where the “signal
of loyalty” is associated with a close match between the inflated polling estimates and
incumbent’s electoral returns, and vice versa, the “signal of disloyalty” is associated with
a mismatch between both estimates.
To elucidate the institutional foundations of electoral signaling, in this chapter I intro-
duce a game theoretic model—a signaling model (Cho & Kreps 1987)—which is used to
motivate a set of empirical models that are estimated using the data from cross-national
and Russian data (Kalinin & Mebane 2011). My approach utilizes the last digit of the
turnout percentage and incumbent’s vote percentage as the marker of fraud, reducing it
to observation of 0s and 5s in the data (Beber & Scacco 2008). This approach has demon-
strated its relative efficiency as a measure of fraud in our earlier works (Mebane & Kalinin
2009b).
The implications from the game-theoretic model are helpful in our understanding of
the general mechanisms by which specific “signaling” markers such as 0s and 5s occur in
percentages and vote counts across different political regimes. I confirm the predictions
of the model via empirical analysis using data from Russia as well as cross-national data.
The expansion of the “signaling game” to the cross-national realm is possible through
classification of different emergent equilibria. Specifically, the presence of rigged elec-
tions and associated numerical anomalies either in democracies or autocracies can be
explained by a combination of various institutional factors such as regime type (author-
itarian or democratic), system of government (federal or unitary), form of government
(presidential vs. parliamentary). In sum, all these factors preset a specific level of loyalty
of local agents via-a-vis the leader, leading to the described strategic behavior expressed
in signaling strategies.
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The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is threefold. First, it offers
a theoretical model of electoral signaling by bringing together electoral and financial
data. Second, it uses implications from formal modeling to understand the mechanisms
by which the evolution of federal relations in Russia can be connected to election fraud,
and explores the spread of the “signaling” phenomenon worldwide. Finally, this chapter
engages two original datasets collected by the author: the Russian dataset and cross-
national dataset, derived from both Adam Carr’s Election Archive1 — the largest and
most comprehensive archive of electoral statistics from 182 countries, and Government
Finance Statistics(GFS) database managed by the International Monetary Fund.2
The structure is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the idea of signaling and loyalty
in connection to election fraud, while reviewing the literature on this topic. Section 3.3
examines the basic formal model and its extension to cross-national analysis. Section 3.4
formulates basic empirical model used in the Russian and cross-national data analysis.
Section 3.5 contains empirical analysis of the Russian and cross-national data. In the
final part, I draw conclusions and discuss prospects for further research.
3.2 Signaling Strategies and Election Fraud
In authoritarian regimes, the leader and elites collaborate to preclude political partic-
ipation by the population, making it costly for citizens to coordinate and punishing those
who criticize the regime. While most citizens cannot challenge the leader, elites with key
positions in the regime can still oust leaders if they can solve their coordination problem.
Therefore the question becomes to what extent the leader can monitor and punish the
members of elites for expressing their disapproval. In authoritarian regimes, informa-
tion uncertainty about the extent of the leader’s real support among the elites prevents




dilemma becomes possible on the one hand through control of the intelligence organs,
allowing the Leader to monitor and punish the disloyal members, and on the other hand,
through the use of positive incentives to encourage the elites to insure loyalty and compli-
ance. For instance, Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues suggest that this is precisely why
leaders of authoritarian regimes create small winning coalitions: the exchange between
loyalty and private goods available with small winning coalitions strengthens ties be-
tween the leader and the elites (de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow 2004; Gehlbach
2013).
The distribution of rents in exchange for loyalty is undermined by the principal-agent
problem between the autocrat and his local agents, where the agents are willing to en-
gage in fraud only in situations where vested risks are compensated by certain financial
awards, such as rents and payments coming from the principal (Rundlett & Svolik 2014).
This observation is supported by the general theory of agency, arguing that the principal
benefits from giving the agent some rent to induce him to take a desired but unobservable
action and to truthfully reveal his private information. This exchange, however, is costly
in terms of the policymaker’s objective and decreases economic efficiency of the outcome
compared to non-authoritarian states (Dixit 2010).
Even though the repression of various information channels helps an autocrat to effi-
ciently deter any risks associated with the emergence of possible challengers (de Mesquita
et al. 2004; Egorov, Guriev, & Sonin 2009; Wintrobe 1998), elections can still provide a
wealth of useful information. Although manipulation and fraud may make the signal
somewhat noisy, elections allow assessment of the strength of the potential opposition
in a given society (Gandhi 2008, 167). The limited information problem, however, with
regard to the leader’s genuine popularity makes it quite difficult for him and the local
agents to efficiently allocate election frauds throughout the system, as well as to differ-
entiate the costly signals of agent’s loyalty expressed in election frauds. In spite of this,
some parts of the “signaling” information or the fingerprints of electoral fraud are well
52
embedded in the electoral data and can be easily detected by a loyalty-seeking autocrat
or by anomaly-seeking election forensics researchers. In fact, those agents with highest
risks of exclusion from the winning coalition are most likely to radiate stronger signal-
ing patterns (de Mesquita et al. 2004; Gehlbach 2013). In this sense elections serve an
important purpose to the autocrats. If rightly controlled in their hands, elections period-
ically demonstrate the regime’s popular support, thus reducing the likelihood of a coup
by disappointed regime notables, and solidifying the legitimacy of the autocrat among
the general public (Geddes 2006; Magaloni 2006). Also, electoral information enables
the leader to get a snapshot of the loyalty status of the local agents and their success in
mobilizing their regional “political machines” to provide necessary electoral support to
the leader (Gel’man 2009).
Signaling patterns serve as the markers of election fraud within the data, and can
be detected using various kinds of the digit-based tests. For instance, the last-digit vote
counts test (Beber & Scacco 2008) argues that if the turnout or vote counts reflected the
natural complex of processes that cause people to vote or not to vote, we would expect
the counts’ last digits to be uniformly distributed (i.e., each digit zero through nine would
occur equally often). The rational strategic patterns of election fraud can be detected by
the second-digit test: we might expect that if substantial vote switching or ballot stuffing
is occurring, we should see significant departures from the Benford’s expected mean for
the second digit (j̄B = 4.187) (Mebane 2010; Mebane & Kalinin 2009a). The patterns in
the data resulted from the use of signaling strategies are best explored by the “last digit
of percentages” of turnout or voting percentages, which is a special case of the Beber and
Scacco (2008) approach. According to Kalinin and Mebane (2013) the signaling strategies
are explicitly present when the expected value for the mean of this indicator variable is
significantly higher E(P 05s) = 0.2.
In fact, the notion of signaling strategies has been especially acute during the Soviet
period. During this time, governors would use “false accounting” (pripiski), designed to
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affect the measures of the level of regional output and help them to avoid punishment
(Harrison 2009). Because of this “false accounting”, it comes as no surprise that with
the start of new Russian recentralization in 2000s, such Soviet practices were restored in
relation to Russian contemporary elections. As a result, the presence of electoral fraud
became a basic signaling mechanism of regional bosses’ loyalty and of their ability to con-
trol administrative resources to the Kremlin’s benefit. Electoral signaling can be readily
detected by analyzing the percentages of electoral outcomes. If electoral signaling occurs,
electoral “pripiski” are most likely to take place with rounded percentages of turnout or
vote percentages, which is the easiest and most readily detected way to report basic in-
formation to superiors. In such cases, favorable percentages are first sent down from
the Kremlin to the regional elections commissions, which passes this information further
down to the territory-level commissions and, finally, precincts (Kalinin & Mebane 2013).
One of the obvious ways to detect signaling patterns is to display kernel density esti-
mates for precinct-level incumbent’s vote shares and turnout for the Russian presidential
elections. For most of the years, the figures in Figure 3.1 show the presence of non-
normal distributions, exhibiting spikes at locations corresponding to the excess of vote
shares and turnout values at values of 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85% and 90% (Buzin
& Lubarev 2008; Mebane & Kalinin 2009a, 2009b). The authors argue that the only ac-
ceptable explanation for the spiked distributions is a wide-spread adjustment of those
figures to specific “rounded” figures. Inspecting the last digits of the original precinct-
level turnout counts adds to the impression that many of them are faked. If the turnout
counts reflected the natural complex of processes that cause people to vote or not to vote,
we would expect the counts’ last digits to be uniformly distributed, i.e. each digit zero
through nine would occur equally often (Beber & Scacco 2008). Table C.1 in Appendix
C shows for each digit the signed square root of the discrepancy between the observed
frequency of the digit and the frequency of 0.1 expected if the distribution is uniform.
The distribution of the last digits in the actual turnout counts from 2003-2012 is very
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often far from uniform for both presidential and parliamentary elections.
A value of 2.0 or greater in magnitude represents a significant discrepancy. The table
shows that across all Russian elections there are always too many zeros and fives, with
one exception too few nines.
The rise in political centralization leads to integration of local agents into the super-
structure of the center with economic and political resources flowing from the leader to
subnational units. From the cross-national perspective, the unitary system of govern-
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ment, in which the center delegates authority to subnational units, making subnational
units more dependant on its political and economic resources, should be prone to sig-
naling strategies. Moreover, in the federal system of government without gubernatorial
election, i.e. de facto unitary systems, such as Russia’s, one would expect the presence
of similar signaling patterns. The signaling game is built around the political loyalty,
defined as the local agent’s ability to control the political, social and economic spheres in
the dependent region so as to provide the leader with the favorable electoral outcomes.
In return for electoral outcomes, agents can be rewarded with financial inflows or ap-
pointments, or, in the event of a negative outcome, punished by the leader. Even when
the political regime is stable and durable, the actual benefits from committing election
frauds could far outweigh the actual costs, inducing the local agents to adopt their sig-
naling strategies on a regular basis (Rundlett & Svolik 2014). The federal systems of gov-
ernment can be characterized by signaling strategies of subnational agents in the same
way as the unitary. For instance, Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (2004) observe in
a federal system, regional executives’ “aggressive programs of improving their units’ po-
sition” may extend to elections: “If, for instance, the enforcement of antifraud election
provisions is weak or nonexistent, and if regional chief executives can influence voting or
the tabulation of votes for national as well as regional offices, then those executives pos-
sess a powerful asset that can be used to short-circuit constitutional provisions written to
direct federal bargaining elsewhere” (Filippov et al. 2004, 119).
This chapter argues that the pattern of fraudulent electoral results can be explained by
the presence of signaling games between the regions and the Leader/Center. Fraudulent
electoral results show how favorable electoral results can be delivered by the regional
elites to display their loyalty to the Leader/Center in exchange for administrative and
financial rewards.
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3.3 A Formal Model
Consider the signaling game (Cho & Kreps 1987) represented by the diagram in Fig-
ure. 3.23 N denotes a random move by Nature to produce a first player (the local agent or
the governor, G) who is either loyal (L) or not (¬L). Then Prob(L) = λ and Prob(¬L) = 1−λ.
In the election the governor then either commits fraud (F) or not (¬F). Player 2 (the
Leader, K) does not know whether G is loyal, but K does observe G’s move. K then ei-
ther punishes (P ) or not (¬P ). The payoffs are given at the bottom of Figure 3.2. The
interpretation of the symbols used in the payoff definitions is as follows.
• w ≥ 0 is the value of electoral punishment by voters for fraud committed in the
election; w > 0 — the value of electoral punishment when elections take place, and
w = 0 — the value of electoral punishment when elections are absent.
• p > 0 is the value of punishment imposed by K
• v > 0 is the value of excess votes produced by fraud
• t > 0 is the value of transfers from K to G
• b is a coefficient that when multiplied by t gives the present discounted value of the
future expected to be produced by a transfer; this may be positive or negative
• d > 0 is the value to K of replacing a disloyal G
Given equivalent actions by K, fraud is always worse for G due to the sanction from
voters. That is, if G is loyal and K always punishes, then playing F gives G a payoff of
−w − p while playing ¬F gives −p. If there is no sanction from voters, w = 0, then F and
¬F give G the same payoff given an identical response from K. The payoffs to G from F
are always w subtracted from the corresponding payoff from ¬F.
3A more detailed description of the formal model can be found in Kalinin and Mebane (2013)
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Figure 3.2: Game Diagram
symbol G C
A −w − p v − p
B −w+ t (b − 1)t + v
C −w − p v − p+ d
D −w+ (b+ 1)t v − t
E −p −p
G t (b − 1)t
H −p −p+ d
I (b+ 1)t −t
If fraud happens, K always gains excess votes v. If K doesn’t punish, then G always
gains a transfer from K, t, which costs −t to K. If K punishes, then G always loses −p
which also costs −p to K. But if a disloyal G is punished (e.g., fired), then K gains d.
One key difference between a loyal G and a disloyal one is who retains any future
surplus generated by a transfer from K. Compare the payoffs when a loyal G commits
fraud and is not punished to the payoffs when a disloyal G commits fraud and is not
punished: the difference is that the term bt is added toK’s payoff in the former case but is
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added to G’s payoff in the latter case. A similar situation holds when G does not commit
fraud and is not punished: the disloyal G retains the surplus while with a loyal G K retains
the surplus.
The game is presented in multiagent normal form (Myerson 1991). The strategies
of the loyal G are now denoted F1 and ¬F1 while the disloyal G’s strategies are F2 and
¬F2. K’s strategies are now P1 and ¬P1 if acting after fraud and are P2 and ¬P2 if acting
after no fraud. The multiagent strategic normal form of the game appears in Table B.1
of Appendix B. The necessary conditions for a perfect Nash equilibrium are tested for
the set of possible pure strategy equilibria. The strategy profiles along with the payoffs
that go to G and K are listed in Table B.2 of Appendix B. The strategy profiles, the results
of testing whether the profile can be a Nash equilibrium and a brief description of the
requirements for the profile to be an equilibrium appear in Table B.3 of Appendix B. The
tests are done by comparing payoffs produced with each profile to the payoffs produced
with the profiles produced by changing each agent’s strategy while holding the other
strategies constant.
According to the signaling model, four parameters are central to our understanding of
why specific equilibria hold and why, in particular, the “electoral signaling” equilibrium
arises. These parameters are d, the value to the Leader of replacing a disloyal governor,
λ, the probability that a governor is loyal, which is presumably increased by having the
governor be appointed instead of elected, b, the future returns expected to be produced
by a transfer, and w, the value of electoral punishment by voters for fraud committed
in the election. Here loyalty is regarded as a choice each governor makes and not an
immutable personality trait, λ ∈ (0,1): λ = 0 indicates no chance of loyal governor at all,
and λ = 1, a high chance of loyalty.
Several profiles that can be equilibria have conditions that require either λ = 0 or
λ = 1 (See Table B.3 in Appendix B). These are the profiles labeled I*, II*, V*, VI*, XI* and
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XVI*.4
While some of these equilibria have potentially interesting features, the condition
λ = 0—no chance of loyalty at all—is too extreme. Once elections are abolished or all gov-
ernors are appointed, the circumstance of K being certain of G’s loyalty (λ = 1) becomes
at least thinkable, but first we will consider equilibria that admit uncertainty: λ ∈ (0,1).
The profiles that can be equilibria and admit uncertainty about G’s loyalty are the ones
labeled III*, IX*, XII* and XV*.5
The signaling theory implies that over all the country, regions are diverse, so a single
configuration of the parameter values of the game model does not characterize the whole
country.6 The future returns expected from a transfer, b, may be positive or negative.
Negative b values are associated with corruption and political opportunism: as far as the
Leader is concerned, economic resources transferred to a corrupt region are expected to
produce no significant value in the future, and if the resources facilitate regions’ gaining
further autonomy and even independence, the return on transfers to a region may even
be evaluated as strictly negative. Alternatively, b may be positive. Indeed, if b is like
a normal investment, we should have b ≥ 1: the transfer is at least expected to pay for
itself. Different regions may at any one time have different values of b. For instance,
during the 1990s, the threat of regions leaving the Russian Federation was very real, so b
was negative. For this period, the game model does not explain the relationship that may
exist between election fraud and postelection transfers as well, but when the model is
applied it suggests that when b < 0, the relationship between election fraud and transfers
is such that governors who commit fraud are likely worse off than governors who do not.
In the case of greater centralization, the clearest change is that the value of d becomes
4Explicitly, these profiles are I*, (F1,F2,¬P1,¬P2); II*, (F1,¬F2,¬P1, P2); V*, (F1,¬F2, P1,¬P2); VI*,
(F1,¬F2,¬P1,¬P2); XI*, (¬F1,F2,¬P1, P2) and XVI*, (¬F1,F2,¬P1,¬P2).
5Explicitly, these profiles are III*, (F1,F2,¬P1, P2); IX*, (F1,F2, P1, P2); XII*, (¬F1,¬F2,¬P1, P2) and XV*,
(¬F1,¬F2, P1,¬P2).
6Note that we have modeled the relationship between the Leader and one governor. It is assumed that
the Leader plays such a game independently in each region, and that regional actors learn nothing from
one another’s experience. Reality undoubtedly involves more interaction between regions than this, but it
is intractable to extend the game to one in which the Leader simultaneously interacts with all other regions.
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high and increasing over time. The increase in d reflects how local “political machines”
were coopted into the power vertical. As long as the loyalty of governors is not certain—
0 < λ < 1—and b < 0, there may be an alternation between III*, in which both types of
governors commit fraud, and XV*, in which neither type of governors commits fraud—
an alternation that is related to transfers and punishments and depends on loyalty. As
a result, this will induce an association between transfers and punishments, on the one
hand, and election fraud, on the other. With regards to Russia, for instance, recentral-
ization greatly reduced separatist concerns, so that perhaps b > 0. A positive value of b
would rule out XV* as an equilibrium. Recentralization likely raised the typical value of
λ, so that b may more often exceed the lower bound. In the period before gubernatorial
elections were abolished—in particular 2004—this may imply an alternation between III*
and XII*. Now a payoff of −w + t[1 + b(1−λ)] to the governor who commits fraud, under
III*, is likely positive, while the payoff to a governor who does not commit fraud, under
XII*, is −p < 0.
Once regional elections take place or all governors are appointed, as in Russia in 2008,
w = 0 rules out XII*. If b > 0 and having governors be appointed means that often λ = 1,
then VI*, or (F1,¬F2,¬P1,¬P2), comes into play as a possible equilibrium alternative to
III*, with the alternation between the two depending on the balance between transfers
and punishments. If transfers are high enough, VI* may come into play so that only truly
loyal governors commit fraud. The occurrence of both III* and VI* would complicate
assessing the relationship between transfers, punishments and fraud, because in III* gov-
ernors commit fraud and are not punished while in VI* governors commit fraud and are
punished. Nonetheless, III* and VI* give identical payoffs if λ = 1. If often b < 0 notwith-
standing recentralization, then II* can explain why high λ goes with fraud and higher
transfers, and low λ goes with no fraud and lower transfers, if the value of b is associated
with λ.
To summarize, for Russia in the 1990s the game model does not explain the rela-
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tionship that may exist between election fraud and postelection transfers very well. In
the 2000s the clearest change is that the value of d becomes high and increasing over
time: recentralization signals such a change, and the abolition of gubernatorial elections
in 2004 decisively indicates it. The increase in d reflects how local “political machines”
were coopted into the power vertical. This will induce an association between transfers
and punishments, on the one hand, and election fraud, on the other.
Hypothesis 1: In Russia of the 90s, elements of bargaining prevent the observation of signaling
model, whereas in 2000, fraud-signal-transfers-reward regime seems to be fully in place.
The signaling model can be extended to the cross-national setting as well. This game is
characterized by multiple equilibria, which can be successfully mapped using the param-
eters from equilibria conditions, onto different typologies of political regimes (autocracy
vs. democracy), political systems (federal system vs. unitary system), the presence or ab-
sence of regional elections. Table 3.17 presents all the equilibria profiles with conditions
containing both institutional loyalty λ, being a function of political regime, political sys-
tem, and electoral punishment w denoting the presence of regional elections. The table
depicts the results of matching regime type with the system of government. Intuitively
the magnitude of λ has been divided into three broad categories with high, medium and
low values of λ. Depending on the degree of the institutional loyalty and the presence
of electoral punishment of the governors ceteris paribus, the probability of electoral sig-
naling with voter fraud and subsequent rewards/punishments is expected to differ. The
table shows that in highly centralized authoritarian regimes with the absence of possibil-
ity of electoral punishment on behalf of the voters, i.e. with high levels of institutional
loyalty λ, the local agents will be more prone to signaling strategies directed to the Leader
by means of fraudulently augmented turnout or inflated voting support for the ruling
party/candidate.
7The Table is built based on the Table B.3 in Appendix B. Only those equilibria were selected in which
w, and λ are defined, except (¬F1,¬F2,¬P1, P2).
λ = f (Regime,System,w).
(F1,F2,¬P1, P2) equilibrium is defined for λ ∈ [0,1].
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For the purpose of my analysis, only those equilibria have been classified which con-
tain both the value of λ, reflecting the local agent’s loyalty at the country-level, and w,
entailing the presence or the absence of the regional elections with which the electoral
punishment for the voter fraud takes place.
High level of loyalty (λ = 1) corresponds to hard authoritarian regimes. According to
the Table 3.1, the federal system of government in those regimes implies modest levels of
electoral punishment with only loyal type of the governor committing fraud; in contrast,
the unitary system of government with absent elections of the regional heads suggests two
separate equilibria outcomes: the one in which both types of the governors commit fraud,
and the one in which only the loyal type commits fraud (it holds when the amount of
transfers exceed the amount of punishment and the future cash flows are positive). As far
as the Leader’s punishment is concerned, both types of local agents tend to be punished
for their actions in the case of the federal system of government. One of the feasible
reasons for this is that those regional heads who are engaged in committing election fraud
are likely to be ousted by the voters at the regional elections. This incentivizes the Leader
to outpace the unhappy voters and financially punish such a governor after the signaling
has been spotted. In contrast, in the unitary systems of government election fraud is
never punished by the Leader.
A similar logic of mapping equilibria outcomes has been applied to soft authoritarian
regimes, where the value of λ is found in the range between 0 and 1. Table 3.1 demon-
strates that within the federal regimes, election fraud is never conducted by any of the
agents and none of them is punished for the rigged election outcomes. In contrast, the
model predicts that in soft authoritarian regimes with the unitary system of government
(w = 0) always experience election fraud which is strategically exercised by both types
of the agents, but the Leader’s punishment strategy is quite ambiguous. The observation
of both types of local agents tending to resort to election fraud, can be understood from
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costless signaling (w = 0) , inducing the nonloyal type of local agents to imitate its loyalty
towards the Leader. Hence,
Hypothesis 2: In autocracies one would observe electoral signaling in both the federal and the
unitary systems of government higher than in democracies.
The democratic regime is characterized with a low level of institutional loyalty to the
Leader (λ = 0) for the unitary system of government, and undefined λ for the federal
system of government. In the case of the federal system of government, none of the
agents commits actual election fraud and none of them is punished, the situation in the
unitary states is much more sophisticated. (¬F1,¬F2,¬P1, P2) is the only equilibrium with
undefined λ. This equilibrium fits democracies with the federal system of government
quite well. In the unitary system of government election fraud conducted by nonloyal
agent, only happens in the situation, where w = 0. Moreover, the nonloyal agent can
always avoid punishment for conducting election fraud. The same is true for the loyal
agent who never commits election fraud and is never punished. Hence,
Hypothesis 3: In democracies one would observe greater electoral signaling in the case of the
federal system of government, suggesting the presence of subnational authoritarianism, and
only nonloyal type of the local agent committing fraud in the unitary system.
The efficiency of signaling in determining the agents’ loyalty status by the Leader is
one of the most important implications of the equilibria analysis. It is determined by
the type of the equilibria outcome, facilitating the Leader’s ability to learn about agent’s
type: in a pooling equilibrium with two different types choosing the same message and in
a separating equilibrium different types selecting different messages. In the hard author-
itarian regimes both systems of federal government imply separating equilibria, making
it easier for the Leader to learn about the agent’s type, with the loyal type always re-
sorting to election fraud and nonloyal type always abstaining from it. Conversely in a
soft authoritarian regime with the unitary system of government both types will commit
election fraud, making it impossible for the Leader to disentangle them. The latter situa-
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tion, resulting in the Leader being unable to determine if the present discounted value of
the future expected to be produced by a transfer would belong to him or to the nonloyal
agents. If we turn our attention to equilibria profiles of the soft authoritarian regimes, we
would find the constellation of pooling equilibria, in which the nonloyal type of the agent
fully imitates the strategic behavior of the loyal types. In the case of the federal system of
government none of the agent types implements election fraud, fearing retaliation from
the voters, whereas in the unitary system of government both types do.8 In contrast to
conventional wisdom, the observation of multiple pooling equilibria with widely spread
imitational strategies of nonloyal agents would be in place under the soft authoritarian-
ism. Finally, democratic regimes are characterized by one pooling equilibria, in which
none of the types conducts election fraud (federal system of government), and two sep-
arating equilibria with the loyal type abstaining from election fraud and nonloyal type
conducting it (unitary system of government).
The equilibrium analysis across multiple regime types provides us with an important
insight on the sources of election fraud: in the hard authoritarian regime we would pre-
dict mostly loyal types of local agents conducting election fraud and getting away with it.
In the soft authoritarian regimes both types act more synchronically in delivering fraud-
ulent results with the ambiguous punishment patterns. Finally, in democratic regimes
loyal types never conduct election fraud, but nonloyal types of the governors do, which
partially undermines the notion that the opposition is interested in playing by democratic
rules (Przeworski 1991).
3.4 Basic Empirical Model and Its Variants
To interpret the empirical model, transfers t are not defined by the totality of actual
transfers from the Leader to regional governments, but rather as a deviation from the
8Of course, the local agent in order to avoid punishment by the electorate, can attempt to falsify the
regional elections as well. However, my basic assumption implies that in the federal states the regime will
be hosting free and fair elections w = 1.
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plain relationship between successive years’ transfers. That is, if the regression of total
transfers T in region i in the year immediately following the election, s, on the level of
transfers in the year preceding the election, s−, is written Tit = c0 + c1Tit− +uit, for distur-
bance uit and coefficients c0 and c1, then the amount of transfers subject to manipulation
may be represented by a term tit in the form
Tit = b0 + b1Tit− + tit + eit . (3.1)
The coefficients c1 and b1 should be close to 1.0, capturing the relative stability of the
social and economic needs and resources that affect the total amount of transfers going
to an area, tit can be thought as a short-run distortion. In particular tit exists in the year
following a presidential election. The game model motivates a special form for tit that
is discussed further below. The point to make now is that for the game model’s b to be
interpreted in terms of the future returns associated with the component tit of Tit and not
with the entirety of Tit.
My empirical data analysis is divided into two parts: (1) the analysis of authoritarian
regime, such as Russia, and (2) cross-national analysis using the aggregated electoral
results.
3.4.1 Empirical Model for Russia
The empirical model is motivated by the associations suggested by the game model,
focusing on the form of the short-run distortion term tit. The empirical model does not
follow in any direct way from the game model, but rather picks up on its core idea that
the signaling structure induces a short-run distortion in transfer payments that depends
on election fraud and loyalty. I analyze data measuring Tit, transfer payments to region i
for postelection year s: Tit measures the amount of transfers per 10,000 people allocated
to the region. Tit is a function of preelection transfer payments (Tit−) and other variables
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in models of the form
Tit = b0 + z
′






where b0 is a constant term and c and d are vectors of coefficients, zit is a vector of
covariates, fit is a vector of fraud measures, λi is a function to be defined that represents
the probability the governor is loyal and eit is a normally distributed disturbance. zit
contains variables that plausibly affect the level of transfer payments from Leader to each
region. The term λitf′itg corresponds to the idea expressed by tit in (3.1), for particular
fraud measures fit and particular functional forms for λit: postelection transfer payments
are a function of readily observable fraud signals, depending on the probability of loyalty.
For some years (1996, 2000) there is territory-level election data. For other years (2004,
2008) I have both territory- and precinct-level (UIK-level) election data.
To measure election fraud, I use Frauds Indices, defined as follows. First compute
voter turnout and incumbent’s percentage in the presidential election for each precinct
or territory as a percentage rounded to the nearest digit. Define two variables turnout-
last0 and incumbentlast0 that is equal to 1 if the last digit of turnout and incum-
bent’s variable is a zero and equal to 0 for other digits, and define another pair of vari-
ables turnoutlast5 and incumbentlast5 that is equal to 1 if the last digit is a five
and equal to 0 for other digits. The variables Turnoutf raudf0 and Incumbentf raudf0 are
the means of turnoutlast0 and incumbentlast0 for each region, and Turnoutf raudf5,
Incumbentf raudf5 are the means of turnoutlast5 and incumbentlast5. The Frauds In-
dices are fraudT0it,fraudI0it,fraudT5it,fraudI5it.
Vector zit contains other variables that may relate to transfer payments: Republicsit is
a dummy variable measuring whether a region belongs to a Republic10; Incumbentit is the
percent of the incumbent party’s electoral support in the region (in 1996 the incumbent
9Because of the convergence issues Tit− enters the model only as a part of λi component, which is a
substantial departure from the original model.
10Republics are Russian regions with predominantly the non-Russian ethnicity.
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is Yeltsin, in 2000 and 2004 it is Putin, and in 2008 it is Medvedev); and turnoutit is the
turnout percentage defined above.
The term λit represents a notion of loyalty slightly different from that in the game
model. The game has the governor moving before Leader, with Nature first selecting the
type of the governor. In reality the governor makes a decision whether to be loyal, in
response to anticipations of what Leader will do and in light of preelection conditions.
Among those conditions are preelection actions by the Leader. A simple way to connect
preelection actions to the game model is to imagine that they influence the value of λ: pre-
election actions affect the likelihood that the governor is loyal. Here the λit is defined as a
logistic function of preelection transfers (Tit− or Transfersit) and possibly several other
preelection variables: Appointedit, a dummy variable measuring whether the governor
was appointed a year before the elections; Bilateralit, a dummy variable measuring
whether the regions signed a bilateral treaty by the year of elections; and GovernorURit,
a dummy variable measuring whether a governor openly supported Unity/United Russia
after 1999 parliamentary elections. The formulation is
λit =
1
1 + exp(−a0 − x′ita)
(3.3)
where a0 is a constant, xit is a vector containing Transfersit and possibly some of the
other preelection covariates, and a is a vector of coefficients. Variables Appointedit and
GovernorURit measure actions affecting or taken by the governor that would suggest the
governor is loyal, and Bilateralit indicates disloyalty. Higher preelection transfers may
indicate either the presence or purchase of loyalty (Hyde & O’Mahony 2010).
The rationale behind selection of the nonlinear functional form is explained by esti-
mation of loyalty. Since we are dealing with probabilities of loyalty, we need to have a
function that naturally varies between 0 and 1. Moreover, logistic function has a good
theoretical underpinning. Both lower and higher levels of loyalty are associated with the
weaker effect of loyalty on dependent variable (election fraud or transfers), which can
69
be especially the case if the Leader is indifferent between too small or too large levels of
loyalty.
The model (3.2) represents a very simple implementation of a mixture model. Fraud
measures and transfers are related when the governor is loyal and not otherwise. The
probability that the governor is loyal is measured by λit. All parameters are assumed
to be identical for the various types of governors, so the interaction term involving λit
is sufficient to represent the mixture. Conceptually, the fraud variables play a role only
when the governor is loyal. Regression relationships based on linear predictors are not
specifically implied by suggested theoretical model, but they represent the easiest way to
get at possible relationships, taking into account the likelihood that multiple, correlated
and conceptually distinct variables are associated with the occurrence of fraud.
The theoretical model supports different predictions about the relationships among
fraud, transfers and other variables in different time periods. The game model suggests
that transfers will be negatively associated with measures of fraud, where loyalty is rel-
atively high, during the 1990s. During the 2000s, once the Kremlin commences recen-
tralization and Putin comes to power, and particularly after 2004 when gubernatorial
elections are abolished, the game model predicts that when loyalty is high the incidence
of fraud will be positively associated with transfers.
To guide the choice of what to include in xit, I include the vector of variables that
relate directly to the probability that the governor is loyal: substantive judgments about
what factors matter. This principle draws on the judgment that different institutional
arrangements existed at different times, so that actions to incentivize or reflect loyalty are
different at different times. It is always assumed that xit includes Transfersit, preelec-
tion transfers. The Appointedit variable enters the equation in 1996 and 2008, because
when these three elections occurred, some governors were appointed while others were
elected.11 Variable GovernorURit, used in years 2000, 2004 and 2008 to indicate whether
11The 2004 presidential election held on March 14, 2004, before gubernatorial elections were abolished
at the end of 2004.
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the governor was nominated on the United Russia ballot in the previous parliamentary
elections (1999, 2003 and 2007), measures how closely affiliated a governor is to the party
of power Unity/United Russia and the governor’s predisposition to use necessary eco-
nomic and administrative resources of the region to support the Kremlin’s candidate at
the presidential elections. Variable bilateralit, used in years 1996, 2000 and 2004 to
indicate whether the region has signed a bilateral treaty with the Leader, measures the
political autonomy of the governor from the Leader.12 Because most bilateral treaties
were abolished after 2004, bilateralit is excluded in 2008.
3.4.2 Empirical Model for Cross-National Analysis
For the purpose of cross-national analysis I resort to nonlinear least squares model
specifications with postelectoral transfers serving as a response variable. The proposed
mixture model implies that the future short-run distortions in the levels of financial cen-
tralization result from the interaction effects between the election fraud measures and the
institutional loyalty λit, which also encompasses the measure of financial centralization in
a given electoral year. Here I propose a slightly revised variant of the model estimated
for the Russian case, and adopted it to cross-national analysis:








where b0 is a coefficient and c and d are vectors of coefficients, zit is a vector of covari-
ates, yit is a vector of time covariates, fit is a vector of fraud measures, λit is a function
to be defined that represents the probability of institutional loyalty. In this case loy-
alty is represented by λit, which can be defined as a logistic function of key institutional
variables: Appointedit — a dummy variable denoting whether the regional executives
12In Russia bilateral treaties have been negotiated between the Center and forty-seven regions during the
90s. These assumed the provision of additional economic resources in exchange of political support for the
Kremlin’s policies.
13Because of convergence issues Tit− enters the model only as a λi component, which is a substantial
departure from the original model.
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are appointed by the central authorities or not; Polityit —an interval variable defining
regime’s level of democracy; Presidentialit — a dummy variable specifying the form of
government (presidential vs. parliamentary); Federalit — a dummy variable denoting
the system of government (federal vs. unitary). I also added two additional controls:
Ralliesit, which is a total sum of three components: strikes, rallies and demonstrations
from the “Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive” and lagged annual GDP growth rate
taken from the World Bank data (GDPgrowthit). The vector zit contains variables that
plausibly affect the level of transfer payments to subnational units. The term λitf′itd cor-
responds to the idea expressed by tit in model (3.1), for particular fraud measures fit
and particular functional forms for λit: postelection transfer payments are a function of
readily observable fraud signals, depending on the probability of loyalty.
All the nonlinear least squares models for the Russian and cross-national data were
estimated using nls2() function in R.
3.5 Empirical Data Analysis
The data used in this research were taken from multiple sources. The data on finan-
cial transfers for different periods were kindly provided by Daniel Treisman and Andrei
Starodubtsev. The data on governor’s affiliation with United Russia in 2003 and 2008
were kindly given by Olesya Tkacheva. The electoral data for 1996 and 2000 presidential
elections were provided by Alexei Sidorenko. The data for 1996 and 2000 include only
territory-level election reports. The electoral data for 2004 and 2008 were obtained from
the website of Russian Central Elections Commission (http://www.cikrf.ru). The data
for 2004 and 2008 include both precinct-level (UIK-level) and territory-level election re-
ports. Other data were collected by the author from the databases of Federal State Statis-
tics Service and the websites of regional administrations. The cross-national electoral
data on comes from Adam Carr’s Election Archive. An additional measure of election
fraud capturing the extra-constitutional irregularities was been drawn from the Database
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of Political Institutions. The financial data on fiscal decentralization was been taken from
the Government Finance Statistics(GFS) database managed by the International Monetary
Fund.
3.5.1 Empirical Analysis of the Russian Case
Electoral signaling can be readily detected by analyzing the percentages of electoral
outcomes. If electoral signaling occurs, electoral manipulations with figures are most
likely to take place with rounded percentages of turnout or incumbent’s vote percentages,
which is the easiest and most readily detected way to report basic information to superi-
ors. In such case, favorable percentages are first sent down from Kremlin to the regional
elections commissions, which pass this information further down to the territory-level
commissions and, finally, precincts. Of course there is no direct evidence that this “pass-
ing down” is the precise procedure used to commit the fraud I allege exist, nor is reliable
information available about exactly how the fraud is implemented. Ballot box stuffing
and simply writing down false numbers are likely mechanisms (e.g. Boldyrev 2012), but
also likely is fraud using phony voter registrations (Arbatskaya 2004) or perhaps other
methods (Lehoucq 2003). Since the territory-level commissions serve as an intermedi-
ate body between regional and precinct level commissions, I suppose that these have the
highest leverage to produce faked numbers in the system and report them to the upper
level in percentages. Thus I expect numeric anomalies with percentages to be detected at
both tiers of the system, i.e. at both precinct and territory levels.
The results from the multivariate regression analysis are presented in Tables 3.2 and
3.3. Since the sample size used in this analysis is small and there is no substantive justifi-
cation for which outliers should be excluded, I keep all of the observations in multivari-
ate regression analysis and account for any possible outliers by reporting White’s robust
standard errors. To estimate the model (3.3) here I apply to nonlinear least squares us-
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ing transfer payments, Tit, measured in postelection years 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2009.14
Each model is estimated for each year separately. Moreover, two different indicators of
transfers designed to check robustness of my findings are included as dependent vari-
ables: transfers per capita and the proportion of transfers in the regional revenues. For
1996 the model is estimated separately for the first and the second round elections using
fraud measures derived respectively from each election (see models M(01) and M(02) in
Table 3.215). In 1996 λi is a function of several loyalty indicators including Transfersit,
Bilateralit, and Appointedit, where only Transfersit yields statistically significant pos-
itive coefficient for â1 in the first model. My initial expectation that none of the coefficient
estimates f̂0 and f̂5 of the Frauds Index yield statistically significant results for the 90s is
supported by the findings: only the effect of anomalies in incumbent’s vote shares f̂5 is
positive and significantly different from zero. In both rounds of elections fraud, as mea-
sured by the Frauds Index measures, seems to play only limited role in signaling, while
preelection transfers show statistically significant effects on postelection transfers.
The model M(03) in Table 3.2 reports results for 2000. As one would expect, the coef-
ficient estimate â1 for Transfersit in λit is significantly positive. Besides, the coefficient
estimates for Putin’s vote percentages f̂0 and f̂5 and for anomalies in turnout f̂5 are also
characterized by positive and statistically significant effects. This finding bears the evi-
dence about election forensics measures being indicative of the relatively larger signaling
phenomena taking place in 2000 compared to 1996.
Models M(04) and M(05) report the results for 2004 based on territory-level and
precinct-level election returns. Again, the coefficient estimates for pre-electoral Transfersit
yield a positive statistically significant effect. GovernorURit in both models yield negative
effects that are statistically significant at α = 0.1. While the original intuition suggests
14For estimation we use the nls() function of R (R Development Core Team 2011).
15Transfersit = b0+c1Republicsit+c2Incumbentit+c3Turnoutit+f0fraudT0it+f5fraudT5it+f0fraudI0it+
f5fraudI5it +λit +λit · (f0fraudT0it + f5fraudT5it + f0fraudI0it + f5fraudI5it) + eit ,
λit =
1
1 + exp{−(a0 + a1Transfersit− + a2Bilateralit + a3GovernorURit + a4Appointedit)}
.
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Table 3.2: Postelectoral Model: Effect of Election Fraud on Logged Transfers Per Capita
M(01) M(02) M(03) M(04) M(05) M(06) M(07)
Constant b0 -1.68 -0.812 -0.758 0.189 0.297 -3.367??? 3.637???
(1.802) (1.278) (1.008) (0.761) (0.657) (0.287) (0.331)
Republics c1 0.085 0.185 0.277 0.084 0.13 0.045
(0.225) (0.215) (0.194) (0.207) (0.148) (0.066)
Incumbent c2 -0.507 0.082 0.428 1.264 -0.353 1.53? -0.993
(0.875) (0.662) (0.879) (1.021) (0.867) (0.618) (0.659)
Turnout c3 -0.451 -1.467 1.44 0.928 0.303 0.304 0.156
(2.438) (1.674) (1.557) (0.793) (0.649) (0.552) (0.502)
Constant a0 6.131? 12.328? 1.967? -7.995??? -5.118??? -1.68 -11.477???
(2.985) (6.586) (0.951) (2.029) (1.315) (5.919) (2.308)
Transfers a1 3.967? 8.454 2.969??? 3.025??? 1.717??? -2.848 2.861???
(1.975) (4.518) (0.923) (0.756) (0.419) (2.232) (0.596)
Bilateral a2 0.294 0.5 -0.476
(0.775) (1.229) (0.572)
GovernorUR a3 0.527 -1.492? -0.444 0.612? -0.533?
(0.53) (0.59) (0.252) (0.239) (0.235)
Appointed a4 0.036 1.015 -0.215? -0.413
(0.606) (0.956) (0.086) (0.222)
fraudT0 f0 1.592 0.28 -0.135 2.408??? 1.41?? 0.77?? 2.02???
(0.867) (0.986) (0.711) (0.653) (0.519) (0.281) (0.559)
fraudT5 f5 0.142 -0.713 2.492? 0.202 6.19??? 1.114??? 4.671?
(0.845) (0.827) (1.053) (0.642) (1.985) (0.302) (1.9)
fraudI0 f0 1.019 -0.145 0.747??? 1.576? 4.049 0.044 0.39
(0.907) (0.737) (0.215) (0.624) (2.096) (0.293) (1.205)
fraudI5 f5 1.063 1.643? 1.821? 0.656 3.193 -0.243 -0.27
(0.799) (0.765) (0.84) (0.613) (2.205) (0.273) (1.443)
σ̂ 0.753 0.723 0.631 0.514 0.421 0.341 0.259
N 81 80 79 82 80 77 78
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.05, ??p ≤ 0.01, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.001. Listed
models: M(01) – regression model for 1996 (first round); M(02) – regression model for 1996 (second round);
M(03) – regression model for 2000; M(04)-M(05) – regression models for 2004 territory and precinct-level elec-
tions; M(06)-M(07) – regression models for 2008 territory and precinct-level elections.
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that the governors aligned with the party of power are expected to be recipients of larger
transfers, the coefficient’s negative sign is indicative of the leader’s parsimonious policies
with regard to the governors affiliated with United Russia. In both models built for 2004,
the presence of statistically significant positive coefficient estimates f̂0 and f̂5 for anoma-
lies in turnout and Putin’s vote percentages at α = 0.05 and α = 0.1 levels, respectively,
demonstrate the presence of a strong relationship between anomalies and transfers as
predicted by the theory. Specifically, when the probability of loyalty is high, readily ob-
servable fraud is associated with higher levels of postelection transfers directed to each
region. This is a kind of result the game model suggests should happen when either
game model parameter b is positive and there is alternation between the equilibria, as
described by III* and XII*, or when b is negative and there is alternation between fraud
and no fraud, as allowed by II* when there is suitable association between b and λ. No-
tably, the figures for incumbent’s vote share (ĉ2) and the turnout proportion itself (ĉ3) are
not significantly associated with transfers for either levels of analysis. The fact that λi
is a function of different covariates when territory-level versus precinct-level returns are
considered may reflect the reality that different kinds of officials are involved in fraud
committed in the respective election commissions. Perhaps, in reality, election fraud in
Russia in 2004 involved multiple levels of signaling, not merely signaling between each
governor and the Leader.
Both models M(06) and M(07) in Table 3.2 show the results for 2008 for both territory-
level and precinct-level election returns. For both levels of electoral data aggregation, the
coefficient estimates Transfersit are positive and significantly different from zero. If
precinct-level model demonstrates that loyalty expressed in United Russia’s affiliation
and appointments can be associated with lower transfers, the territory-level model pro-
vides us with the opposite finding: party affiliation with the United Russia can be re-
lated to higher amounts of transfers. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates f̂0 and f̂5
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Table 3.3: Postelectoral Model: Effect of Election Fraud on the Log Share of Transfers in the
Regional Revenues
M(01) M(02) M(03) M(04) M(05) M(06) M(07)
Constant -0.052 -0.338 -3.37??? -1.905??? -3.227? -2.11??? -2.203???
(0.557) (0.496) (0.787) (0.246) (1.287) (0.4) (0.397)
Republics c1 0.091 0.127? 0.297 0.171 0.078 0.229? 0.235?
(0.057) (0.059) (0.159) (0.094) (0.07) (0.091) (0.089)
Incumbent c2 -0.504 -0.172 -0.597 0.152 0.283 1.082 0.157
(0.402) (0.146) (0.797) (0.355) (0.408) (0.718) (0.775)
Turnout c3 -0.533 -0.237 2.02 0.215 0.023 -0.917 -0.546
(0.607) (0.613) (1.396) (0.247) (0.311) (0.559) (0.486)
Constant a0 1.148? 1.055??? 8.829? 3.72??? 3.041??? 4.827??? 4.013???
(0.523) (0.317) (4.06) (1.107) (0.738) (1.137) (1.094)
Transfers a1 1.845??? 1.656??? 4.052? 3.907??? 2.559??? 3.112??? 2.473???
(0.337) (0.276) (1.92) (0.582) (0.536) (0.623) (0.669)
Bilateral a2 -0.297 -0.455
(0.429) (0.302)
GovernorUR a3 0.368 -0.747? -0.097 0.321 0.142
(0.824) (0.327) (0.127) (0.381) (0.201)
Appointed a4 -0.336 -0.325 0.232 0.011
(0.33) (0.254) (0.416) (0.234)
fraudT0 f0 -0.177 0.638? 1.004? 0.095 0.186 0.694? 0.327
(0.399) (0.276) (0.505) (0.222) (0.322) (0.293) (0.218)
fraudT5 f5 -0.155 0.025 1.25? 0.577 3.129 0.758?? 2.329?
(0.602) (0.294) (0.534) (0.361) (2.186) (0.271) (0.964)
fraudI0 f0 0.35 -0.781 -0.272 1.057??? 3.181 0.157 1.695?
(0.282) (0.538) (0.315) (0.311) (2.317) (0.316) (0.838)
fraudI5 f0 0.059 0.072 0.659 -0.212 2.328 -0.02 0.057
(0.221) (0.188) (0.535) (0.29) (1.499) (0.215) (1.434)
σ̂ 0.204 0.184 0.626 0.368 0.324 0.285 0.276
N 81 81 80 82 82 79 79
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.05, ??p ≤ 0.01, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.001. Listed
models: M(01) – regression model for 1996 (first round); M(02) – regression model for 1996 (second round);
M(03) – regression model for 2000; M(04)-M(05) – regression models for 2004 territory and precinct-level
elections; M(06)-M(07) – regression models for 2008 territory and precinct-level elections.
77
for turnout measured at the precinct-level data model are significantly positive and sub-
stantively comparable in the magnitude to the values estimated for 2004. Thus, when
the probability of loyalty is high, readily observable fraud with turnout committed at
the precinct level is associated with higher levels of postelection transfers directed to the
regions. Overall, the demonstrated models yield broad variation of signaling strategies
throughout the studied period: relatively weak signaling patterns in the 90s; relatively
strong signaling is associated with turnout and vote shares in the 2000 elections; strong
signaling is associated with turnout and weak signaling associated with incumbent’s sup-
port in 2004; finally, very strong signaling is associated with turnout and the absence of
any signaling whatsoever with regards to Medvedev’s vote percentages back in 2008.
Table 3.316 exhibits a different set of models designed to check the robustness of my
previous findings by using the proportion of transfers in the regional revenues as a de-
pendent variable. In general, the results are compatible with my previous findings from
Table 3.2: signaling patterns seem to persist across all the years. The coefficient estimate
Transfersit â1 is significantly positive across all my models. The signaling patterns are
prevalent for the second round of 1996 where f̂0 shows its statistical significance, and
also 2000 elections with both anomaly measures for turnout being statistically signifi-
cant. It is worth mentioning that while the credibility of my findings for the 1990s can be
undermined by the issues of data quality, especially for the shares of transfers in the re-
gional revenues, the models M(04)-M(07) built for 2004 and 2008 are more trustworthy.
If in 2004, the territory-level models show the presence of apparent signaling patterns in
incumbent’s percentages f̂0, in 2008 precinct-level models yield quite comparable levels
of signaling positively associated with postelectoral transfers. Unlike the 2004 models
though, both 2008 models display signaling patterns associated with turnout in both
precinct and territory levels. Thus, alternative measure of transfers provides us with a
16Transfersit = b0+c1Republicsit+c2Incumbentit+c3Turnoutit+f0fraudT0it+f5fraudT5it+f0fraudI0it+
f5fraudI5it +λit +λit · (f0fraudT0it + f5fraudT5it + f0fraudI0it + f5fraudI5it) + eit ,
λit =
1
1 + exp{−(a0 + a1Transfersit− + a2Bilateralit + a3GovernorURit + a4Appointedit)}
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solid empirical proof of the signaling concept: anomalies associated with election fraud
are closely related to transfers per capita as well as the share of transfers in the regional
revenues.
Table 3.4: Panel Data Analysis with the First-Difference Estimator, OLS
M(01) M(02) M(03) M(04) M(05) M(06)
Incumbent 13.972??? -1.347??? 11.331?? -0.476 -131.145? -0.524?
(2.841) (0.13) (4.186) (0.543) (51.428) (0.229)
Turnout -6.979 -4.827??? 13.518 -6.73??? 70.383 0.692???
(14.686) (1.037) (17.552) (1.551) (44.38) (0.121)
Transfers 6.877??? 0.058 7.613??? 0.031 2.043 -0.023
(1.438) (0.147) (1.524) (0.224) (0.133) (0.111)
fraudT0 -5.297 -0.208 -16.946 1.234? -103.029 0.129
(6.079) (0.339) (9.591) (0.533) (88.227) (0.19)
fraudT5 -2.888 -0.454 2.089 0.014 130.244? 0.05
(6.378) (0.358) (5.985) (0.563) (49.825) (0.172)
fraudI0 6.052 -0.022 -4.805 -0.283 42.783 0.015
(5.354) (0.159) (10.362) (0.21) (50.237) (0.178)
fraudI5 3.816 -0.17 18.824? 0.888 69.677 0.114
(10.706) (0.36) (8.909) (0.554) (46.776) (0.172)
Transfers × f raudT 0 -15.109? -0.099 0.023 -4.416?? -0.382 2.422??
(6.908) (1.206) (18.67) (1.775) (2.497) (0.733)
Transfers × f raudT 5 4.477 -0.89 -21.725? -1.453 -5.27??? 1.165
(10.564) (0.847) (9.49) (1.857) (1.641) (0.834)
Transfers × f raudI0 -4.577? 2.266 -0.637 -0.838 3.006? 0.212
(1.961) (1.173) (3.536) (1.411) (1.442) (1.712)
Transfers × f raudI5 2.538 3.582?? -38.701?? -1.692 -3.685? 3.042???
(8.813) (1.212) (14.596) (2.532) (1.572) (0.758)
σ̂ 5.219 0.289 5.872 0.404 27.062 0.113
N 80 80 80 80 80 80
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.05, ??p ≤ 0.01, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.001.
Listed OLS models: a) the first-difference estimator for 1996(first round) and 2000 with transfers per capita
M(01) and M(02) with the share of central transfers in the regional budget as dependent variables; b) the
first-difference estimator for 1996(second round) and 2000 with transfers per capita M(03) and share of
central transfers in the regional budget M(04) as dependent variables; c) the first-difference estimator for
2004 and 2008 with transfers per capita M(05) and the share of central transfers in the regional budget
M(06) as dependent variables.
Next, for additional robustness check I perform panel data analysis, which enables me
to estimate both temporal effects of election fraud associated with loyalty in the 1990s
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and 2000s, and also addresses the problem of region-specific heterogeneity that can po-
tentially bias my estimates of interest. In particular, I obtain two separate territory-level
datasets for 1996-2000 and 2004-2008, and then I compute the first-difference estima-
tors using the ordinary least squares regression, which is an unfortunate departure from
the original nonlinear model. Since data for the 1990s and 2000s come from different
data sources, to avoid the measurement error, I exclude first-difference estimator between
2000 and 2004. The proposed linear model includes direct and indirect effects of elec-
tion fraud, enabling me to estimate the conditional effects of anomalies on postelectoral
transfers. Moreover, in order to insure comparability of results across different elections
I resort to curtailing the “loyalty” component by reducing it to only one variable — pre-
electoral Transfersit. My findings from the panel data analysis are shown in Table 3.417.
According to the Table, while in the 90s incumbent’s vote share is positively related to
transfers per capita, in the 2000s the sign of this effect has been reversed to a negative.
One of the most feasible explanations of this counterintuitive finding originate from the
difference between electoral contexts and varying mobilization mechanisms of the re-
gional “political machines,” used to provide necessary electoral support to the national
ruling elites. The 1996-2000s period was more crucial for regime’s own stability, as these
were years of transition, as compared to 2004-2008, which was a period of consolidation.
In addition, the Table also provides us with the limited evidence that Turnoutit coeffi-
cient yields its negative effect on the proportion of transfers in the regional revenues in
the 90s, while in 2000s its effect is positive, thus displaying regime’s greater attention to
the level of turnout in the 2000s rather than in the 90s.
Since the inclusion of interaction effects between pre-electoral transfers and anoma-
lies associated with turnout and incumbent’s support makes their interpretation quite
complicated, here I build graphs depicting the marginal effects of electoral anomalies on
17Ordinary least squares estimates for all the models were used. ∆Transfersit = b0 +
b1∆Incumbentit + b2∆Turnoutit + b3∆Transfersit− + b4∆fraudT0it + b5∆fraudT5it + b6∆fraudI0it +
b7∆fraudI5it + b8∆Transfersit− × ∆fraudT0it + b9∆Transfersit− × ∆fraudT5it + b10∆Transfersit− ×
∆fraudI0it + b11∆Transfersit− ×∆fraudI5it .
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transfers. All figures are sorted in such a way as to simplify the comparative analysis
between the 1990s and 2000s. According to Figure C.1(a) in Appendix C, while for the
1990s, as pre-electoral transfers increase, the marginal effect of election fraud f̂0 on post-
electoral transfers decreases. In the 2000s, however, the marginal effect of election fraud
f̂0 on post-electoral transfers takes the opposite sign. The remaining pairs of figures agree
with each other in terms of direction of the marginal effects: the graph for f̂5 yields a neg-
ative statistically significant linear trend for 1996-2000(c) and 2004-2008(d), and yields
a positive statistically significant effect for 1996-2000(e) and 2004-2008(f). In a similar
vein, Figure C.2 in Appendix C depicts the marginal effect of anomalies associated with
turnout on post-electoral Transfersit: while in the 90s the increase in preelectoral trans-
fers contributed to noticeable drop in the marginal effect of turnout’s fraud f̂0 on post-
electoral transfers, in the 2000s the observed effect is statistically significant and positive
(See Figure C.2(a,b) in Appendix C). Finally, the marginal effects of f̂5 on postelectoral
transfers are negative for both studied periods (See Figure C.2 (c,d) in Appendix C).
In sum, while the 2000s have a number of instances in which the marginal effects are
negative, thus contradicting my theoretical expectations, this period is also characterized
by mainly positive marginal effects, while the 1990s are characterized by mainly negative
ones. Interestingly, the drastic differences between both periods has been well-observed
for f̂0 in incumbent’s percentages and turnout. While in the 1990s f̂0 would result in
the drastic decline in the amount of transfers directed from the Leader, in the 2000s this
association has been reversed: the presence of excessive 0s has been always compensated
with additional postelectoral transfers. Thus, the presented modified panel data analysis
is in agreement with my by-year regression analysis, supporting theoretical implications
from the model.18
The results from estimating model (3.3) using data from the various elections strongly
18In addition to OLS analysis, after computing first differences for the data I also apply to nonlinear
least squares estimation (See Table C.2). Although key model parameters such Incumbentit , Turnoutit and
Transfersit demonstrate almost similar in sign statistically significant coefficients, the change in specifi-
cation has led disappearance of statistically significant positive signs of coefficient estimates for anomalies.
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confirm the theoretical argument that refers to the game model and also validates using
the fraud measures that focus on particular digits occurring in turnout figures. Thus,
my Hypothesis 1 has been confirmed. All examined Russian presidential elections show
evidence of fraud that is described more or less well by the game model. For elections
from 2000 on, and very clearly for the elections of 2004 and 2008, evidence indicates
that there was widespread fraud motivated by governors’ desire to signal their individual
loyalties to the Center. The fact that signaling in 2004 is apparent in both territory-level
and precinct-level turnout data suggests, of course, that many officials besides merely
the governors are involved in the fraud. The signaling in 2008 is apparently connected
to postelection turnout rewards at the precinct-level. These both observations say some-
thing about election fraud activities having become even more completely federalized
in ways that go beyond the scope of our game model. Likely hierarchies of signals are
involved.
The specific institutional change that began as Putin came to power in 2000 severely
impacted the structure incentives of local agents. In terms of the game model, the value of
the parameter d greatly increased. As recentralizaton gained hold, the threat associated
with transfers to regions often decreased—the threat of regional secession disappeared—
so that the long-run returns associated with transfers likely often increased: b was less
often negative or at least often less negative. These changes led to revision of the strate-
gies governors and the Kremlin found optimal, leading to the situations seen in 2004 and
2008, where election frauds are easy to detect because governors are using them to send
signals to the Kremlin. Of course, the methods used by Myagkov et al. (2009) that focus
on turnout also diagnose fraud in all of these Russian elections, but their methods do not
focus specifically on turnout and vote figures’ last digits. As it has been shown, in Russia,
the occurrence of zeros or fives in the last digit is connected to an extensive signaling
structure wherein election frauds are closely interlinked with postelection rewards and
punishments.
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Overall, our theoretical propositions are supported by my data. The results sometimes
display a complex picture. The presidential election of 1996 seems to contain elements
of bargaining that the signaling model is not optimally designed to represent. In the
first round of the 1996 election we see empirical results that match what the game model
suggests should happen—governors who commit election fraud are worse off. The pres-
idential election of 2000 reflects political uncertainty and institutions under transition:
governors who signal by committing fraud seem to be rewarded in an incipient way. By
2004 and continuing into 2008, the fraud-signal-transfers-reward regime seems to be
fully in place. The rewards in terms of postelection transfers from committing fraud in
order to signal seem to be comparable in 2004 and 2008.
The prevalent “signaling” mechanism raises a fundamental problem for the politi-
cal regime: regional elites after being coopted by the Center are inclined to exploit the
existing asymmetry in distribution of information between the Center and themselves
for their own benefit, by systematically distorting information in their best interests, in-
cluding electoral information. Is it “folly” to rest “the stability of a federation on the
shoulders of some electoral scheme” (Filippov et al. 2004, 175)? B. D. Taylor (2011) sug-
gests perhaps yes. The scope of this analysis is too narrow to support an evaluation of
whether what Bednar (2009) calls the “safeguards” of federalism have been improved or
worsened by the highlighted changes. But in Russia, the signals of political loyalty, in
exchange for reduced interference by the Center highlighted here occur in the context
of great informational asymmetry between the regions and the Center. The true level of
support for the ruling party is difficult to discern. Both III* and XII*, which, among the
equilibria, best describe what happens in 2004 and 2008, are pooling equilibria: both
loyal and disloyal governors take the same actions. This makes the Center unable to sep-
arate the types of the heads of the regions—who is really supportive of the regime and
who is not but is successfully faking their support.
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3.5.2 Cross-National Data Analysis
The data on electoral anomalies comes from Adam Carr’s Election Archive, which is
one of the largest and most comprehensive archive of electoral statistics from 182 coun-
tries.19 All the country-year data from 1997 to 2010 available at the subnational level
in different formats has been extracted and processed to derive several measures of in-
terest: the last digit of the percentage and the last digit of vote counts for the candidate
or party who has received the most popular votes, as well as the last digit of the total
vote counts and turnout. Additionally, the auxiliary data, containing the last digit in the
percentage and in the last digit in vote counts across all the candidates, has been utilized.
As a result, I have an electoral data sample that includes 567 country-year observations.
An additional measure of election fraud, capturing the extra-constitutional irregulari-
ties reported by international observers or mentioned in the text of the sources, also has
been used from the Database of Political Institutions. The only potential drawback of
this measure, which needs to be accounted for, is that there may have been instances of
fraud/violence that were not reported, thus resulting in false negatives. Since application
of alternative better indicators, such as Judith Kelley’s data on electoral observation, has
been limited due to a poor overlap with my electoral data, I have decided to remove it
from my the present analysis. For a similar reason, the empirical measure of loyalty norm
based on the the CNTS dataset has been eliminated from my analysis (de Mesquita et al.
2004).
Unfortunately, the data scarcity on the regional grants and transfers at the Government
Finance Statistics(GFS) database managed by the International Monetary Fund prevented
me from using these most appropriate indicators. As a substitute for the relevant depen-
dent variable, in this chapter I apply to two measures of fiscal decentralization rigorously
described in Dziobek, Mangas, and Kufa (2011), both of which supposedly must be sensi-
tive to any inflows and outflows in the regional revenues. These two financial decentral-
19http://psephos.adam-carr.net/
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ization indicators picked for the purpose of my analysis are revenues and tax effort. The
financial decentralization involving the revenues is computed as a GL2/GL3 ratio, i.e. the
ratio between the noncash revenues of the central government and the noncash revenues
of the general government both measured as a percentage of GDP.20 The alternative mea-
sure is the tax effort, which is the fiscal indicator defined as the sum of tax revenue and
compulsory social security contributions also computed as aGL2/GL3 ratio. According to
the manual, the notion of “tax burden” actually duplicates the notion of “fiscal burden”,
which is understood as the “amount of compulsory transfers by units of the general gov-
ernment sector on the rest of the economy”, which can be approximated by the sum of tax
revenue and social security contributions (“The IMF Statistics Department’s Government
Finance Statistics Manual 2001” 2001, 48). Both measures reflect the simple notion, by
which the increase in the values of indicators is tied to the increase in the level of finan-
cial centralization. As a result of merging financial centralization data with my electoral
data, the size of the original data sample has dropped to 375 country-year observations.
I also use two additional control variables: collective action and economic development.
The collective action variable implies opposition’s capability to mobilize support against
election fraud. Economic development can be regarded as a factor affecting the Leader’s
financial redistribution policies (Treisman 2011); as well as the demand for allocation of
additional resources by the local agents.
The set of institutional covariates comprising institutional loyalty are obtained from
the Database of Political Institutions coming from the World Bank. The included mea-
sures are as follows: political system (parliamentary or presidential), presence of regional
elections (in other words, whether the regional government are directly/indirectly elected
or appointed). A measure of federalism has been obtained from Daniel Treisman’s dataset
20According to “The IMF Statistics Department’s Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001” (2001,
13-15), “[t]he political authority of a country’s central government extends over the entire territory of the
country. The central government can impose taxes on all resident institutional units and on nonresident
units engaged in economic activities within the country” and “The total economy of a country consists of
the set of all resident institutional units, and the general government sector consists of all resident general
government units”.
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Barplot of the Last Digits Among the Winners
(c)
assembled for this chapter (Treisman 2000). A measure reflecting the country-year level
of democracy has been taken from the Polity IV project.
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My cross-national analysis starts with the construction of the barplots with 90% con-
fidence intervals for the winners, all the participants on the ballot, and total vote counts
and turnout. It is worth noting that before starting my analysis all the percentages for
parties and candidates less than 1% were removed from my data. Figure 3.3(a) illustrates
the differences in 0s and 5s in the winners’ electoral results between the countries with
appointed and elected regional authorities: these anomalies in the percentages are char-
acterized by a well-expected small excess for the states with unelected local agents over
the elected ones, however, this difference is not statistically significant. Figure 3.3(b) de-
picting the comparison between the states with unitary and federal systems, shows excess
of 0s and 5s in the unitary states over the federal. Unfortunately, overlapping confidence
intervals between the box-plots prevent us from making any stronger conclusions. A
similar pattern is observed in Figure 3.3(c): the quantities of interest in authoritarian
compared to democratic regimes are characterized with a slightly greater excess of 0s
and 5s though such a difference lacks statistical significance.
To better understand the baseline for comparison, it’s also critical to construct the
barplots for all the participants across the country-year electoral races. Figure D.1(a) in
Appendix D shows an excessive appearance of 0s in the percentages compared to other
anomalies. Specifically, in authoritarian regimes compared to democratic ones, the num-
ber of 0s in the percentages is not only greater, but also statistically significant, which is
also supportive of my theoretical expectations (Figure D.1(c)). In Figure D.2 in Appendix
D yielding the comparison of the last digits in turnout across different systems the bars
look quite complicated: while in the states with unelected local agents the proportion
of 0s in the percentages is smaller than with elected, the systematic excess of 0s in the
unitary states over the federal ones is observed.
The results from my multivariate analysis are reported in Table 3.5.21 A set of find-
21Nonlinear least squares estimates for all the models:
Revenuesit+1 = b0 + b1Yr2005it + b2Yr2011it + b3Ralliesit + b4GDP Growthit + λit + λit(f0fraud0sit +
f5fraud5sit) + eit ,
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Table 3.5: Effects of Institutional Loyalty and Election Frauds on Finan-
cial Centralization (Revenuest+1) a
M(P05) M(C05) M(T05) M(F)
Const b0 0.042? 0.019 0.034 0.04
(0.022) (0.024) (0.045) (0.025)
Rallies b1 -0.004?? -0.004?? -0.004??? -0.005??
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
GDP growth b3 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Year2005 b4 -0.005 -0.006 0.003 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
Year2011 b5 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Appointed a1 0.007 0.003 0.088 0.006
(0.097) (0.097) (0.109) (0.09)
Revenues(Electoral) a2 4.668??? 4.553??? 4.811??? 4.563???
(0.212) (0.222) (0.579) (0.202)
Polity a3 -0.241??? -0.231??? -0.262??? -0.239???
(0.014) (0.013) (0.03) (0.012)
Presidential a4 -0.108 -0.126 -0.245?? -0.121
(0.106) (0.1) (0.105) (0.103)
Federalism a5 -0.098 -0.095 -0.012 -0.085
(0.079) (0.074) (0.094) (0.071)
Fraud 0s f0 -0.081 0.1 -0.05
(0.08) (0.066) (0.072)




σ̂ 0.03 0.031 0.031 0.03
N 107 107 64 107
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.1,
??p ≤ 0.05, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.01. The models include the measure of fraud: M(P05) – the
proportion of 0 or 5s in the vote shares of the winners; M(C05) – proportion of 0 or
5s in the vote counts of winners; M(T05) – proportion of 0 or 5s in the percentages
of turnout; M(F) – the binary indicator of election fraud from Database of Political
Institutions.
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ings shown in the table are supportive of my hypothesis that financial rewards can be
connected to the signaling strategies of the regional authorities. For instance, in Model
M(P05) the effect of f5 yields statistically significant negative effect on financial central-
ization −0.099% (significant at the 0.05 level). These findings elucidate the fact that sig-
naling strategies conditional on λ̂ seem to affect the successive allocation of financial
resources in the regions: 1% increase in 5s contributes to almost 0.10% increase in real-
location of revenues to the regions, holding all other variables constant.
Additional empirical support for my findings is provided by my auxiliary model M(F),
utilizing the observer-based measure of fraud: it yields statistically significant negative
effect of election fraud on financial centralization. According to model M(F), if a governor
moves from a clean election to a fraudulent election, the country average of regional
revenues increases by 0.084 points, holding all other variables constant. Across all the
computed models in Table 3.5 the regime’s lower democracy score seem to be predictive
of higher levels of financial decentralization.
Table 3.622 reporting the effects of election fraud on financial centralization expressed
in tax effort also shows the presence of statistically significant effects of 0s and 5s in the
direction predicted by my theory. Specifically, in Model M(P05) a 1% increase in the
winner’s vote percentage of 5s contributes to 0.29% increase in financial allocation of
tax effort favoring the regions; in Model M(T05) 1% increase in 0s of turnout results in
0.21% rise in financial allocation of tax effort favoring the regions. Finally, the direction
and significance of explored effect also holds for the alternative measure of fraud in M(F).
The overall results of analysis are reported in Table D.1 of Appendix D. This table
utilizes results from the models presented in Table 3.5. For each of the country groups I
λit =
1
1 + exp{−(a1Appointedit + a2Revenuesit + a3Polityit + a4Presidentialit + a5Federalit)}
22Nonlinear least squares estimates for all the models: Tax Efforti+1t = b0 + b1Yr2005it + b2Yr2011it +
b3Ralliesit + b4GDP Growthit +λit +λit(f0fraud0sit + f5fraud5sit) + eit ,
λit =
1
1 + exp{−(a1Appointedit + a2Effortit + a3Polityit + a4Presidit + a5Federalit)}
.
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Table 3.6: Effects of Institutional Loyalty and Election Frauds on Finan-
cial Centralization (Tax Effortt+1) a
M(P05) M(C05) M(T05) M(F)
Const b0 0.057 -0.015 0.001 0.033
(0.054) (0.037) (0.054) (0.027)
Rallies b1 0.002 0.002 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP growth b2 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year2005 b3 -0.002 0.015 -0.008 -0.005
(0.029) (0.014) (0.029) (0.016)
Year2011 b4 -0.035 -0.023 -0.019 -0.011
(0.035) (0.029) (0.033) (0.022)
Appointed a1 -0.303 -0.3 0.204 0.008
(0.195) (0.205) (0.102) (0.138)
Revenues(Electoral) a2 6.125??? 6.454??? 5.766??? 4.871???
(1.108) (1.2) (0.693) (0.454)
Polity a3 -0.311??? -0.318??? -0.322??? -0.258???
(0.052) (0.057) (0.033) (0.02)
Presidential a4 0.035 -0.047 0.139 0.047
(0.188) (0.169) (0.4) (0.098)
Federalism a5 -0.223 -0.184 0.374??? 0.001
(0.189) (0.172) (0.091) (0.091)
Fraud 0s f0 -0.316 0.191 -0.211??
(0.228) (0.137) (0.098)




σ̂ 0.448 0.45 0.056 0.045
N 74 74 37 74
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.1, ??p
≤ 0.05, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.01. The models include the measure of fraud: M(P05) – the
proportion of 0 or 5s in the vote shares of the winners; M(C05) – proportion of 0 or
5s in the vote counts of winners; M(T05) – proportion of 0 or 5s in the percentages
of turnout; M(F) – the binary indicator of election fraud from Database of Political
Institutions.
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computed the mean predicted probability of loyalty on financial punishment.23 The ta-
ble displays the means and standard errors of predicted probabilities, across the different
political regimes and systems of government.
Unfortunately, because of the data limitations I was unable to estimate the mean effect
of loyalty on punishment in the federal setting.
As one moves from the democracy to autocracy, the mean predicted probability of
the effect of institutional loyalty on financial punishment increases. Thus, autocracies
are characterized with greater signaling patterns, compared to democracies, confirming
Hypothesis 2. The comparison of mean effects between the federal and unitary states
in democracies shows a distinctive effect of loyalty on financial punishment in the fed-
eral states than in the unitary states: counter to my theoretic expectations the signaling
patterns seem to be prevalent in the unitary states compared to the federal ones. Thus,
Hypothesis 3 has not been confirmed by my empirical analysis: unitary states demon-
strate stronger signaling patterns compared to federal ones.
3.6 Conclusion
My basic empirical findings suggest that theoretical implications from the formal sig-
naling model are supported by the data.
The data analysis from the Russian presidential elections shows strong evidence of
election fraud associated with the interbudgetary transfers. For elections from 2000
and on, and very clearly for the elections of 2004 and 2008, I am confident that there
is widespread fraud motivated by governors’ desire to signal their individual loyalties
to Kremlin. The fact that the signaling in 2004 is apparent in both territory-level and
precinct-level turnout data suggests that many officials besides merely governors or lo-
cal agents are involved in the frauds. Likely hierarchies of signals are involved. The
23p̂λ =
1
1 + exp{−(a1Appointedit + a2Revenuesit + a3Polityit + a4Presidentialit + a5Federalit)}
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signaling patterns with turnout and incumbent’s vote percentage in 2008 are apparently
well-connected to postelection rewards. This tells us something about how election fraud
activities by 2008 have become even more completely federalized in ways that go beyond
the scope of the game model.
In a broader perspective my analysis suggests that institutional change over time as-
sociated with Putin’s recentralization policies in the 2000s also impacted the structure
of election frauds in Russia. In terms of the game model, the value of the parameter d,
the value to the Leader of replacing a disloyal governor, greatly increased. As recentral-
ization gained hold, the threat associated with transfers to regions often decreased—the
threat of regional secession disappeared—so that the long-run returns associated with
transfers likely often increased: b was less often negative or at least often less negative.
These changes changed the strategies governors and the Kremlin found optimal, leading
to the situations seen in 2004 and 2008, where election frauds are easy to detect because
governors use them to send signals to the Kremlin. As has been shown, in Russia, the
occurrence of zeros or fives as the last digit in turnout and vote percentages is connected
to an extensive signaling structure wherein election frauds are connected to postelection
rewards and punishments, confirming my Hypothesis 1.
My game-theoretical propositions have been also adjusted to cross-national data anal-
ysis by classifying equilibria profiles from the signaling game across multiple political
regimes. The empirical analysis based on unique original datasets helps us to draw two
important conclusions. First, specific signaling patterns seem to be prevalent in cross-
national data as well as in the Russian data: abundance of zeros and fives contributes
to growing financial decentralization, i.e. leading to more resources concentrated in the
regions. Second, in accordance with my theoretical expectations, autocracies are charac-
terized by greater signaling patterns than democracies, confirming Hypothesis 2. More-
over, counter to my theoretic expectations, the signaling patterns seem to be prevalent
in the unitary states compared to the federal ones, rejecting Hypothesis 3. Although the
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implications from the formal model are suggestive of Hypothesis 3, intuitively it seems
plausible that the unitary states are expected to show greater signaling patterns com-
pared to the federal ones, because of the stronger hierarchies and larger consolidation of
resources in the center. The observed complexity in interpretation of results may be also
due to classification errors and subsequent misattribution of equilibria profiles to specific
regimes.
Although this research employs multiple robustness checks for both the Russian and
cross-national data, it has several important limitations. First, analysis of the cross-
national data has been performed using regional level data, however, data scarcity with
respect to the proxy of transfers has led to the aggregation of all data to the national level.
Second, convergence issues related to nonlinear models prevented me from utilizing the
model including short-run distortion linearly, and led to substituting it with its nonlinear
equivalent. In the future more fine-grained data will mostly likely resolve these issues.
Even though all these limitations are substantial, my empirical analysis demonstrates
strong applicability of the signaling games of election fraud to the Russian case, and to a
broad range of political regimes, in particular, to autocracies and unitary democracies.
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CHAPTER IV
Theory of Credibility: Linking Preference Falsification and
Election Fraud In Electoral Autocracies
4.1 Introduction
In elections under authoritarian rule, the ruling party or an incumbent usually en-
joy overwhelming electoral support, with the elections often considered fraudulent (Dia-
mond 2002). Electoral autocracies or hybrid regimes combine democratic and authoritar-
ian elements, masking the authoritarian nature of the regime with democratic political
institutions, such as multi-party elections. These regimes conduct public opinion polls
in addition to holding elections, and surprisingly, a close match between public opinion
polls and election results is often observed, even when obvious vote stealing takes place.
What is the general mechanism behind a close match between the polls and the rigged
election results? Can pre-election polls constrain the autocrat’s ability to commit election
fraud? Can pre-election polls be used as a reliable way to detect election fraud? The an-
swers to this set of questions are consequential to our understanding of how elections are
organized in electoral autocracies, and of how helpful the polling data can be as a tool
of election fraud detection in democracies (Charnin 2012). Indeed, the importance of
pre-election polling is hard to overestimate, since a single opinion poll can serve as a co-
ordination mechanism, having a significant influence on election outcomes and allowing
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the incumbent to guarantee the credibility of rigged election results (Andonie & Kuzmics
2012).
The electoral research on preference falsification is usually focused on misprediction
of the final outcomes by the pollsters (Bischoping & Schuma 1992). However, no research
has focused, so far, on the striking accuracy of election polls in electoral autocracies when
the presence of election fraud is common knowledge among the populace. Major national
polling organizations issued election forecasts based on Putin’s electoral ratings that suc-
cessfully predicted official election results within the margin of error (See Table E.1 in
Appendix E). Surprisingly, however, despite his high popularity oftentimes driven by ex-
aggeration of external threats and terrorist dangers (Arce 2003; Ekman 2009; Mansfield
& Snyder 1995) election fraud has always been an integral part of his presidency, and is
characterized by an upward trend over Putin’s time in office (Mebane & Kalinin 2009a).
This especially applies to the most recent Russian presidential election in 2012, which
was marked by the spread of massive protests associated with the growing public aware-
ness of alleged election fraud and a substantial voter mobilization effort (Enikolopov et
al. 2013; Kalinin 2016; Kalinin & Shpilkin 2012; Shpilkin 2011).
The observed close congruence between Putin’s official electoral support and the poll-
ing election forecasts has three explanations: (1) in reality the election fraud has never
occurred, therefore the election polls are correct; (2) since a significant amount of elec-
tion fraud is present, the election polls are incorrect; and (3) both electoral results and
election polls are fabricated and therefore fraudulent. Based on anecdotal evidence from
election observers and scholarly research, this chapter argues that the second explanation
provides the most plausible argument.
There are many reasons for which polls can be incorrect in electoral autocracies, from
crude data fabrication to issues with the sampling frame. The abuse of non-probability
sampling design can contribute to unintentional upward inflation. Measurement error,
specifically social desirability bias (or preference falsification), can inflate the incum-
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bent’s election ratings due to the respondents’ eagerness to portray themselves in a so-
cially desirable way. Two explanations can be readily excluded. Previous research on
the 2012 presidential election indicates that the non-probability sampling design used
by a majority of the organizations cannot explain the observed inflation in the estimates
(Kalinin 2014a). Since across all the survey organizations, with a range of relationships
to the Kremlin, polling estimates vary within the margin of error, it is unlikely that data
fabrication took place. The final explanation is linked to the preference falsification. It
implies that respondents give dishonest answers to conform to societal norms, thus con-
tributing to an increase in response bias in the autocrat’s electoral ratings.
This chapter provides an innovative perspective on the mechanism by which the au-
tocrats in electoral autocracies strategically benefit from preference falsification, which
boosts their own electoral ratings and encourages perpetration of election fraud. By do-
ing so, the autocrats are able to organize election fraud up to the level of the discrepancy,
effectively hiding the extent of election rigging and avoiding the political risks associ-
ated with revealed mismatch. Ideally, the presence of the observed close match between
polling forecasts and election results enables the autocrat not only to claim his electoral
legitimacy validated by pre-election polling, but also to reveal the weaknesses of political
opposition unable to enjoy such extensive public support.
If, however, any of such mismatches occur these goals are severely undermined. Po-
litically sensitive questions in pre-election polls in electoral autocracies and democracies
have been studied in a fairly large body of literature (Anderson 1994; Beltran & Valdivia
1999; Bischoping & Schuma 1992; Geddes & Zaller 1989; Sieger 1990). This literature is
usually focused on misprediction of the final outcomes by the pollsters due to contextual
effects related to the authoritarian nature, flaws in sampling, last minute changes in pref-
erences or preference falsification. For instance, according to Bischoping and Schuma
(1992) almost all polls in Nicaragua forecasted a clear victory for the incumbent Sandin-
istas, but their opponent won the race, which was attributed to the preference falsification
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due to the perceived partisanship of a poll by the respondents.
Theoretically, this chapter builds on Timur Kuran’s work on preference falsification,
by adjusting his basic model to the topic of election fraud (Kuran 1987, 1991). Within this
framework, election fraud is designed to mask the discrepancy between endogenously
determined public and private pre-electoral preferences, and guarantee the autocrat a
stable equilibrium. My theory suggests that election fraud serves as a by-product of pre-
election forecasts that are contaminated with the preference falsification, creating lee-
way for numerous electoral violations, including election fraud. Theoretical implications
of the model are tested on empirical data from the 2012 Russian presidential elections,
thereby opening the door to empirical estimation of election fraud by means of election
polls and survey experiments. In order to extend my findings beyond the Russian case
and perform robustness checks of my main findings, I also apply a statistical analysis of
cross-national data.
The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is threefold. First, this chap-
ter extends Kuran’s model by adding to the model the concept of election fraud, and thus
offers a mechanism by which an incumbent insures his most desirable electoral outcome.
Second, this chapter tests the theoretical implications of the model by utilizing original
survey data collected by the author in Spring 2012 during the Russian presidential cam-
paign. In contrast to conventional election forensics research, which does not consider
the dimension of public opinion surveys, this research demonstrates strong empirical
findings with respect to the effect of preference falsification on the level of election fraud
in electoral autocracy. Third, I compare the reliability of two types of election fraud indi-
cators: two digit-based tests and the model-based measure of election fraud.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses three key actors in-
volved in the mechanism linking preference falsification with election fraud, while re-
viewing the literature on this topic. Section 4.3 describes the specifics of Russian context
and provides detail on the organization of election fraud in Russia. Section 4.4 provides
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an overview of research on the preference falsification or social desirability bias in Rus-
sia. Section 4.5 offers a short description of Kuran’s model of preference falsification
adapted for the topic of election fraud, and presents an empirical analysis of the model’s
implications by employing the Russian and cross-national data. In the final part I draw
conclusions and discuss prospects of future research.
4.2 Theory of Election Fraud and Preference Falsification
In the combined theory of election fraud and preference falsification, there are three
key actors: the voter/respondent, the autocrat and the survey organization. All three
actors are affected by pre-election polling: the voter/respondent by falsifying his pref-
erences and inadvertently instilling a pro-incumbent bias in the polls, the autocrat by
organizing election fraud aimed to match the magnitude of pro-incumbent bias, and the
survey organization by computing biased electoral ratings and making them accessible
to the general public.
Voter/Respondent The importance of pre-election polling in a voter’s strategic choice
has been the subject of several studies. Since elections with voters acting strategically
typically have multiple equilibria, they exacerbate a coordination problem (Kuran 1991;
Palfrey 1989), which can be alleviated by pre-election polls. For example, the experi-
mental evidence described in Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993) suggests that
elections can be regarded as a function of poll results: through the polls the majority can
guarantee itself the most favorable outcome. Usually, however, more precise information
about pre-election preferences can result in a drastic increase in turnout, thus boosting
the aggregate cost and reducing total welfare (C. R. Taylor & Yildirim 2010). The authors
argue that pre-election polls can be used by voters as an equilibrium selection device
in which the respondents truthfully indicate their favorite candidate. The lying respon-
dent, however, triggers a non-coordinated outcome, thus increasing the probability of an
98
outcome with a tie and consequential payoff loss. From this perspective the strategic be-
havior of respondents enables them to use a chance of being selected into the survey as a
way to influence the voting decisions of other voters.
Theories based on the general model of voting and polls are built on the assumption
of guaranteed anonymity and privacy for the respondents, when there are no external
threats inhibiting them from openly sharing politically sensitive information with the
survey organization. In an authoritarian setting, however, the respondents might fear
repercussions for failing to mention the “right” candidate. If these fears persist, respon-
dents will be inclined to falsify their preferences, thus reducing the probability of the
desirable outcome to the voters and consequently increasing the probability of the de-
sirable outcome to the autocrat. Besides high repression costs for the support of oppo-
sition due to the coercive capacity of the state, additional incentive for respondents to
falsify their preferences can be associated with the small probability of tied elections in
such regimes, thus reducing rational benefits for sharing truthful information about such
elections (Way & Levitsky 2006). Moreover, because the regime controls ballot access,
credible opposition candidates can be left off the ballot, thus inducing the respondents to
make suboptimal choices with low-valued outcomes. In such cases, the respondents can
be prone to falsifying their preferences in favor of the autocrat. This affects pre-election
polls and exacerbates a coordination problem, in which the majority cannot guarantee
itself the most favorable outcome and the autocrat enjoys an increase in the likelihood of
his most preferred outcome.
The concept of preference falsification implies that respondents give dishonest an-
swers to conform to societal norms and to not be embarrassed by their responses, thus
contributing to an increase in response bias and measurement error. It has long been a
subject of survey research literature (Couper, Singer, & Tourangeau 2003; Dillman & Tar-
nai 1991; Groves & Kahn 1979; Tourangeau & Smith 1996). Kuran’s theory of preference
falsification is especially helpful for our understanding of how electoral preferences can
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be endogenously determined in electoral autocracies (Kuran 1991). According to Kuran,
the incentive of an individual to reveal his private preference is a function of the size of
public opposition and psychological cost of preference falsification. With the growth of
public opposition, while keeping private preferences constant, there comes a point where
his external cost of joining the opposition falls below his internal cost of preference falsi-
fication (i.e. bandwagon effect) (Kuran 1991, 18). For instance, according to mail surveys
in the Soviet Union, the presence of preference falsification and low response rates could
be largely attributed to the consequences the Soviet citizen could face if his political rep-
utation were negatively affected. Authoritarian regimes are always concerned about pref-
erence falsification and try to keep themselves informed about the private preferences of
their constituencies, by withholding and manipulating certain parts of data from polls
(Otava 1988), thus contributing to the rise of “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann 1984).
Autocrat In the pre-election period, the autocrat is well-motivated to exploit all re-
sources to remain in power. He may use violence, polls, and media in an effort to prevent
an unfavorable electoral outcome, by weakening the opposition and solidifying his own
political dominance. Indeed, repression of various information channels, providing the
opposition and the citizenry with information on the relative balance of power, loyalty
and dissatisfaction, helps an autocrat to deter the emergence of any possible challengers
and minimize his own political risks (Egorov et al. 2009; M. K. Miller 2014; Wintrobe
1998). However, this impacts the autocrat as well, since political transparency is often
seriously circumscribed, leading to information shortages, inefficiency, and low quality
of the public policies. One reliable information channel is local elections, which the auto-
crat regards as an important trial ground for handpicked successors (Boix & Svolik 2007;
Magaloni 2010; Malesky & Schuler 2010; Reuter & Robertson 2012).
Another alternative to consider are public opinion polls. As a rule, in electoral au-
tocracies public opinion polls conducted by polling organizations tend to help autocrats
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to gauge their popularity prior to an election, and, ideally, serve the goal of creating a
public impression of his own political dominance, which might discourage the political
opposition from its quest for power (Gel’man 2005; Lohmann 1994; Simpser 2005, 2013).
As Lohmann (1994) points out, repression and censorship enable an autocrat to maintain
negative information within the private domain, thus preventing political entrepreneurs
from taking advantage of it to mobilize the opposition. In this sense election polls can
be especially useful for an autocrat if they contain a survey error that inflates the au-
tocrat’s public support. The autocrat can also rely on diversification of data sources by
engaging security agencies in the polling, though given the methodological opaqueness
of the data collected by these agencies, its quality is unknown and its reliability is often
compromised (Birukova & Nikol’sky 2014). If, however, public opinion polls are known
to be anticipatorily unreliable, the incumbent might have difficulty estimating his true
popularity. He may therefore be over-responsive towards the threats from the opposition
and may excessive violence or election fraud, as a result potentially undermining his own
prospects of political survival (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski 2013). For instance,
elections in Zimbabwe (2000-2008) show how the lack of reliability of pre-election polls
within the suppressed informational environment motivated Mugabe to employ tactics
of election violence and fraud (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013).
Survey organization Since some survey errors can be beneficial to the autocrat, he
might try to encourage false polling data through bad polling techniques or crude data
fabrication. There are two important constraints making this strategy suboptimal. One
constraint is related to autocrat’s interest in obtaining private information about his gen-
uine support. Knowing this, the survey organization would be interested not so much in
wholesale fabrication of data, but rather in data collection that would permit derivation
of “quantifiable” biases and errors, making it possible to extract the genuine information
from the biased estimates. This strategy encourages the survey organization to utilize
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relatively cheap survey techniques in its polls, which permit extraction of valuable pieces
of information to be shared with the autocrat. This enables the survey organizations to
substantially cut back on data collection costs by conducting the survey only once, and at
the same time send separate information signals to the general public and the autocrat.
As a result, while the general public receives inflated estimates based on the respondents’
public preferences, in contrast, the autocrat receives deflated estimates based on the re-
spondents’ private preferences.
Another constraint prohibiting survey organizations from data fabrication is associ-
ated with reputation costs. For instance, organizations such as Levada-Center extensively
work with foreign customers interested in the high quality data. Levada-Center periodi-
cally conducts the Omnibus survey, utilized in this research, with a mix of questions from
both foreign and domestic clients. This incentivizes Levada-Center to exercise quality
control over the entire data collection cycle. Therefore unlike other survey organizations,
Levada-Center being financially independent from Kremlin can be viewed as least inter-
ested in data fabrication. However, Levada’s electoral forecast for Putin’s support turned
out to be higher than those issued by state-controlled organizations that are presumably
more prone to fabricating data. This observation indirectly refutes the notion that all
forecasting data produced by the survey organizations can be easily fabricated in the au-
tocrat’s interest.
4.3 Context
During Vladimir Putin’s presidency in the 2000s, growing authoritarian tendencies in
Russia exacerbated the problem of blatant election fraud in favor of pro-Kremlin candi-
dates and parties (Buzin & Lubarev 2008; Enikolopov et al. 2013; Kalinin & Shpilkin
2012; Kobak et al. 2012; Kobak, Shpilkin, & Pshenichnikov 2016; Mebane & Kalinin
2009a; Myagkov et al. 2009). Evidence of election fraud is based on multiple sources,
such as electoral and survey data and observer reports. Statistical analysis of the Russian
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presidential election 2012 estimates election fraud reaching 5% for Putin’s electoral sup-
port and 10% for turnout (Kalinin & Shpilkin 2012). Other studies show that in 2012 the
estimated proportion of precincts with the election fraud reached about 40% Klimek et
al. (2012), which seems to be an exceedingly high number to be even remotely believable.
The organization of election fraud is usually assigned to regional and local authorities.
In federal states, such as Russia, federal elections are organized by regional authorities
who are responsible for the provision of favorable electoral outcomes that match general
social expectations in respective regions. This phenomenon became especially acute with
Putin’s centralization policies of the 2000s, which led to the cooptation of governors’ “po-
litical machines” into the power vertical. As a result, political loyalty in addressing the
Kremlin’s political needs was regarded as a crucial quality for the governors. Although
with the abolition of gubernatorial elections, the costs for committing fraud by the gov-
ernors were reduced because the credibility of electoral outcomes could be guaranteed
by their close match with the regional pre-election polls. To comply with Kremlin’s ex-
pectations, the regional governors can resort to a broad range of methods, such as ballot
stuffing, ballot switching or protocol tampering (Harrison 2009). All three methods of
election fraud are widely used in Russia, with the first two methods used on the level of
precincts and the third, at the level of territorial commissions.
Since the manufacturing of results is not directed from the Kremlin, the regional vari-
ation in Putin’s electoral support is expressed in standard deviation is 10%, ranging from
47% of electoral support in Moscow to 99% in Chechnya. Importantly, the abnormal
zones of the Russian elections with reference to turnout and voting have almost always
been associated with the ethnic regions, such as Republics of the North Caucasus (such
as Chechnya), and rural areas where mobilization of political machines and clientelis-
tic networks by the regional authorities has been most effective. According to this logic
over time we expect to observe a “race to the top” with more election fraud and polling
weakly associated with election results. However, this race has an additional constraint:
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since electoral results must meet the credibility criteria, a “race to the top” has to be
strongly associated with the bias in the regional election ratings. Otherwise, excessive
election fraud can make election fraud easily detectable by the voters, consequentially
raising the probability of mass protests and higher attributed costs to both the autocrat
and the governor. While this observation is supported by analysis of Russian electoral
data, demonstrating positive progression of electoral anomalies over time (Mebane &
Kalinin 2009a) it has to consistently match the magnitude of the social desirability bias
in election polls as well.
In sum, we would expect the following causal mechanism to be in place: by falsifying
their preferences, respondents inadvertently instill a pro-autocrat or a pro-incumbent
bias in surveys, which in turn incentivizes regional governors to mobilize their political
machines for election fraud, in order to match the expectations expressed in the biased
public polls and meet Kremlin’s electoral expectations. In this mechanism the autocrat
comes into play indirectly: by creating an unsafe polling environment, contributing to
inflation of his public polls, and setting up the power vertical in which political loyalty in
addressing the autocrat’s electoral needs is regarded as a crucial quality for the governors.
4.4 A Study of the Social Desirability Bias
Noelle-Neumann’s seminal work on the “spiral of silence” helps us to explore the
mechanism by which social desirability evolves in autocracies, such as Russia (Noelle-
Neumann 1984). It implies that when one faction in society possesses total public vis-
ibility while the other has been completely marginalized, the individual will assess the
political climate personally or through the media. This assessment impacts the public
behavior of an individual and her willingness to reveal her private political preferences.
In particular, the revelation of her private preferences is less likely when an individual
feels unsafe about expressing ideas contrary to official policy, or has a fear of isolation.
Under these circumstances she will be inclined to falsify her political preferences in fa-
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vor of those she thinks are acceptable to the public, or simply withdraw from discussion
(Noelle-Neumann 1984, 5). For instance, the general setting of the Russian presidential
elections 2012 with the incumbent’s dominant position was likely to trigger sensitivity to
questions related to his electoral support; supporters of political opposition, being in the
minority, would feel pressured to remain silent or to falsify their preferences in favor of
the incumbent.
This research will be primarily focused on testing the central implication of the “spiral
of silence” theory: on inflation in the estimates of the incumbent’s electoral support.
The concept implies that polled individuals may give dishonest answers to conform with
societal norms and so as not to be embarrassed by their responses, thus contributing to
an increase in response bias and measurement error.
According to Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski (2000, 257) the “notion of sensitive ques-
tions presupposes that respondents believe there are defining desirable attitudes and be-
haviors, and that they are concerned enough about these norms to distort their answers
to avoid presenting themselves in an unfavorable light”. In this work I’ll refer to the
concept of “social desirability bias” every time I discuss the response bias of survey re-
spondents from the perspective of the survey methodology literature. Social desirability
and self-censoring can substantially affect respondents’ responses due to social sanctions
and risks arising from the respondent’s decision to voice her support for the opposition
or contentious opinions (Tourangeau et al. 2000). When there is almost no benefit in an-
swering the questions truthfully, the individual would be more likely to subscribe to this
strategy (Corstange 2009, 2-3). Also, there is a concept of “preference falsification”, which
according to Kuran “is the act of misrepresenting one’s genuine wants under perceived
social pressures” (Kuran 1991, 37-57). Since the concept of “preference falsification” is
more conceptually grounded in political science literature, I’ll be referring to it when I
focus on my theory.
With respect to voting and voter turnout, social desirability has been explored in the
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works of Streb, Burrel, Frederick, and Genovese. (2008), Belli, Traugott, and Beckmann
(2001), Holbrook and Krosnick (2010a, 2010b), Comsa and Postelnicu (2012). In their
cross-national study of turnout in several democracies, Karp and Brockington (2005) find
that in national settings with higher levels of participation, the tendency to over-report
turnout is greater than in settings with low participation levels. There are several stud-
ies focused on survey experiments in an authoritarian setting. Weghorst (2011) in his
paper on support for opposition violence against an incumbent party shows the differ-
ence between the results from direct and indirect self-reporting. Gonzalez-Ocantos, de
Jonge, Melendez, Osorio, and Nickerson (2011) provide evidence showing that after the
2008 Nicaraguan municipal elections, a direct question on vote buying, compared with
responses from a survey experiment, clearly underestimated the proportion of those who
reported this behavior.
How much social desirability bias would we expect to find in our study? In their
research Karp and Brockington (2005) by comparing official voting records with survey
responses on turnout from several democracies conclude that the social desirability bias
in democracies not only positively correlates with the turnout rate, but also demonstrates
high levels reaching 27% for Britain, 26% for Sweden and 40% for the US. Turning to
incumbent support, since other mature democracies have nothing like the problem that
the US has in terms of information and bandwagon effects with regard to incumbent’s
support, the U.S. seems to be the most appropriate case for such comparison. For instance,
in the U.S. presidential election there appears little bias, reaching 1.5%. For the House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate races it’s slightly higher, reaching 4%, for gubernatorial
races it’s about 5% (Wright 1993, 295).
Which U.S. election can be taken as a benchmark for our analysis? Since the Rus-
sian presidential election belongs to the low information environment where it is likely
that many will not have heard of any candidate apart from the front-runner, as a bench-
mark the measure from similar setting needs to be taken. Even though at first glance the
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U.S. presidential elections seem to provide the most plausible benchmark for compari-
son, their high salience and competitiveness make such comparison disputable. Instead,
however, by taking into consideration the U.S. gubernatorial and congressional elections,
known for their low salience and strong incumbency effects, I thus find the most appro-
priate way of handling this problem. Presumably, if the inflation in turnout exceeds 30
percent or in Putin’s votes yields the estimate of 20-25% (i.e. exceeds 5%) one can argue
that there is no doubt about the significance of the additional bias found in Russia. I
surmise that any such discrepancy is due in large part to “spiral of silence” motivations.
Thus my hypothesis is a follows:
Hypothesis 1: Due to social desirability effects, Russian presidential elections in 2012
were characterized by a substantial inflationary bias in the estimates for incumbent and voter
turnout, exceeding the democratic benchmark of 5% for the incumbent’s support and 30% for
turnout.
Another question of interest is related to the variability of the social desirability bias
across different demographic subgroups. Individuals displaying high levels of social de-
sirability bias in contexts analogous to support for Putin are those who are relatively
isolated, with weaker self-confidence, less interest in politics, and fear disrespect or un-
popularity. Among those most disposed to speaking out publicly are rather men than
women, younger people than older ones, those belonging to a higher social strata than
those from lower strata (Noelle-Neumann 1984, 24). However, when it comes to turnout,
a number of studies have found that individuals most likely to overreport voting have the
same characteristics as those likely to vote: those who are highly educated, supportive of
the regime, higher-status individuals are most likely to falsify their preferences in a sur-
vey (Bernstein, Chadha, & Montjoy 2001; Silver, Anderson, & Abramson 1986). They are
more likely trying to create a good impression on the interviewer and feel pressured to
vote, leading to a greater desire to falsify their responses. Those respondents for whom
the norm of voting is most salient will be most likely to overreport their preferences.
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Hence, here I formulate different hypotheses for Putin support than for turnout:
Hypothesis 2.1: The social desirability bias in estimates for an autocrat’s electoral support
is expected to vary across different social groups: women, the elderly, persons with low educa-
tion and the poor are expected to exhibit greater levels of misreporting compared to men, the
young, those with higher education and the wealthy.
Hypothesis 2.2: Overreporting individuals with respect to voter turnout are expected to
have the same demographic characteristics as the likely voters, i.e. those individuals who truth-
fully report having voted (highly educated, supportive of the regime, higher-status individuals)
The next question is related to the temporal persistence of preference falsification
throughout the electoral campaign. Here by the temporal persistence of the social desir-
ability bias I mean the situation in which the magnitude of the social desirability remains
unchanged throughout the campaign while the pre-electoral expectations of the incum-
bent’s electoral support closely match the incumbent’s official post-electoral outcome.
According to Noelle-Neumann (1984, 31) one might expect a recognizable pre-election
tendency of people claiming they are going to vote for the incumbent, but a post-election
tendency to claim support for the incumbent can be even more salient, with a greater
proportion of people falsifying their preferences. This comes as no surprise, especially,
when the autocrat has managed to manufacture much of her official electoral support,
thus creating the illusion of enormous popularity contrasted with the chronic weakness
of political opposition (Simpser 2013). If, however, the autocrat did worse in the elec-
tions than pre-election polls reported, the magnitude of social desirability bias would
most likely decrease and contribute to the growth of public opposition (Kuran 1991, 18).
Since Putin’s official results matched public expectations quite well, I expect the presence
of temporal persistence of preference falsification to be without any significant changes
between pre- and post-electoral periods.
Hypothesis 3: For pre-election and post-election polls, one can expect the presence of tem-




Social desirability bias can be simply understood as the difference in the probability
of the socially desirable response and the honest response, where anonymity is strictly
guaranteed. While the socially desirable response is measured by direct questioning tech-
nique, the honest response is measured by indirect techniques. My analytic strategy em-
ploys both types of techniques, making it possible to measure the magnitude of the social
desirability bias. Indirect questioning techniques are specifically designed to offer re-
spondents an opportunity to answer truthfully without a fear of retribution. A list exper-
iment or item count technique (ICT), which is a type of indirect questioning technique,
uses random assignment of respondents to treatment and control groups(J. D. Miller
1984). According to the ICT, respondents are randomly assigned to two groups. One
group serves as a control group, receiving both questions containing four statements
each, while another group is a treatment group that receives both questions containing
five statements (i.e. four non-sensitive items plus one sensitive). The share of respon-









t=1(1 − Ti)Yi , where N1 =
∑N
i=1Ti is the size of the
treatment group and N0 =N −N1 is the size of the control group (Blair & Imai 2012).
Many studies have shown that ICT provides a reliable control of the social desirability
bias (Chaudhuri & Christofides 2007; Corstange 2009; Glynn 2013; Green & Kern 2012;
Imai 2011; Tsuchiya 2005). Nonetheless, the technique has several established limita-
tions. For instance, Kiewiet and Nickerson (2014) illustrate that ICT can provide ex-
tremely conservative estimates of high incidence behaviors; Glynn (2013) mentions its
relative inefficiency and its failure to provide individual-level measures for the sensitive
item. Moreover, the anonymity condition can be violated due to a ceiling effect (when
all of the statements are chosen by a respondent) or a floor effect (when none of the
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statements is chosen), which can be partly overcome by increasing the length of the list
(Holbrook & Krosnick 2010b; Tsuchiya, Kirai, & Ono 2007). While the core assumptions
of the technique hold, list experiments can generate valid estimates of social desirability
bias. However, violations of these assumptions can substantially undermine the validity
of obtained results.
In the present study I have conducted two list experiments designed to measure gen-
uine electoral preferences for Putin and voter turnout:
Here is the list of four/five assertions. Please, listen to them all and then tell me
how many you agree with. Do not tell me which assertion you agree or disagree
with, just give me the total estimate.
• I usually read at least one newspaper or magazine a week;
• I want to see Russia as a country with high-living standards;
• I can recall the name of the head of Russian Constitutional Court;
• I will vote [voted for] Vladimir Putin in the most recent Presiden-
tial elections (March 4);
• I am satisfied with the level of my income.
I agree with ___ (number of assertions)
Here is the list of four/five assertions. Please, listen to them all and then tell me
how many you agree with. Do not tell me which assertion you agree or disagree
with, just give me the total estimate.
• My family has a car;
• I can recall the name of the head of the Federation Council;
• I watch TV daily;
• I will vote [I voted] in the most recent Presidential elections (March
4);
• The level of pension in our country is quite high.
I agree with ___ (number of assertions)
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4.4.2 Data and Measurements
The fieldwork stage of the project was conducted over a period of two months be-
tween early February and early April 2012. Three surveys were conducted by Levada-
Center (Omnibus/Courier Study, February 17-20 and 24-27; March 2012), and one by
the Demoscope (Russian Election Study, March-April 2012) with 1500-1600 respondents
sampled for each survey (Colton, Hale, Kosolapov, Tonis, & Prudnikova 2014). The major
characteristics of the surveys can be found in Table E.2 of Appendix E. First, the sampling
design employed by Levada-Center is typically utilized by the majority of national sur-
vey organizations. It is based on a proportional stratified sampling with the selection of
households completed by the random route method and the selection of respondents by
using quota sampling. In contrast, Demoscope’s sample is based on multistage probabil-
ity sampling with respondents selected by the nearest birthday method. All the surveys
encompass both direct and indirect (ICT or list experiment) questions on Putin’s electoral
support and turnout, thus making an estimation of social desirability bias possible. The
ICT experiment was preceded by direct question asked 5-10 minutes earlier as in Droit-
cour et al. (1991), because of concerns on the part of the pollsters about the unforeseen
effects of list experiments on the estimates derived from the direct question. Moreover,
the ICT experiment on turnout preceded the experiment on voting, being 5-6 questions
apart from the latter.
Table 4.1 contains a summary of weighted demographic characteristics across four
surveys. The observed similarities in the table entries for some demographic characteris-
tics are explained by the quota sampling method and post-stratification weights used to
construct this table (For more information, see Table E.2 in Appendix E). By and large,
the collected data samples illustrate the absence of large differences across key demo-
graphic indicators, with the exception of wealthy/poor and rural/urban category for the
post-electoral dataset. In order to simplify subsequent empirical analysis, I resort to data
pooling, first by producing pre-electoral and post-electoral datasets, and second, by pro-
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ducing one single dataset from all of the data.
Table 4.1: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents from Four Surveys, in percentages
Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4 Survey 5
Gender
Male 46.3 46.3 46.3 44.6 45.0
Female 53.7 53.7 53.7 55.4 55.0
Missing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Age
18-24 13.9 13.9 13.9 15.0 13.5
25-34 21.0 19.8 20.1 17.9 19.6
35-44 16.3 18.3 15.8 17.3 17.1
45-54 18.6 17.9 20.0 18.0 18.3
55-64 16.6 17.8 18.0 16.7 17.0
65-74 9.0 8.4 8.7 9.1 9.3
75 and older 4.5 3.9 3.5 6.0 5.2
Missing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Education
High school 70.7 70.7 70.7 67.6 69.25
College 29.3 29.3 29.3 31.6 30.61
Missing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.14
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Well-being
Wealthy 21.4 26.1 26.0 14.4 21.5
Poor 78.2 73.7 73.6 84.6 77.9
Missing 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Residence
Urban 51.4 51.1 50.0 70.0 55.7
Rural 48.6 48.9 50.0 30.0 44.3
Missing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sample size 1601 1601 1633 1682 6517
Notes: Survey 1 – Levada(17-20 Feb.), Survey 2 – Levada(24-27 Feb.), Survey 3 – Levada(March), Survey 4
– Demoscope(March-April), Survey 5 –Pooled data.
In both cases my data pooling has been justified by a statistical testing procedure
equivalent to a likelihood ratio test for the pooled and unpooled data samples. All the
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missing values in the independent variables have been replaced with the medians or
means.
In their methodological study Blair and Imai (2012) list three identification assump-
tions for an ICT to be met: a) randomization of the treatment, i.e. randomization of
respondents into the treatment and control groups; b) no design effect, i.e. the presence
of the sensitive item in the list doesn’t affect the way the respondent thinks about the con-
trol items; c) no liars, i.e. respondents share their truthful answers when asked an ICT
question. Any violation of these assumptions can potentially lead to the failure of the list
experiment, and thus distort the estimates. The overall quality of designed experiments
is assessed on the basis of whether all three assumptions were satisfied.
For determining the overall validity of the conducted ICT experiment, I test the pres-
ence of any apparent violations in the key ICT assumptions, such as randomization of
treatment and the absence of liars. The randomization assumption is tested by regressing
treatment assignment on covariates using both pre-electoral and post-electoral datasets.
Almost all of the covariates are statistically insignificant, which is indicative of successful
randomization of the treatment (Table E.3). However, it has been impossible to achieve
completely balanced treatment assignments. In both regressions one of the covariates
turns out to be statistically significant: “Sex” in the case of the pre-electoral dataset, and
“Wealth” in our post-electoral data. The assumption that the presence of floor and ceiling
effects compromises anonymity has been also satisfied. According to Table E.4, depicting
the frequencies of item counts for voting and turnout, this problem has been minimized
by the proper pre-selection of non-sensitive items, which reduced the frequency with
which 0s and 5s appear in the data. Finally, since it is impossible to empirically test the
design effect assumption in my experimental setting, I am forced to make strong assump-
tion about the absence of design effect in my analysis.
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4.4.3 Results
My initial findings with respect to the means for direct and indirect ICT self-reporting
(ICT) as well as the difference between them, i.e. social desirability bias (∆) and associated
bootstrapped standard errors are presented in Table 4.2. One of the potential challenges
when using the ICT measures is the loss in efficiency of the estimator, i.e. computed stan-
dard errors for the list experiment are four times larger than for the direct self-report. In
spite of this fact, the presence of a strong statistically significant social desirability effect
is observed in both pre-electoral and post-electoral settings. The difference in means esti-
mator (DIM section of the table) shows the percentage of pre-electoral support for Putin
among the participants reaching 47.2%, with s.e. 4.2%, while the direct self-report yields
the estimate of 66.1%(1.3%). The difference between both figures gives us the estimate
of social desirability bias of 18.9%, which is different from zero at α = 0.05 for a one-
tailed t-test. The pre-electoral estimates for turnout show somewhat similar patterns: the
indirect self-report yields an estimate of 50.7%(4.1%), and the direct technique yields
67.1%(1.0%). The difference of 16.5% is statistically significant. In addition, using Blair
and Imai (2012)’s package on multivariate analysis of ICT, I also control for ceiling and
floor effects (See “Modeled” section in the table). When using this control, even though
the presence of social desirability seem to be prevalent for Putin’s electoral support, the
estimates for turnout seem to be more ambiguous. None of the social desirability esti-
mates is statistically significant. Hence, my theoretical implications from Hypothesis 1
are well supported by the data: both the difference in means estimator and the modeled
portion of my analysis demonstrate the presence of strong social desirability bias only in
the incumbent’s estimates, though failing to agree in the case of turnout. Basic findings
illustrate that the magnitude of social desirability bias with respect to turnout is quite
comparable with democracies while with respect to Putin’s support observed inflation
turns out to be higher compared to democratic benchmark defined earlier.
The comparison of the pre-electoral and post-electoral estimates shows the absence
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Table 4.2: Electoral Support Using Direct and Indirect Self-Report, in percentages
Pre-electoral period Post-electoral period
DIM
direct indirect ∆ direct indirect ∆
Incumbent(All) 45.3 28.5 16.8 47.8 34.6 13.2
(1.1) (3.7) (3.7) (0.9) (3.2) (3.2)
Incumbent(Voted) 66.1 47.2 18.9 68.8 52.1 16.7
(1.3) (4.2) (4.3) (1.0) (3.4) (3.6)
Turnout(All) 67.1 50.7 16.4 75.9 55.3 20.6
(1.0) (4.1) (4.0) (0.8) (3.7) (3.7)
Modeled
Incumbent(All) 67.1 42.2 24.9 68.6 36.7 31.9
(6.5) (16.3) (16.2) (7.9) (16.0) (11.5)
Turnout(All) 72.9 64.7 8.2 75.6 72.6 3.0
(6.4) (24.5) (19.5) (10.7) (24.5) (15.3)
Sample size 3202 3315
Notes: DIM – estimates computed with standard difference in means estimator (weighted); Modeled
– estimates computed using multivariate regression analysis with list() package. Incumbent(All) –
percentage of Putin’s supporters among all respondents; Incumbent(Voted) – percentage of Putin’s
supporters among those who intend to vote [voted]; Turnout – percentage of those who will vote
[voted]. Monte Carlo standard errors are in parentheses. According to official election results,
Putin received 63.6% of the popular vote, turnout reached 65.34%.
of statistically significant difference. Social desirability bias is persistent across both set-
tings without any notable changes in the estimates. The statistically significant difference
between pre-electoral 67.1%(1.0%) and post-electoral estimates 75.9%(0.8%) for voter
turnout is the only exception to this. The observed higher levels of social desirability bias
with regard to turnout reveals the growth in proportion of those who falsify their true
preferences after incumbent’s win, which is partly supportive of the “spiral of silence”
theory. Thus, my Hypothesis 3 seems to be also supported by the data.
Holbrook and Krosnick (2010b) argue that comparison between survey estimates and
official estimates can be troublesome, because the numerous methodological problems
associated with surveys – such as undercoverage, nonresponse – produce different kinds
of survey biases in the estimates. However, it is still potentially useful to explore how
well our survey estimates match the results from official statistics. According to official
election results, Vladimir Putin received 63.6% of the popular vote with voter turnout
reaching 65.34%. Both Putin’s estimated support with the direct self-report and turnout
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for pre-election and post-election studies illustrate close proximity between the survey
estimates and official statistics, a difference that is statistically indistinguishable from
zero. Along with the basic difference-of-proportions estimates, I also resort to multivari-
ate analysis to test the hypotheses about the levels of bias across different subgroups.
Here I implement the list-experiment models using the Blair and Imai (2012) max-
imum likelihood estimator, which enables me to obtain more efficient estimates of the
social desirability bias. The set of predictors included in the model is as follows: sex, age,
education, a measure of subjective well-being of an individual (also termed as wealth or
rich vs. poor in the text) and type of residence (rural/urban). In order to make the results
more readily interpretable, in the next stage I resort to computing individual-level mea-
sures of social desirability bias by finding the differences in predicted probabilities for
direct (the binary logit model) and indirect responses(maximum likelihood estimator, as
suggested by Blair and Imai (2012)). All measures have been aggregated up to the level of
social groups by computing corresponding means and standard errors. Figures 4.1(a,b)
depict the means as filled circles and 95% confidence intervals as solid lines for all three
computed measures. The direction of social desirability bias is marked as upper/lower
triangle characters, depending on the sign of obtained bias. Figure 4.1(a) illustrates that
almost all of the estimated proportions are bounded between zero and one (with the
exception of the rich category), which is consistent with our expectations. Specifically,
Putin’s public support is in line with the previous work, indicating that he is more likely
to be publicly supported by richer than poorer, rural than urban residents (Rose, Mishler,
& Munro 2011). Indeed, the social desirability bias is not evenly distributed across the
sample population. In Figure 4.1(a) all social groups demonstrate high and statistically
significant levels of social desirability bias: the rich, young and female demonstrate the
highest values of social desirability bias while the poor, old, uneducated demonstrate the
lowest.
The younger age group is likely to inflate their electoral support of Putin by 22%, and
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the old, by 17%. Men are likely to falsify incumbent support by about 19%, and women,
by 21%. Those with higher education contribute to inflation by about 20%, and those
with lower education, by about 18%. The poor seem to be least biased inflating their
support for Putin by 13%, while the rich are the most biased, inflating it by 31%. A small
distinction in the levels of the social desirability bias is observed between urban and rural
residents. Since for Putin’s electoral support, the likely voters — women and the rich —
seem to demonstrate maximum (although not statistically significant) bias, Hypothesis
2.1 is not well supported. The pattern of over-reporting for Putin’s support is more like
what would be expected for turnout, though not significantly so. Finally, Figure 4.1(b)
representing turnout depicts that none of the distinctions appear significant apart from
the distinction between young and old cohorts, male and female, urban and rural. Since
most of the computed biases are statistically insignificant, we lack evidence to confirm or
reject our Hypothesis 2.2.
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4.4.4 Validation Study
In order to gain greater confidence in the result of the list experiment, I refer to an
additional external validity check by utilizing an urns experiment, organized by one of
the national pollsters (VCIOM) prior to the 2012 elections. The experiment is a street
survey based on non-probability sampling design: on the first day a randomly chosen
respondent is directly asked by the interviewer about her electoral preferences, while
on the second day a randomly chosen respondent fills out a questionnaire by herself
and drops it into an urn, thus ensuring anonymity of response. The geography of the
experiment included four Russian regions (Moscow, St.Petersburg, Sverdlovskaya oblast’
and Altayskiy kray), each containing four primary sampling units. The declared response
rate is in the range of 54-68%.
Table 4.3: External Validity Check of Putin’s Electoral Support, in rounded percentages
Urns Experiment ICT Experiment
Regions Official Means Mean differences Model-based
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
Moscow 47 56 51 46 42 49 61
(52; 60) (49; 53) (29; 62) (25; 58) (30; 68) (31; 90)
St.Petersburg 59 64 51 59 36 67 63
(61; 67) (48, 54) (34; 85) (11; 62) (38; 97) (35; 90)
Altayskiy kray 57 50 44 63 57 67 95
(48, 52) (42, 46) (33; 92) (28; 87) (48; 85) (63; 129)
Sverdlovskaya oblast’ 65 72 59 52 13 62 88
(70; 74) (57; 61) (8; 96) (-31; 57) (36; 87) (26; 151)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. Sample sizes for the urns experiment:
Moscow(direct: 675, indirect: 2283) St.Petersburg(direct: 1284, indirect: 927), Altayskiy kray(direct: 2299,
indirect: 2208), Sverdlovskaya oblast’ (direct: 2346, indirect: 1578). Sample sizes for the pooled dataset:
Moscow(direct: 346, indirect: 534), St.Petersburg(direct: 146, indirect: 218), Altayskiy kray (direct: 146, indi-
rect: 205), Sverdlovskaya oblast’ (direct: 68, indirect: 105).
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.3. In both types of experiments
the indirect self-reporting always yields consistently lower estimates than for direct self-
reporting. The estimates based on the ICT experiments seem to largely agree with the
urns experiments: almost all of the confidence intervals overlap. According to the ta-
ble when both types of experiments are compared similar or greater differences between
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direct and indirect estimates for the urns experiment than for the list experiment are ob-
served, making the original findings appear more conservative in light of this robustness
test. Thus, the results from the urns experiment support my main findings from the list
experiments.
A study of social desirability bias in authoritarian regimes helps to structure and rec-
oncile many of the diverse arguments and contradictory interpretations about the role of
survey research in the electoral politics in those regimes. Even though the majority of
the previous research has been focused on understanding the sources of misprediction of
electoral outcomes by pollsters, oftentimes due to the inflationary or deflationary effects
of the social desirability bias (Bischoping & Schuma 1992; Bodor 2012), this research has
taken a different approach by building on the striking observation that the election polls
in authoritarian regimes are accurate even though the validity of official results is seri-
ously questioned by the presence of blatant election fraud. In this case, the observed close
congruence between the figures of official electoral support and the polling estimates can
contribute to well-grounded suspicions concerning the compromised quality of election
polls.
Based on anecdotal evidence from election observers and extensive scholarly research
on this topic, this section argues that in the 2012 Russian presidential elections the esti-
mates released by Russian national polling organizations contain a substantial degree of
inflationary bias with respect to Putin’s electoral support, which was persistent through-
out the electoral campaign. An important finding here is that the similar level of infla-
tion in turnout for Russia and the US suggests that inflationary mechanism is similar in
both countries. Most likely this mechanism has an alternative explanation: if regarding
the candidate support respondents might fear repercussions for failing to mention the
“right” candidate, in turnout there are no repercussions for suggesting a failure to vote.
For those who falsely claim to have voted, the resulting need to name the candidate voted
for gives rise to an “information effect” (Bartels 1996) in favor of the leading candidate.
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Given the similarity of turnout bias in the two countries, a similar information effect can
be expected in Russia which, in this chapter, we have estimated on the basis of a suitable
US benchmark at 5 percent. As discussed earlier in the text, regarding support for Putin,
the presence of discrepancy between the expected information effect of 5% derived from
the U.S. benchmark and observed bias of 20% provided by my empirical data analysis
can’t be plausibly explained by any other concept than the “spiral of silence”. Therefore
the estimated inflationary bias once compared with the U.S. benchmark for incumbents
provides us with an estimate of about 15%. This estimate is somewhat comparable with
the level of election fraud by election administrators. Though being slightly higher than
election forensics research suggests, this discrepancy can be explained by the presence
of measurement error in the data (Kalinin & Shpilkin 2012). My basic findings are also
supported by an alternative urns experiment conducted during the period of the study,
reinforcing evidence of the vulnerability of electoral polling in authoritarian regimes.
My analysis demonstrates that the distribution of the social desirability bias is not
even across the sample population, yet all social groups demonstrate high and statisti-
cally significant levels of social desirability bias in regard to Putin’s support with the
rich, the young and women demonstrating the highest values of social desirability bias.
The social desirability estimates for turnout exhibit somewhat weaker findings: the rich,
men and urban residents contribute most to inflated turnout estimates.
Hence, this section by addressing theoretical implications from Noelle-Neumann’s
seminal work on the “spiral of silence” strongly suggests that when an individual feels
unsafe about expressing ideas contrary to official policy or having a fear of isolation, she
will most likely hide her private preferences in favor of an incumbent she thinks is most
accepted by the general public. My theory suggests that the social desirability bias, inflat-
ing the autocrat’s support, can be viewed as a valuable resource for the autocratic regime,
effectively hiding the vote-rigging needed to convincingly win the election. Once the
“spiral of silence” is effectively installed, the general public can be deceived into accept-
120
ing the election fraud necessary to match the inflationary gap. The observed inflation in
election ratings permits election administrators to deliver the results predicted by polls,
matching the outcome desired by the autocrat. While this research reveals the presence
of significant social desirability bias in the Russian public opinion polls, on a broader
scale it poses the problem of the persistence of biased responses and survey errors in
authoritarian regimes for a large number of politically sensitive questions.
4.5 Linking Preference Falsification and Election Fraud
4.5.1 Model
The proposed theoretical model is built on three basic assumptions: first, on the day
of elections all voters vote in accordance with their private preferences; second, the ob-
served inflation in pre-election ratings originates from preference falsification rather than
crude data fabrication conducted by the survey organizations; third, governors do not co-
ordinate their strategies with governors of neighboring regions.
The first assumption implies the presence of voting by secret ballot would be enough
to ensure sincere voting similar to secret polling. The second assumption has stronger
implications by proposing that pre-election polls are not fabricated by polling organiza-
tions to satisfy the governor or the autocrat (see the Theory section for more discussion).
The third assumption implies that the governors act independently from each other.
The stylized model is a revised version of Kuran (1987)’s, and will be limited only
to analysis of the governor’s strategy of selected region to provide a favorable electoral
outcome to the autocrat. This game is played in each of the regions. In the game there
are N individuals S = {1, . . . ,N }, from which the respondent i is chosen into the survey.
Using the survey, the survey organization is able to measure both types of preferences:
individual private and public preferences. It is assumed that two competing candidates
enjoy certain level of electoral support. One of the candidates is the autocrat labeled here
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as incumbent (I) and another one is an opposition candidate (O). For voting for a par-
ticular candidate, the voter expects to receive a direct benefit Bi(θ
pr
i ), where θ
pr
i ∈ [0,1],
i.e. the proportion of those who falsify their preferences. In his decision to reveal the
vote he is influenced by the subjectively perceived social pressure, which is a function
of the respondent’s assessment of pre-electoral vote margin between two major candi-
dates ŝI − ŝO = λi . As a result, the respondent’s utility function takes the following form:
Ui = Bi −λi . The function is single-peaked, meaning there exists a unique policy at which
the utility is maximized. Following this, I will subdivide respondents into two groups:
committed respondents, who are strongly tied to specific candidates and reveal their po-
litical preferences in any case (λi = 0), and those who respond to social pressures with a
certain degree of preference falsification, i.e. reluctant respondents with λi ∈ (0,1).
Figure 4.2(a)1 depicts the incumbent’s electoral support of respondents at the pre-
election polls. In the Figure, the collective threshold function gives the range of average
public support for the incumbent defined by the black curve θ̄pu(ŝI ): the larger is ŝI the
higher is the probability of Φ(θ̄pu) of the incumbent’s public support by the respondent.
The red curve in Figure 4.2(b) Φ(θ̄pr) denotes the cumulative density function, which
measures the share of individuals whose private preferences are to support the incum-
bent, i.e. 1 −Φ(θ̄pr). As a result, the actual shares of electoral support of the incumbent
become: sI = 1−Φ[θ̄pr(ŝI )]. In Figure 4.2(a) one observes the presence of disequilibrium
due to the preference falsification ε, since the average public electoral support for the
incumbent is 0.52, but the actual share is 0.38, resulting in the proportion of preference
falsification in favor of incumbent ε = 0.14. The only depicted equilibrium in this graph
results from the bandwagon effect at the bottom: if the incumbent is publicly supported
by less 40% of respondents, he will end up in losing all the electoral support.
Figure 4.2(b) depicts the electoral stage with the blue curve f [Φ(θ̄pr], representing the
1In the Figure: θi – distribution of individual preferences, ŝI – private electoral support for incumbent
in the polls, sI – public electoral support for incumbent in the polls, v̂I – unofficial electoral support for
incumbent in the elections, vI – official electoral support for incumbent in the polls.
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Polls: public electoral support for Incumbent, si
θ i
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manufactured distribution of official “electoral support”, which has been shifted in the
direction towards the official electoral support by a governor engaging in election fraud.
According to the model, the second equilibrium emerges once the amount of election
fraud fI is equal to the magnitude of the preference falsification fI = εI within the margin
of error. Hence, Figure 4.2(b) illustrates the presence of two equilibria at the elections:
the first equilibrium outcome is most desirable for the autocrat and the governor, since it
guarantees the majority of the vote (52%); in contrast, if the election fraud is not enough
to win elections (less than 41%), this contributes to a reverse bandwagon process with
none of the individuals supporting the incumbent. Thus, if fI < εI , then equilibrium with
desirable properties for the governor never takes place and he will end up in the inferior
Pareto outcome by losing elections. As Simpser’s theory suggests, in Figure 4.2(b), the
governor will seek to maximize incumbent’s vote margin VI = vi − vo and votes vi by
shifting the average public support, defined by the black curve in the upward direction.
This is possible through the increase in social pressure λi on the respondent exogenously
determined by the autocrat and organization of more election fraud fI . However, the
imposed costs for the incumbent defined by cI = fI + ε
2
I , can serve as an additional check
on his actions: greater levels of preference falsification require more vote stealing and





) (See Figure 4.2(c)).
Hence, given biased election polls, election fraud fI is beneficial to the incumbent and
the governor, if the following set of necessary conditions is satisfied:
Necessary conditions for Fraud:

v̂I = ŝI (1)
ŝI − sI = εI if εI > 0 (2)
fI = εI if εI > 0 (3)
If any of these necessary conditions is not satisfied than election fraud will never oc-
cur. The first condition states that the official vote share vI is expected to be equal to the
incumbent’s electoral support in the polls, ŝI . The second condition exposes the magni-
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tude of preference falsification. The third condition implies that the magnitude of elec-
tion fraud in the election fI and amount of preference falsification εI and must be equal.
The marginal cost was not included into the set, because in this set it’s not necessary, but
a sufficient condition for election fraud.
The main implication of this model is related to the expected relationship between
preference falsification and election fraud: one would expect that higher levels of pref-
erence falsification would require a higher level of election fraud to compensate for the
disparity between the pre-election polling results and voting. Thus, the observed infla-
tion in election ratings would encourage the governors to compensate for mismatch by
mobilizing their political machines. Hence, my Hypothesis 4 is that preference falsifica-
tion shall positively correlate with the amount of election fraud across Russian regions. From
here I also derive my Hypothesis 5, stating that for the higher magnitude of pre-electoral
preference falsification one would expect greater electoral support for the incumbent.
Since with a decrease in the margin of victory, the marginal cost of election fraud also
decreases, the incumbent will be more interested in election fraud than otherwise when
the margin of victory is large. Here my Hypothesis 6 states that the larger the vote margin
is between two major candidates, the weaker the effect of preference falsification on election
fraud will be.
My further analysis of empirical data aims to test the set of conditions for emergence
of election fraud and provide empirical evidence in support of the proposed hypotheses.
4.5.2 Data and Measurements
In this empirical part I utilize the official electoral and polling data from the 2012 Rus-
sian presidential elections aggregated to the regional level. The polling data was collected
by the national polling organization Levada-Center as part of the Omnibus longitudinal
study on February 17-20 and February 24-27 of 2012. These both polls are most prox-
imate to the official date of elections, March 4th 2012. For this part of analysis all the
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electoral data was downloaded from the Russia’s Central Election Commission website.
The difficulty of my empirical analysis is related to the hidden nature of election fraud
and preference falsification: very often, not only measuring, but even detecting election
fraud and preference falsification is problematic. The existing methods of fraud detection
combine qualitative, based on the observer reports, and quantitative, based on election
forensics, techniques. The field of election forensics includes several methods of election
fraud detection, such as digit tests based on the assumption about inability of humans to
randomly produce figures in an unbiased way, as well as, parametric models with a set
of important distribution assumptions. Last digit tests (“VL”, “V05”) The last digit test
is founded on the assumption that last digits of the vote counts or turnout are uniformly
distributed if election fraud does not take place (Beber & Scacco 2008). An application of
last digit tests has demonstrated that manipulations of turnout increased over the period
2003 to 2008 in Russia (Mebane & Kalinin 2009a). The last digit approach was further
extended by a new test of last digit of percentages, supported by the concept of signaling
games. The presence of election fraud becomes a basic signaling mechanism of regional
bosses’ loyalty and of their ability to control the administrative resources to the Krem-
lin’s benefit (Kalinin & Mebane 2013). If electoral signaling occurs, data manipulation
is most likely to take place with rounded percentages of electoral support, which is the
easiest and most readily detected way to report basic information to superiors. In such
cases, favorable percentages are first sent down from the Kremlin to regional elections
commissions, which pass this information to territory-level commissions and, finally, to
precincts.
Higher levels of election fraud are therefore associated with a lower mean of last digit
of vote counts, and higher proportion of 0s and 5s in the electoral data. This test has been
also supported the literature focusing on exploration of spikes in the kernel density esti-
mate of the distribution of both precinct turnout and incumbent’s vote shares for values
of 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% and 100% Kobak et al. (2016); Mebane and Kalinin (2009a), a
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pattern initially noticed by Shpilkin and Shulgin (Buzin & Lubarev 2008, 201). Analysis
of the last digits of turnout counts in Russia shows an unusually high frequency of ze-
ros and fives Mebane and Kalinin (2009a). Hence, the only plausible explanation for the
spiked distributions is a widespread adjustment of turnout to specific rounded figures.
In this chapter I will use two digit-based measures of election fraud: the mean of last
digit of vote counts (“VL”) and the proportion of 0s and 5s (“V05”) in a given region (for
the precinct-level analysis both measures).
The third measure of election fraud is based on a finite mixture model (“FMM”) devel-
oped by Mebane (2016), which is partly originated from the Klimek’s parametric model
(Klimek et al. 2012). Klimek et al. (2012) propose a parametric model quantifying the
magnitude of electoral fraud and perform cross-national analysis to test its applicability.
The basic assumption of the model is that in fair elections, vote counts and turnout must
look approximately Gaussian. In contrast, in rigged elections these distributions are char-
acterized by right-tailed skewness and larger kurtosis. The observation of bimodality in
distributions for Uganda and Russia leads the authors to two separate modes of election
frauds: ballot switching (“incremental fraud”, fi) and ballot stuffing (“extreme fraud”, fe).
Mebane (2016) develops this model further by utilizing a finite mixture likelihood model
to estimate three distinct components measured at the precinct level: probabilities of
incremental, extreme fraud and no fraud.
Here, a measure of preference falsification based on two pre-election polls is com-
puted using the item count technique (ICT) (Chaudhuri & Christofides 2007; Corstange
2009; Glynn 2013; Green & Kern 2012; Imai 2011; Tsuchiya 2005). The share of respon-
dents privately supporting Putin ŝI is a standard difference in means estimator of two
subsamples (Blair & Imai 2012). The final measure of preference falsification is com-
puted using the formula εI = sI − ŝI , where sI – is Putin’s public vote share computed
from the direct question. This preference falsification measure is computed for forty-five
Russian regions for which the polling data was available.
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Since I am interested the way preference falsification affects election fraud at different
levels of the margin of victory, I also construct the “margin of victory” variable based
on the electoral data. It is the absolute difference in vote shares between the leading
candidate (Vladimir Putin) and the second candidate (Gennadiy Zuganov, the leader of
the Communist party).
4.5.3 Results
Before getting to the main analysis, I check to see if the set of conditions derived from
the model are met. For this preliminary part I apply a series of paired t-tests to check
(a) if a significant difference in the means between direct self-report and official election
results is observed; (b) if the share of public electoral support is significantly higher than
the share of private electoral support; and (c) if no statistically significant difference is
observed between the share of election fraud due to preference falsification and the share
of preference falsification. Almost all of the conditions are supported by the data: (a) no
statistically significant difference in between the means of public survey preferences and
Putin’s official election results is observed (t = 1.03, df = 43, p-value = 0.31); (b) there is a
statistically significant difference between public and private electoral preferences for the
incumbent (t = 8.28, df = 43, p-value = 0); and (c) contrary to my expectations, there is a
statistically significant difference between election fraud (“FMM” probability measures)
and preference falsification with regard to Putin’s support(t = 3.88, df = 32, p = 0.001).
If we compare election fraud (“FMM” proportion of votes that are fraudulent) and pref-
erence falsification the difference between both estimates will be even more substantial.
The third assumption is the hardest one to meet. It can be violated for the reasons of poor
survey quality and measurement errors associated with each estimate.
Although the estimates obtained from the regional level data are more “noisy” com-
pared to the national-level estimates, implementation of the nonparametric regression
analysis to measure the effects of preference falsification on the incumbent’s electoral
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support in the Russian presidential elections is helpful. In Figure 4.3(a)2 preference fal-
sification and voting show a statistically significant and positive relationship, which is
fully supported by the theory: higher mean values of preference falsification contribute
to greater values in Putin’s support. Thus, this finding confirms Hypothesis 5.
In Figure 4.3(b), containing the last-digit mean of vote counts as a measure of anomaly
(“VL”), one observes a statistically significant negative association with the certain de-
gree of non-linearity present: as preference falsification increases, the last digit mean in
Putin’s vote counts decreases. This pattern suggests the presence of an excessive num-
ber of zeros and fives in vote counts, i.e. signaling patterns that shift the regression line
downward. The observed convex-shaped curve peaks around the value of preference fal-
sification equal to zero, thus roughly dividing the graph into two regions. The region of
preference revelation located on the left-hand side is characterized by a positive associ-
ation between the two measures; here, as preference revelation decreases, the anomalies
in the incumbent’s vote counts increase. The region of preference falsification on the
right-hand side shows a negative association between both measures; as the preference
falsification increases, the quantity of anomalies in incumbent’s vote counts decreases.
Figure 4.3(c), illustrating whether the proportions of 0s and 5s in incumbent’s vote
counts are dependent on the level of preference falsification, shows an inverted pattern
similar to the nonlinear pattern of “VL”. It can be visually divided into the region of pref-
erence revelation in the interval [−0.2;−0.05] and the region of preference falsification in
the interval [0.06;−0.4]. Finally, the finite mixture estimator in Figure 4.3(d) indicates the
2“AL” - Altayskiy kray, “AR” - Arkhangel’skaya oblast’,“CH” - Chelyabinskaya oblast’, “CV” - Chu-
vashiya Republic, “GM” - Moscow, “GP” - St.Petersburg, “KL” - Kaliningradskaya oblast’, “KO” - Ke-
merovskaya oblast’, “KH”- Khabarovskiy kray, “KB” - Kostromskaya oblast’, “KR” - Krasnodarskiy kray,
“KD” - Krasnoyarskiy kray, “KU” - Kurganskaya oblast’, “KS” - Kurskaya oblast’, “LE” - Leningradskaya
oblast’, “LI” - Lipetskaya oblast’, “MA” - Magadanskaya oblast’, “MO” - Moskovskaya oblast’, “NI” - Nizhe-
gorodskaya oblast’, “NV” - Novosibirskaya oblast’, “OM” - Omskaya oblast’, “OR” - Orenburgskaya oblast’,
“PM” - Permskiy kray, “PR” - Primorskiy kray, “PS” - Pskovskaya oblast’, “AD” - Adygeya Republic, “BA” -
Bashkortostan Republic, “DA” - Dagestan Republic, “RH”- Khakassiya Republic, “TA” - Tatarstan Repub-
lic, “RO” - Rostovskaya oblast’, “SA” - Samarskaya oblast’, “SR” - Saratovskaya oblast’, “SM” - Smolen-
skaya oblast’, “ST” - Stavropol’skiy kray, “SV” - Sverdlovskaya oblast’ , “TM” - Tambovskaya oblast’, “TU”
- Tul’skaya oblast’, “TY” - Tyumenskaya oblast’, “UL” - Ul’yanovskaya oblast’, “VI” - Vladimirskaya oblast’,
“VO” - Volgogradskaya oblast’, “VR” - Voronezhskaya oblast’, “YA” - Yaroslavskaya oblast’.
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Table 4.4: Preference Falsification, Election Fraud and Margin of Victory in
Russian Elections, 2012 (regions)
M(01) M(02) M(03)
Constant 4.61??? 0.17??? −0.11???
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Preference Falsification -0.26 0.12??? 0.3??
(0.19) (0.04) (0.12)
Margin of Victory −0.25??? 0.09??? 0.42???
(0.08) (0.02) (0.05)
Preference Falsification X Margin of Victory 0.45 −0.3??? −0.84???
(0.36) (0.09) (0.28)
R2 0.14 0.34 0.64
Sample Size 44 44 44
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.1, ??p ≤ 0.05,
? ? ?p ≤ 0.01. Dependent variables: M(01) – “VL”, M(02) – “V05”, M(03) – finite mixture
estimator.
presence of nonlinearity dividing the graph into three regions: the region of preference
revelation [−0.2;0], weakly defined region of preference falsification [0;0.18] and ending
with the region of preference revelation [0.2;0.4]. In summary, digit tests seem to yield
stronger confirmation for my Hypothesis 4, compared to the finite mixture estimates.
The former test is stronger supported by the signaling theory of election fraud compared
to a parametrically estimated measure of election fraud.
For testing my Hypothesis 6 about whether preference falsification has a weaker ef-
fect on election fraud where the margin of victory is larger, I apply to linear regression
analysis (See Table 4.4).
While model 1, with the mean of the last digit as dependent variable, yields more
mixed findings, the results in models 2 and 3 are in line with my conjectures. The table
demonstrates statistically significant main and interaction effects in the predicted direc-
tion. The independent effects of preference falsification and margin of victory on election
fraud are positive, while their interaction is negative. Further, I visualize the marginal
effect of preference falsification on election fraud, conditional on the margin of victory
estimated from the electoral data (See Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: The Marginal Effect of Preference Falsification Conditional on the Difference
of the Margin of Victory Between the Candidates








































































































































































































































































































According to Figure 4.4, as the margin of victory for the party increases, the marginal
effect of preference falsification on election fraud decreases. The Figure 4.4(a) shows that
the marginal effect of preference falsification on the proportion of 0s and 5s becomes
statistically significant when the victory margin is in the range of values between 0.55
and 0.75. Figure 4.4(b) illustrating the marginal effect of preference falsification on finite
mixture estimates demonstrates similar a pattern, statistically significant in the range of
values between 0.43 and 0.75. Thus, both graphs confirm Hypothesis 6, stating that the
larger vote margin between the two major candidates contributes to the weaker effect of
preference falsification on election fraud (“FMM”).
For an additional robustness check, I engage precinct-level data analysis in which
each of the measures of anomalies and margin of victory are provided at the precinct-
level, and the measures of preference falsification, at the regional level. Based on this
data, I estimate linear mixed-effects models (“VL” and “FMM”) and generalized linear
mixed-effects model (“V05”) with a random intercept grouped by the region (See Table
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E.5 in Appendix E). The results largely agree with my earlier findings. However, the finite
mixture estimate yields the reversed results: preference falsification has a negative effect
and the sign of the interaction coefficient between preference falsification and margin of
victory is positive. In Appendix E, three additional models were added to the analysis
with two extra covariates (“Republics” – indicating if the region belongs to the ethnic
region or not, and “Rural” – indicating if the area belongs to rural or urban area) and two
extra interaction terms. My findings from three earlier models seem to be in accordance
with the results of the extended models. Interestingly, in both “V05” and “FMM” models,
the effect of preference falsification on anomalies in ethnic Republics seems to be less
acute compared to non-ethnic regions. The effect of preference falsification on anomalies
in rural areas (vs urban areas) is strongly positive in the “V05” model but negative in the
“FMM” model.
4.5.4 Validation Study: Cross-National Analysis
In order to extend my findings beyond the Russian case, I also apply a statistical anal-
ysis of 59 countries with the inclusion of both electoral autocracies and democracies.
Unlike the analysis of the Russian data, containing the ICT measure, which enables me
to compute the measure of preference falsification, in this section I use a proxy measure
of preference falsification – proportion of respondents who refused to respond to polling
questions on the electoral support of the winning party. Given the difficulty of directly
measuring preference falsification, particularly cross nationally, refusals are an imperfect
proxy for the underlying concept. This proxy enables me to measure whether voters hide
their private preferences by declining to answer the question on party support, but does
not pick up voters’ preference misrepresentation. I therefore assume that it captures
certain aspects of social desirability bias cross-nationally. The rationale for using this
measure is based on the assumption that preference falsification is strongly connected to
the item nonresponse: the probability of a respondent misreporting his true preference
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increases with the degree of sensitivity to the question. For instance, most of the stud-
ies point out that income questions typically yield high rates of missing data (Juster &
Smith 1997; Moore, Stinson, & Welniak 1999). Specifically, Tourangeau and Yan (2007,
862) argue that the item nonresponse rate for the National Survey of Family Growth for
the total household income is the highest compared to other types of sensitive behavior.
The authors also conclude that sensitivity to a given question positively correlates with
item nonresponse, which can be explained by the fact that sensitivity can be attributed to
the content of the question rather than situational factors (Tourangeau & Yan 2007, 862-
863). Since the respondent perceives those questions as an invasion of privacy, a truthful
answer on a sensitive topic can be seen as inappropriate. Another viable strategy for the
respondent would be to decline further participation in the survey or simply to refuse to
answer the sensitive question, thus contributing to lower response rates or an increased
proportion of missing data for a variable of interest. Since the data on unit nonresponse
has been unavailable, I focus my attention on the proportion of respondents who refused
to respond to polling questions on the electoral support.
Unlike the “don’t know” category, the “refuse to answer” category is more restric-
tive, excluding those respondents who simply can’t make an informed decision. Thus,
here I resort to several cross-national election studies carried out in the period between
1990 and 2012, such as Afrobarometer (Rounds 1-4), American National Election Studies
(1990-2012), European Social Survey (Rounds 1-6), European Election Study (Trend file),
and Latinobarometer (1995-2010). The question of primary interest contains information
on the respondent’s future or past electoral preferences. By using this data, I obtained
two key variables of interest: “Refusals” (the proportion of item nonresponse), and either
“Pre-electoral” (referring to whether the survey was conducted before or after the elec-
tions) “Margin of Victory”(the vote differential between two leading parties), depending
on the timing of the survey. As far as the measure of election fraud is concerned in my
cross-national analysis, I apply observer-based measure obtained from the Database of
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Political Institutions from the World Bank. According to the released guide, this measure
of election fraud “captures extra-constitutional irregularities, which are recorded only if
mentioned in sources. 0 reported for countries where, for example, opposition parties are
officially and constitutionally banned or where irregularities are not mentioned (although
may still exist); “1” when opposition is officially legal but suppressed anyway. Recording
is irrespective of whether only opposition claims that fraudulent elections have occurred
or whether allegations are backed by independent international observers” (DPI2012
2012, 17). The method’s drawback, however, is that there may have been instances of
fraud/violence that were not reported, thus resulting in false negatives(DPI2012 2012,
17).
The proposed models include a set of controls related to the leader’s success of eco-
nomic policy, such as lagged GDP growth per capita (variable: “GDP growth (t-1) year”).
GDP growth should help the incumbent to increase the credibility of election results, by
garnering political support of the population, and to attract more resources necessary to
commit election fraud in specific localities (Higashijima 2014). Another measure used as
a control variable is the amount of resources at the disposition of the leader expressed
in the oil and gas per capita index (Ross 2012). The variable is computed as the prod-
uct of oil/gas production and oil/gas price divided by total population (in order to solve
the scaling problem in the regression analysis the index was also divided by 100). A set
of variables measuring political institutions are as follows: the form of the government
parliamentary vs. presidential (variable: “Parliamentary”); the sum of the squared seat
shares of all parties in the government, showing the amount of representation of the par-
ties in the government (variable “Government”); and a variable measuring the level of
democracy (variable: “Polity IV”). The degree of intimidation in a given country is mea-
sured by the variable “Violence”, which contains a total summed magnitudes of both
societal and interstate violence, measured on the scale from 0 to 10 (Major Episodes of
Political Violence, MEPV2012 database).
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In addition to these two variables I also use the polling data to obtain “Margin of
Victory” variable, indicating the vote margin between the two winning parties (a proxy
measure of the social pressure). A set of decade interval variables is also included to
control for time-specific effects.
Since the observer-based measure is a dummy variable, I apply to estimation of the
binary logit model and compute the robust standard errors clustered by countries to solve
the problem of heteroscedasticity.
In Table 4.5, models 1-2 present the results of statistical analysis demonstrating that
the proportion of refusals is positively related to the probability of election fraud being,
statistically significant at α = 0.05 level. Thus, my original findings from the Russian data
analysis for Hypothesis 4 are supported by my cross-national data analysis.
The next set of results, utilizing the margin of victory, are shown in the models 3-6
with the main effect of item nonresponse being robust to model specifications. It yields
statistically a significant and positive effect on the fraud measure at α = 0.5 and α = 0.1.
For the “Margin of Victory” variable one can observe statistically significant direct effects
with a negative sign (models 3 and 6). For model 6, the interaction effect between the
proportion of refusals and the margin of victory is negative and statistically significant.
Further, I visualize the marginal effect of preference falsification on election fraud, con-
ditional on the margin of victory (See Figure B1). As the margin of victory for the party
increases, the marginal effect of refusals on election fraud decreases (the histogram in the
Figure shows the distribution of the Margin of Victory variable). As the graph shows,
this marginal effect becomes statistically significant when the victory margin is located
in the range of values between 0 and 0.60. In other words, as the victory margin becomes
larger, the impact of preference falsification on election fraud decreases. Thus, the pre-
sented graph supports Hypothesis 6, stating that the larger vote margin between the two
major candidates or parties contributes to the weaker effect of preference falsification on
election fraud.
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Table 4.5: Cross-Country Analysis with Margin of Victory (Monitoring Data)
M(01) M(02) M(03) M(04) M(05) M(06)
Constant −3.59??? −3.78??? −3.43??? 1.17 −4.02? -3.94
(1.000) (1.12) (1.13) (1.50) (2.15) (2.56)
Refusals 7.32?? 6.73? 2.17 13.59?? 81.76??? 92.68???
(3.53) (3.6) (3.75) (5.5) (23.19) (22.34)
Margin of Victory -0.72 −5.48? −5.54? −12.93? −11.95???
(2.09) (3.26) (2.86) (6.86) (5.33)
Pre-electoral 0.67 0.79 0.8 -0.89 -1.07 -0.99
(0.82) (0.84) (0.87) (0.97) (0.87) (0.99)
Parliamentary −10.65??? −11.8??? −12.03???
(0.74) (1.42) (1.6)
Oil/Gas(per capita) -3.92 -3.77 -4.31 −3.51? −3.62?
(3.33) (3.13) (2.78) (1.87) (1.93)
GDP growth(t-1 year) 0.08 0.09? 0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Violence 0.25 0.25 0.09 0.01 -0.03
(0.23) (0.23) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28)
Government -0.86 -0.94
(1.86) (2.11)
PolityIV −0.34?? 0.6 0.93
(0.16) (2.22) (-2.00)
Incumbent’s share 4.92 5.86
(4.01) (4.32)
Refusals X Margin of Victory 48.36? -23.99 -84.94 −113.95???
(29.19) (29.96) (53.44) (47.86)
PolityIV X Refusals −62.69?? −73.01???
(25.9) (19.2)
PolityIV X Margin of Victory 9.55 7.61??
(7.85) (4.00)
Refusals X Margin of Vict. X Pol -33.83
(89.27)
2000s 0.17 0.4 0.43 1.10 1.1 1.2
(0.75) (0.89) (0.9) (1.37) (1.43) (1.6)
R2 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.4 0.43 0.44
LR χ2 6.99 16.43 19.87 65.94 72.53 73.71
Number of obs 409 361 361 359 361 359
Notes: For M(01)-M(06) – binary logit models with dependent variable – an observer-based measure of
election fraud from the Database of Political Institutions; independent variable of interest – proportion
of respondents who refused to respond to polling questions on the electoral support of the winning party.
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.1, ??p ≤ 0.05, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.01.
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Figure 4.5: The Marginal Effect of Preference Falsification Conditional on the Difference
of the Margin of Victory Between the Parties





























Figure 4.6: Comparing the Effect of Preference Falsification and the Vote Margin on Elec-













































































The analysis of interaction effect between the Polity score and Refusals shows a sta-
tistically significant negative effect (See Figure 4.6 (a,b)). There is a statistically signifi-
cant difference between electoral autocracies and democracies: compared to democracies,
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electoral autocracies are characterized with a larger marginal effect of preference falsifi-
cation on election fraud.
In contrast to this, there is no statistically significant difference between electoral au-
tocracies and democracies in terms of the effect of the margin of victory on election fraud.
Moreover, for both electoral autocracies and democracies, a marginal effect of the margin
of victory on election fraud is not statistically distinguishable from 0. In other words,
according to these findings, social pressure seems to be an insignificant predictor for the
level of election fraud conditional on regime type.
4.6 Conclusion
The main objective of this study was, on the one hand, to provide a theoretical frame-
work that links together preference falsification and election fraud in the revised Kuran’s
model, and, on the other hand, to test whether the implications of the model could be
supported in by empirical data analysis.
The importance of pre-election polling in the voter’s, autocrat’s and survey organi-
zation’s strategic behavior is truly substantial. According to my findings, the autocrat
is strategically interested in boosting preference falsification and organizing the propor-
tionate amount of election fraud in a given country so as to provide himself with the most
favorable and, importantly, credible electoral outcome. Undoubtedly, the level of prefer-
ence falsification exacerbates the role of pre-election polls in guaranteeing the credibility
of rigged electoral outcomes for the autocrat. The autocrat’s failure to meet this require-
ment leads to the worse-off outcomes for him, resulting in the Pareto inferior outcomes
due to the bandwagon effect.
In this setting the survey organization would be interested in data collection that
would permit derivation of “quantifiable” biases and errors, making it possible to extract
the genuine information from the biased estimates and provide them to the autocrat. Fi-
nally, organization of election fraud in the Russian setting is entrusted to the heads of the
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regional governments engaging in competitive falsification to show loyalty and extract
certain benefits from the center.
My empirical findings derived from the analysis of the Russian electoral data and
cross-national analysis strongly support the theoretical implications of the model. First,
analysis of both datasets shows that preference falsification is indeed positively related
to the amount of election fraud in a given country. Second, the hypothesis that the in-
cumbent earns a larger vote share by increasing the level of preference falsification is
confirmed. Third, my hypothesis about the presence of a moderation effect of the margin
of victory is confirmed: indeed, the marginal effect of preference falsification on election
fraud becomes weaker with an increase of the margin of victory between two leading
candidates.
While these findings look promising, there are several important limitations to this
research. First, analysis of the Russian data was performed on a sample of the regions,
which might be different from those left outside of the analysis. Second, the presence of
nonlinear patterns in my non-parametric analysis provided me with mixed evidence in
favor of the main hypothesis. Third, the auxiliary cross-national data analysis on the part
of the preference falsification variable was entirely based on academic surveys rather than
pre-election polls. Even though these limitations are substantial for our consideration,
the successful generalization of my findings makes them applicable to a broad set of
electoral autocracies. This research helps to come closer to a better understanding of the
mechanism by which the survey polls can be important in different political settings, and




This dissertation sought to explore the methodological and theoretical aspects of elec-
tion forensics research. It focused on a balanced discussion of various forensics tests,
methods and web applications needed for detection and measurement of electoral anoma-
lies in the data. It also attempted to contribute to the field of election forensics by propos-
ing two innovative theories aimed to unravel the mechanisms behind certain anomalous
data patterns and test them using the Russian as well as cross-national data analysis.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation was devoted to the exploration of election forensics
methodology and validation of the finite mixture model. From this Chapter we learnt that
even though none of the election forensics statistics provide definitive proof of fraud, the
combination of electoral and auxiliary data enables us to strengthen our conjectures. This
research was specifically aimed at validating finite mixture model of election fraud using
auxiliary data from election observation and different voting modes. The new measure
confirms our expectations about vote rigging taking place in the polling stations with bal-
lot boxes rather than KOIBs/KEGs, and without well-trained observers rather than with
them. Moreover, based on the presented evidence, it can be also concluded that several
traditional election forensics indicators can serve as relatively good predictors for these
new measures. There is a relatively strong correlation between various clusters measured
with the help of different forensics indicators, which is indicative of consistency between
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various measures of election fraud and across the Russian elections.
Chapter 3 offered a theoretical perspective on how election fraud can be closely as-
sociated with the loyalty of subnational agents. My analysis suggests that institutional
change over time associated with Putin’s recentralization policies in the 2000s also im-
pacted the structure of election frauds in Russia. In terms of the game model, the value
of the parameter d, the value to the Leader of replacing a disloyal governor, greatly in-
creased. As recentralization gained hold, the threat associated with transfers to regions
often decreased—the threat of regional secession disappeared—so that the long-run re-
turns associated with transfers likely often increased: b was less often negative or at least
often less negative. These changes changed the strategies governors and the Kremlin
found optimal, leading to the situations seen in 2004 and 2008, where election frauds
are easy to detect because governors use them to send signals to the Kremlin. As it was
shown, in Russia, the occurrence of zeros or fives as the last digit in turnout and vote
percentages is connected to an extensive signaling structure wherein election frauds are
connected to postelection rewards and punishments
My game-theoretical propositions in Chapter 3 was also subjected to cross-national
data analysis by classifying equilibria profiles from the signaling game across multiple
political regimes. The empirical analysis based on unique original datasets helps us to
draw two important conclusions. First, specific signaling patterns seem to be prevalent
in cross-national data as well as in the Russian data: an abundance of zeros and fives
contributes to growing financial decentralization, i.e. leading to more resources concen-
trated in the regions. Second, in accordance with my theoretical expectations, autocra-
cies are characterized by greater signaling patterns than democracies. Moreover, counter
to my theoretic expectations, the signaling patterns seem to be prevalent in the unitary
states compared to the federal ones. Although the implications from the formal model
are suggestive of this, intuitively it seems plausible that the unitary states are expected
to show greater signaling patterns compared to the federal ones, because of the stronger
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institutional loyalties and larger consolidation of resources in the center. The observed
complexity in interpretation of results may be also due to classification errors and subse-
quent misattribution of equilibria profiles to specific regimes.
The main objective of Chapter 4 was, on the one hand, to provide a theoretical frame-
work that links together preference falsification and election fraud in the revised Kuran’s
model, and, on the other hand, to test whether the implications of the model could be
supported by empirical data analysis. According to my theory, the importance of pre-
election polling in the voter’s, autocrat’s and survey organization’s strategic behavior is
truly substantial. Empirical findings illustrate that the autocrat is strategically interested
in boosting preference falsification and organizing the proportionate amount of election
fraud in a given country so as to provide himself with the most favorable and, impor-
tantly, credible electoral outcome. Undoubtedly, the level of preference falsification ex-
acerbates the role of pre-election polls in guaranteeing the credibility of rigged electoral
outcomes for the autocrat. The autocrat’s failure to meet this requirement leads to the
worse-off outcomes for him, resulting in the Pareto inferior outcomes due to the band-
wagon effect. In this setting the survey organization would be interested in data collection
that would permit derivation of “quantifiable” biases and errors, making it possible to ex-
tract the genuine information from the biased estimates and provide them to the autocrat.
Finally, organization of election fraud in the Russian setting is entrusted to the heads of
the regional governments engaging in competitive falsification to show loyalty and ex-
tract certain benefits from the center. My empirical findings derived from the analysis
of the Russian electoral data and cross-national analysis strongly support the theoretical
implications of the model. First, analysis of both datasets shows that preference falsifica-
tion indeed positively affects the amount of election fraud in a given country. Second, the
hypothesis that the incumbent earns a larger vote share by increasing the level of prefer-
ence falsification is confirmed. Third, my hypothesis about the presence of a moderation
effect of the margin of victory is confirmed: indeed, the marginal effect of preference
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falsification on election fraud becomes weaker with an increase of the margin of victory
between two leading candidates.
What comes next? The finite mixture estimator, developed by Mebane (2016), so far,
seems to be the most promising tool in election forensics research, especially if combined
with other methods. Implementation of all these methods via the web-application “Elec-
tion Forensics Toolkit” makes election forensics methodology technically accessible to
many interest individuals and organizations. Its further development will harness these
social scientific efforts to create innovative resources for policymakers, practitioners, and
scholars who study and evaluate election outcomes enabling them to evaluate better the
integrity of election returns. As the Toolkit develops into the Portal we will build an
international community of people with different backgrounds, sharing similar research
interests, and having access to different data sources and methodologies. It will serve as
an information hub for researchers, practitioners, and observers by providing a conve-
nient interface for data collection and data sharing, as well as quick and easy access to
election forensics results presented in graphs, tables, dynamic maps. It will help these
professionals to stay interconnected and informed about the most up-to-date techniques
of election forensics analysis. Specifically, it will help to reach the following goals: a)
make election forensics results quickly and easily accessible for on-the-ground monitor-
ing of elections by domestic and foreign observers, as well as ordinary citizens; b) help to
make most up-to-date election forensics methods easily accessible for data analysis any-
where in the world where internet connection is provided; c) create high-quality visuals
(maps, graphs, tables) for presentations to the wider audiences, experts and journalists;
d) develop dynamic maps designed to present geo-referenced election forensics results
in a user-friendly format; e) create an on-time monitoring news system of election fraud
around the world; f) integrate the website with the parallel vote tabulation (PVT), which
can be used by different observer missions around the globe; g) accumulate, store, and
disseminate data and election forensics results among the interested audiences; h) build
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an international community of people interested in election forensics methodology and
data analysis.
Unfortunately, development of election forensics methodology can also lead to ele-
vated risks and challenges of autocratic adaptation, expressed in such data fabrication
that would make it insensitive to contemporary election forensics methods and tech-
niques. Being explored by Sjoberg (2014), this phenomenon was demonstrated in the
dissertation’s opening paragraph related to the past Russian Duma elections. The inter-
ests of resource-rich autocrats to organize election fraud specifically designed to remain
undetectable by election forensics methods, is one of the major concerns that needs to be
fully addressed in the future. In this sense, the methodological transparency of election
forensics, which is the virtue of the field, can pose the long-term challenges associated
with autocratic adaptation and data resistance to “super-frauds”. In the future, I hope to
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Figure A.1: KEGs vs. KOIBS
(a)
(b)
Notes: Images are taken from http://www.cikrf.ru








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Overall fraud probability averages are in parentheses. (a,b) – 2012 (0.09); (c,d) 2011 (0.13).
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Table A.1: Number of Territories and Precincts in the Anomalous Clusters (red spots),
by Region
Region Presidential Election Parliamentary Election
Precincts Territories Precincts Territories
fe fi fe fi fe fi fe fi
Amurskaya oblast’ 3
Belgorodskaya oblast’ 4 171 2 17 280 14
Bryanskaya oblast’ 7 11
Chechnya Republic 95 154 12 14 12 14
Chelyabinskaya oblast’ 9 38
Chukotskiy autonomous okrug 1
Chuvashiya Republic 8 306 9 2 24 2
Gorod Moskva 3
Irkutskaya oblast’ 3
Kabardino-Balkariya Republic 162 179 8
Kaluzhskaya oblast’ 17 53 3
Karachaevo-Cherkessiya Republic 111 9 23 133 9
Kemerovskaya oblast’ 2 189 5
Khabarovskiy kray 1
Khanty-Mansiysk autonomous okrug 13 1
Kirovskaya oblast’ 3
Kostromskaya oblast’ 1
Krasnodarskiy kray 3 63 36 377 13
Krasnoyarskiy kray 2 1
Kurganskaya oblast’ 1 6
Kurskaya oblast’ 10 10
Lipetskaya oblast’ 2
Moskovskaya oblast’ 1
Nizhegorodskaya oblast’ 20 1 1 60 2
Novosibirskaya oblast’ 4 58
Omskaya oblast’ 34 1 60 1
Orenburgskaya oblast’ 1 8 1
Orlovskaya oblast’ 5 2 27
Penzenskaya oblast’ 20 4 6
Primorskij kraj 7
Adygeya Republic 1 1
Notes: Only those regions were selected in which at least one cluster was detected.
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Table A.1 (Continued): Number of Territories and Precincts in the Anomalous Clusters,
by Region
Region Presidential Election Parliamentary Election
Precincts Territories Precincts Territories
fe fi fe fi fe fi fe fi
Altay Republic 3 1 2
Bashkortostan Republic 3 404 17 8
Buryatiya Republic 6 6
Dagestan Republic 453 1 39 14 403 1 27
Ingushetiya Republic 54 3 39 2
Kalmykiya Republic 1
Khakassiya Republic 1 6
Komi Republic 1 1 84 1
Mariy El Republic 9 2 3
Mordoviya Republic 5 181 14 20
Sakha Republic 82 10 1 54 1
Severnaya Osetiya Republic 2 78 3 9 200 8
Tatarstan Republic 1 560 41 3 658 34
Tyva Republic 86 17 15 5
Rostovskaya oblast’ 2 32
Ryazanskaya oblast’ 3 7
Samarskaya oblast’ 4 2
Saratovskaya oblast’ 51
Stavropol’skiy kray 9 1 5 1




Udmurtiya Republic 4 1 1
Ul’yanovskaya oblast’ 29 2 6
Volgogradskaya oblast’ 16 4
Voronezhskaya oblast’ 59 9 210 14
Yamalo-Nenetskiy autonomous okrug 70 8 104 5
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Table B.1: Game in Multiagent Strategic Normal Form
P2
P1 ¬P1
F1 F2 −w − p, −w+ t[1 + b(1−λ)],
v − p+ (1−λ)d v + t(λb − 1)
F1 ¬F2 −λw − p, −p(1−λ)−λ(w − t),
λw − p+ (1−λ)d λ[(b − 1)t + v] + (1−λ)(d − p)
¬F1 F2 −(1−λ)w − p, −λp+ (1−λ)[(b+ 1)t −w],
−p+ (1−λ)(v + d) −λp+ (1−λ)(v − t)
¬F1 ¬F2 −p , −p+ (1−λ)d −p , −p+ (1−λ)d
¬P2
P1 ¬P1
F1 F2 −w − p , −w+ t[1 + b(1−λ)] ,
v − p+ (1−λ)d v − t(λb − 1)
F1 ¬F2 −λ(w+ p) + (1−λ)(b+ 1)t , −λw+ t[1 + (1−λ)b] ,
λ(v − p)− (1−λ)t λv + (λb − 1)t
¬F1 F2 −λ(w+ p) + (1−λ)t, t[1 + (1−λ)b]− (1−λ)w,
λ(b − 1)t + (1−λ)(v − p+ d) (1−λ)v + (λb − 1)t
¬F1 ¬F2 −p, λ(b − 1)t − (1−λ)t t[1 + (1−λ)b], (λb − 1)t
Table B.2: Payoffs for Strategy Profiles
label profile governor’s payoff Leader’s payoff
I* (F1, F2, ¬P1, ¬P2) −w+ t[1 + (1−λ)b] v + (λb − 1)t
II* (F1, ¬F2, ¬P1, P2) −p(1−λ)−λ(w − t) λ[(b − 1)t + v] + (1−λ)(d − p)
III* (F1, F2, ¬P1, P2) −w+ t[1 + b(1−λ)] v + t(λb − 1)
IV* (F1, ¬F2, P1, P2) −λw − p λv − p+ (1−λ)d
V* (F1, ¬F2, P1, ¬P2) −λ(w − p) + (1−λ)(b+ 1)t λ(v − p) + (1−λ)(−t)
VI* (F1, ¬F2, ¬P1, ¬P2) −λw+ t[1 + (1−λ)b] λv + (λb − 1)t
VII* (¬F1, ¬F2, ¬P1, ¬P2) t[1 + (1−λ)b] (λb − 1)t
VIII* (¬F1, ¬F2, P1, P2) −p −p+ (1−λ)d
IX* (F1, F2, P1, P2) −w − p v − p+ (1−λ)d
X* (¬F1, F2, P1, P2) −(1−λ)w − p −p+ (1−λ)(v + d)
XI* (¬F1, F2, ¬P1, P2) −λp+ (1−λ)[(b+ 1)t −w] −λp+ (1−λ)(v − t)
XII* (¬F1, ¬F2, ¬P1, P2) −p −p+ (1−λ)d
XIII* (F1, F2, P1, ¬P2) −w − p v − p+ (1−λ)d
XIV* (¬F1, F2, P1, ¬P2) −λ(w+ p) + (1−λ)t λ(b − 1)t + (1−λ)(v − p+ d)
XV* (¬F1, ¬F2, P1, ¬P2) −p λ(b − 1)t + (1−λ)(−t)
XVI* (¬F1, F2, ¬P1, ¬P2) t[1 + (1−λ)b]− (1−λ)w (1−λ)v + (λb − 1)t
Table B.3: Some Equilibrium Tests
label profile equilibrium conditions
I* (F1, F2, ¬P1, ¬P2): λ = 1∩w = 0
II* (F1, ¬F2, ¬P1, P2): λ = 0∩
−p − t
t




t − p − v
t
III* (F1, F2, ¬P1, P2): complicated (see Table B.4)
IV* (F1, ¬F2, P1, P2): never
V* (F1, ¬F2, P1, ¬P2): λ = 0∩ p ≥ −(1 + b)t,
λ = 1∩ b ≤ 0∩ (1− b)t ≥ p ≥ t ∩ 2p ≥ w
VI* (F1, ¬F2, ¬P1, ¬P2): λ = 1∩w = 0∩ t ≥ p∩ b ≥ 0
VII* (¬F1, ¬F2, ¬P1, ¬P2): never
VIII* (¬F1, ¬F2, P1, P2): never




X* (¬F1, F2, P1, P2): never
XI* (¬F1, F2, ¬P1, P2): λ = 0∩w = 0∩ b ≥
w − p − t
t
XII* (¬F1, ¬F2, ¬P1, P2): w ≥ p+ t ∩ t + d ≥ p+ v
XIII* (F1, F2, P1, ¬P2): never
XIV* (¬F1, F2, P1, ¬P2): never
XV* (¬F1, ¬F2, P1, ¬P2):
t + p
w+ t + p




v + t − p
t
XVI* (¬F1, F2, ¬P1, ¬P2): λ = 0∩w = 0∩ b ≥ 0∩ p ≥ d + t
Table B.4: Equilibrium Tests for Profile III*
profile governor’s payoff Leader’s payoff
III* (F1, F2, ¬P1, P2) −w+ t[1 + b(1−λ)] v + t(λb − 1)
conditions:
λ = 0V t(b+ 1) ≥ w − p∩ v + d ≥ t − p∩ p − t ≥ d
λ = 1V t ≥ w − p∩ t(b − 1) ≥ −p
0 < λ < 1V t + p ≥ w∩ t(b+ 1) + p ≥ w∩ v + t(b − 1) + p ≥ 0∩ v + d + p ≥ t






b < 0: 1 +
t + p
bt




t(b − 1) + p
bt + d
= 1 if b =
t − p
t


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.2: Panel Data Analysis with the First-Difference Estimator, NLS
M(01) M(02) M(03) M(04) M(05) M(06)
Constant b0 1.166??? -0.242 1.006??? -0.319? 4.149??? -0.086
(0.113) (0.16) (0.227) (0.135) (0.048) (0.08)
Incumbent c2 0.98 0.322?? 0.635 0.361? -0.298 0.109
(0.763) (0.112) (0.892) (0.158) (0.483) (0.16)
Turnout c3 -2.634 -1.207??? -2.002 -1.611??? -0.203 -0.016
(2.258) (0.278) (2.344) (0.285) (0.42) (0.117)
Constant a0 5.504 0.61 4.116 0.547 -51.7??? -1.301?
(4.142) (0.771) (2.662) (0.574) (14.67) (0.512)
Transfers a1 14.797 0.448? 11.589 0.532? 11.599??? 3.209???
(10.427) (0.201) (7.303) (0.226) (3.303) (0.865)
fraudT0 f0 -0.787 0.041 -1.294?? -0.059 -0.696?? -0.06
(0.526) (0.085) (0.438) (0.095) (0.248) (0.081)
fraudT5 f5 1.158 -0.203 0.576 -0.172 0.3 -0.179?
(0.765) (0.087) (0.891) (0.109) (0.354) (0.086)
fraudI0 f0 0.36 -0.04 0.431 -0.005 0.049 0.035
(0.197) (0.046) (0.229) (0.068) (0.228) (0.069)
fraudI5 f5 -0.396 0.018 0.085 0.028 0.101 -0.027
(0.705) (0.096) (0.928) (0.107) (0.4) (0.094)
σ̂ 0.761 0.118 0.758 0.114 0.253 0.07
N 83 83 83 83 80 80
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.05, ??p ≤ 0.01, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.001.
Listed models: a) the first-difference estimator for 1996(first round) and 2000 with logged transfers per
capita M(01) and M(02) with the share of central transfers in the regional budget as dependent variables;
b) the first-difference estimator for 1996(second round) and 2000 with the logged transfers per capita
M(03) and share of central transfers in the regional budget M(04) as dependent variables; c) the
first-difference estimator for 2004 and 2008 with logged transfers per capita M(05) and the share of
central transfers in the regional budget M(06) as dependent variables.
Nonlinear least squares estimates for all the models:
a ∆Transfersit = b0 + c1∆Incumbentit + c2∆Turnoutit + f0∆fraudT0it + f5∆fraudT5it + f0∆fraudI0it +
f5∆fraudI5it +λit +λit · (f0∆fraudT0it + f5∆fraudT5it + f0∆fraudI0it + f5∆fraudI5it),
λit =
1
1 + exp{−(a0 + a1∆Transfersit−)}
.
Figure C.1: The Marginal Effects of Election Fraud in Incumbent’s Percentage on Post-
electoral Transfers)




































































































































































































































































Notes: Estimated marginal effects for the models in Table 3.4: (a)M(01), (b)M(05), (c)M(03), (d)M(05),
(e)M(02), (f)M(06). Figures show the marginal effect of election fraud on post-electoral transfers conditional
on pre-electoral transfers.
Figure C.1 (Continued): The Marginal Effects of Election Fraud in Incumbent’s Percentage
on Postelectoral Transfers)
(e)























































































































Notes: Estimated marginal effects for the models in Table 3.4: (a)M(01), (b)M(05), (c)M(03), (d)M(05),
(e)M(02), (f)M(06). Figures show the marginal effect of election fraud on post-electoral transfers conditional
on pre-electoral transfers.
Figure C.2: The Marginal Effects of Election Fraud in Turnout on Postelectoral Transfers)




























































































































































































































































































Notes: Estimated marginal effects for the models in Table 3.4: (a)M(01), (b)M(06), (c)M(03), (d)M(05).
Figures show the marginal effect of election fraud measured by different indicators on the post-electoral
transfers conditional on the pre-electoral transfers in Russia.
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Barplot of the Last Digits Among All the Candidates
(c)
Notes: Barplots with 90% confidence intervals for all the candidates. Each barplot contains four groups
of columns (from left to right): proportion of 0s in vote counts, proportion of 0s in vote percentages,
proportion of 5s in vote counts, proportion of 5s in vote percentages.
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Barplot of the Last Digits for Turnout
(c)
Notes: Barplots with 90% confidence intervals for turnout. Each barplot contains four groups of columns
(from left to right): proportion of 0s in vote counts, proportion of 0s in vote percentages, proportion of 5s
in vote counts, proportion of 5s in vote percentages.
Table D.1: Summary of Results: Effect of λ̂ on Finan-
cial Punishment
P 05 T 05 F
Democracies




Unitary 0.802 0.816 0.793
(0.149) (0.083) (0.148)
Autocracies
Federal – – –
– – –
Unitary 0.994 0.997 0.993
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table E.1: Election Forecasts for the Incumbent by Polling Organizations
1996(1) 1996(2) 2000 2004 2008 2012
Pollsters/Incumbents Yeltsin Yeltsin Putin Putin Medvedev Putin
FOM 34.0 52.0 53.0 73.0 67.8 58.7
VCIOM 37.0 56.0 59.0 73.6 72.9 59.9
Levada-Center — — — 73.7 79 66.0
Mean 35.5 54 56 73.3 70.4 59.3
Standard deviation 2.1 2.8 4.2 0.4 5.6 3.9
Official 35.3 53.8 53.0 71.3 70.3 63.6
Table E.2: Characteristics of the Surveys
Sampling Mode RR RR* Weights
Levada-Center (Feb.17-20) Quota Face-to-Face — — Postratification
Levada-Center (Feb.24-27) Quota Face-to-Face — — Postratification
Levada-Center (March) Quota Face-to-Face — — Postratification
Demoscope (March-April) Multi-stage prob. Face-to-Face 35.8 42.1 Postratification
Notes: Sampling frame wasn’t not available for any of the surveys. RR – response rate, RR* – refusal rate.
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Notes: Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.1, ??p
≤ 0.05, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.01. Models: (1) – pre-
electoral data; (2) – post-electoral data.
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Table E.4: Distribution of Item Counts for the ICT, in percentages
Putin’s Support Turnout
Item Counts Control Treatment Control Treatment
Pre-electoral
0 0.8 0.8 1.6 1.0
1 43.2 29.1 40.4 19.5
2 43.5 40.9 40.9 40.6
3 11.4 22.6 15.1 26.8
4 1.1 5.6 2.1 10.6
5 1.0 1.4
Post-electoral
0 1.0 1.0 3.7 1.7
1 39.5 26.5 36.7 17.1
2 46.8 41.3 39.3 38.8
3 11.1 23.5 18.5 31.1
4 1.7 6.3 1.8 10.6
5 1.5 0.7
Notes: Distribution of item counts across for the pre-electoral and post-electoral surveys.
Table E.5: Preference Falsification, Election Fraud and Margin of Victory in Russian Elections,
2012 (Linear Mixed-Effects Models)
M(01) M(02) M(03) M(04) M(05) M(06)
Constant 4.53??? −1.51??? −0.03??? 4.49??? −1.51??? −0.02?
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
Preference Falsification -0.21 0.6??? 0.16?? 0.00 0.17 −0.1??
(0.19) (0.18) (0.06) (0.23) (0.2) (0.04)
Margin of Victory -0.07 0.42??? 0.23??? 0.01 0.38??? 0.2?
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.08) (0.07) (0.01)
Republics -0.06 0.06 0.16???
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Rural 0.02 0.01 −0.03???
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
Pref. Fals. X Margin of Victory 0.41 −1.42??? 0.25??? 0.00 −0.79?? 0.23???
(0.35) (0.32) (0.03) (0.42) (0.36) (0.03)
Pref. Fals. X Republics 0.41 −0.63?? −0.34???
(0.3) (0.26) (0.11)
Pref. Fals. X Rural -0.17 0.52??? −0.05???
(0.16) (0.13) (0.01)
Intercept 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03
Residual 2.87 0.17 2.87 0.17
Log-Likelihood 161205 33621 21085 161209 33607 21297
Observations 65137 65137 65137 65137 65137 65137
Number of groups 40 40 40 40 40 40
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ?p ≤ 0.1, ??p ≤ 0.05, ? ? ?p ≤ 0.01.
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